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Summary 
 
Judgment of a target stimulus can be systematically shifted in either direction 
depending on the context. The experimental findings are robust, but often 
controversial – seemingly similar experiments can lead to opposite effects depending 
on the stimuli or the procedure. There is no single theory that can explain and predict 
all these controversial data. 
In addition, very few computational models of the judgment process are 
implemented in a way that simulation experiments can be run on them. The hope is 
that building such models could contribute to the understanding of these controversial 
data in a coherent way. Our assumption is that several mechanisms interplay in the 
process of judgment, each of them leading either toward assimilation or toward 
contrast, and the behavioral data reflect only the outcome of the competition between 
these mechanisms. That is why seemingly similar experiments could lead to opposite 
results. 
Since the model of judgment should be dynamic and context-sensitive, it seems 
natural to use the dynamic and context-sensitive cognitive architecture DUAL as a 
basis for modeling. In this way, the model of judgment will be integrated with other 
cognitive processes rather than being considered in isolation. 
Moreover, an attempt has been made to use the same basic DUAL mechanisms 
that have been used for analogy-making to model judgment as well. This exerts a 
strong restriction on the range of possible models of judgment and does not allow us 
to construct any possible mechanism that will lead to the desired data. On the 
contrary, if successful, the results would mean that the same mechanisms could 
produce analogy and judgment as well as the assimilation and contrast effects. This is 
a very challenging task and of course, it could not be fully accomplished within a 
dissertation, however, this is the driving force behind the studies. 
An underlying assumption behind the JUDGEMAP model is that judgment is 
based on a process of mapping between a set of stimuli and the set of possible scale 
values. In this way, judgment is considered to be a close relative to analogy-making 
and based on the same mapping mechanisms. This mapping is trying to keep the 
relational structure of the two domains in correspondence, i.e. better stimuli to be 
mapped on higher ratings. Thus ordering relations play important role. Another 
important assumption is that the set of stimuli used as background when evaluating a 
single target stimulus (called comparison set) is dynamically constructed in WM by 
spreading activation mechanisms and based on similarity with the target stimulus. 
Then the target stimulus is included in this comparison set and all elements of this set 
are mapped on the scale competing for the specific scale values. 
The result is that very few modifications of the existing AMBR mechanisms 
have been made and some new mechanisms have been developed, holding all 
principles of the DUAL architecture. A wide range of psychological data has been 
replicated with the model. In addition, the model has made some predictions that have 
later on been tested and confirmed. Some of these predictions have seemed quite 
strange at first but have turned out to be true. Confirmation of non-trivial predictions 
is one of the model’s strengths. In addition, it has been demonstrated that the same 
mechanisms that are used for judgment can also produce choice and can even 
replicate some context effects on choice. At the same time, the model could not 
replicate all the existing experimental data and thus further development is needed, 
especially integrating it with perception and category learning. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Judgment Task 
 
“Please, rate how long is the line that you see on the screen on an ascending 
scale from 1 to 7.” This is a typical example of a judgment task. It has several 
parameters. Some of them are related to the nature of the stimuli – the property, which 
is judged, the category of the stimuli, etc. Others are related to the scale, on which the 
stimuli are judged, more precisely, which are the extreme points of the scale and what 
is its density.  
Four of the parameters - the stimulus S to be judged, the property P that is 
judged, and the scale (from a to b), on which it is judged are usually explicitly 
presented. Sometimes the scale is presented with verbal labels, for example, “1 – (it 
is) not long at all, 2 – (it is) not long … 7 – (it is) very long”; or “1 – (it is) very short 
… 7 – (it is) very long”.  
However, people are able to judge even without such verbal labels. They 
understand unambiguously the instruction: “Please, rate the property P on a scale 
from a to b”. It is implicitly assumed that smaller magnitudes of P should correspond 
to smaller ratings and vice versa, and that approximately equal differences between 
the magnitudes should correspond to approximately equal differences between their 
ratings. 
 
The nature of the stimuli to be judged can be very broad – from lines, to human 
faces, to traits or emotions. Either a single dimension of the stimuli (for example, its 
length or redness) or a complex one (e.g., its attractiveness) may be judged. 
The type of the scales can also vary. It could be ordinal and a limited one – for 
example, from a to b, but could also be a continuous one (“Judge this line length 
using a real number from 0 to 1). The scale boundaries could be predefined, or not, 
they can even be non-existing – for example, the instruction can be “Rate the stimuli 
with a real number – whatever you wish”. 
 
Some theories distinguish judgments of simple1 stimuli, like lines, squares, etc. 
from judgments of complex ones – human performances, or emotions. However, it is 
not easy to find any reason to distinguish the mechanisms that underlie them. As 
Strack (Strack, 1992) said, all judgments should be based on calculations or on 
perceptions (or on both). This is true of both simple and complex stimuli. 
The task of making a judgment is not manifested only in psychological 
laboratories with explicitly given instructions. Instead, people make judgments every 
day and everywhere. They estimate distances, colors, judge people – “I like this 
person, I do not like that one”, etc. The judgments are strongly related with choice, 
decision-making, and other cognitive tasks. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
same basic mechanisms may underlie them. 
 
                                                 
1 A judged stimulus is called simple if it is judged according to a single dimension that can be measured 
with physical instruments. A judged stimulus is called more complex than another judged stimulus if 
the former is judged according to more dimensions than the latter one. 
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1.2  Classical Approach – Judgment as Measuring 
 
The early approaches to the mechanisms that underlie judgment treat the process 
of judgment as a precise measurement of the judged property. In other words, the 
assumption is that people have internal instruments which they use to gauge the 
stimuli. Then they monotonically transform the result according to the given scale. 
Psychophysics studies these measuring instruments, their capabilities and limitations. 
This approach is intuitively simple and clear, but faces a problem when 
analyzing people’s responses. People often rate the same stimulus with different 
ratings, even when it is presented twice within a short time. This dispersion in 
stimulus ratings is explained by psychophysics with some imprecision of our internal 
measuring instruments, i.e. they work with a certain noise. 
Many experimental results, however, are in contradiction with this assumption. 
It has been shown that in certain conditions judgments shift systematically, not 
randomly. A certain change of stimuli distribution, or certain contextual elements 
could produce predictable changes of the mean and the dispersion of ratings. Hence, 
maybe it is wrong to treat the context just as a source of noise. 
 
The number of such violations of the classical approach has grown during the 
last decades, and alternative theories have been proposed. A brief list of experiments 
that demonstrate systematic shifts in judgment, depending on different contextual 
manipulations, is presented in the next chapter. 
 
1.3 Alternative Approaches to Judgment 
 
There are three main approaches to describing the ‘errors’, i.e. the systematic 
shifts in responses due to certain contextual influences. 
Sometimes researchers try to define the boundaries of these errors by studying 
systematically the input–output patterns. In other words, they perform series of 
experiments, each time shifting slightly some parameters, and recording the shifts in 
responses. Then the scientists interpolate mathematical formulas that represent the 
dependency of the responses on the input. Such theories are usually called normative 
theories. 
Another way to study the phenomena is to presume that there are certain 
heuristics that people use, and then to verify this with psychological experiments. 
Heuristics are simple rules, whose application and use is easier than those of the more 
complicated and precise measurements. In most cases, these rules produce ‘correct’ 
answers, but under some special circumstances, they may produce systematic shifts. 
The theories that describe the processes with such heuristics are usually called 
descriptive theories. 
Building cognitive architectures is a third approach. The researchers in this 
group try to define a small set of basic principles that underlie cognition in general. 
Different cognitive capabilities have to be formulated in terms of models, based on the 
architectures. The models based on the same architecture have to be integrated in a 
single whole. After that, the empirical data on a certain cognitive task have to be 
explained with the presumed basic principles and a minimum number of proposed 
novel mechanisms. 
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1.4 JUDGEMAP Model 
 
JUDGEMAP is a computational cognitive model for judgment, based on the 
cognitive architecture DUAL (Kokinov, 1994b, c), which is implemented in a 
computer program. It is focused mainly on the judgment task, but one of its 
assumptions is that the same mechanisms underlie other cognitive abilities as well, 
choice in particular. 
However, the capabilities of JUDGEMAP to model choice are only briefly 
demonstrated. The main work in this direction is subject to further research. 
 
JUDGEMAP proposes several mechanisms that overlap in the course of time 
and influence one another. 
The model assumes that a necessary condition to judge a certain stimulus is to 
have something to compare it with, i.e. a context is needed. The context may consist 
of some explicitly presented stimuli, of stimuli that have been used recently, and also 
of stimuli that are retrieved from memory because they are similar in some respect to 
the judged stimulus. 
JUDGEMAP allows some relations between the available stimuli and their 
properties to be recognized. However, only relevant relations between relevant units 
are explicitly represented. 
Based on the constructed relations, mappings between the constructed stimulus 
set and the available scale labels occur. The construction of such mappings is 
constrained by the requirements of the judgment task. Different hypotheses about the 
best answer emerge one after another. The inconsistent ones compete with each other; 
the consistent ones support each other. As a final result, one winner hypothesis is 
interpreted as the response of the system. 
 
JUDGEMAP assumes that choices between alternatives are based on the same 
mechanisms. However, when choosing, the driving force is not to find the most 
proper rating for a certain stimulus, but to find the most proper stimulus that 
corresponds to the highest rating. 
 
1.5 Verifications of the Model 
 
A series of simulations has been run with JUDGEMAP, highlighting most of its 
capabilities and shortcomings. 
JUDGEMAP proposes possible explanations for some of the known phenomena 
in terms of principles that the DUAL architecture assumes to be fundamental for 
cognition in general. However, since the model has not accounted for several 
behavioral data in judgment, additional improvements are needed. In particular, all 
stimuli representations are given to JUDGEMAP manually, i.e. they are predefined. If 
the model were integrated with abilities for categorization and high-level perception, 
its explanatory power would probably increase. 
 
1.6 Overview of the Thesis 
 
This dissertation presents a model of judgment. Chapter II presents briefly the 
experimental results in the field of relative judgment. Chapter III presents an 
overview of the main theories of judgment. In Chapter IV, the DUAL architecture and 
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the JUDGEMAP model are briefly outlined. The detailed description of the 
mechanisms of JUDGEMAP is presented in Chapter V. In Chapter VI, the 
simulations performed by the model are presented. Some shortcomings of the model 
and open issues are listed in Chapter VII. Chapter VIII presents some conclusions that 
have been made. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Role of Context in Judgment 
 
 
Mussweiler (2003, p.472) pointed out that “when we evaluate a given target, we 
do not do so in a vacuum.” A number of publications from the second half of 20th 
century reported systematic shifts in judgment due to specific contextual 
manipulations. They violate the classical psychophysical theories that treat the context 
as a noise and give rise to alternative theories of judgment. 
 
The contextual shifts in judgment are usually separated into two groups – 
assimilation effects and contrast ones. We speak about assimilation when by adding a 
contextual stimulus in the task the judgments systematically shift toward the 
magnitude of the context. The contrast effect is observed when the judgments shift 
away from the contextual stimulus. 
Unfortunately, there is no single non-controversial scheme that can explain and 
predict exactly under which circumstances assimilation or contrast would be 
observed. Moreover, opposite effects have often been registered in almost identical 
experimental conditions. The hope is that better predictions will be possible by 
building models of judgment. 
  
In this chapter, some of the observed data are presented. Since JUDGEMAP 
also suggests some ideas for modeling choice, a specific part of the contextual effects 
in choice is described at the end. 
 
2.1   Assimilation Effects 
 
Anderson (1966) gave participants three traits describing a person and asked 
them to judge the characteristics on a 1-20 numerical scale according to likeability. 
The result was that the rating of each trait was displaced toward the other two. People 
perceive the set of traits as a Gestalt when they describe a particular person. When 
they are asked to judge a single trait, they do not judge it in isolation but consider the 
whole Gestalt. Anderson called this effect ‘positive context effect’ and later it became 
known as the assimilation effect. 
 
2.1.1   Assimilation toward a Contextual Stimulus 
Wyer (1974) reported a more complicated replication of Anderson’s experiment. 
He separated the adjectives used into three groups according to their likeability – low, 
medium, and high; and into two groups according to their ambiguity – low and high. 
He found that the assimilation effect increased when the target stimulus was 
ambiguous1, independently from its degree of likeability. 
Wedell, Parducci and Geiselman (1987) asked participants to judge 
attractiveness of female faces (presented in pictures). When pairs of pictures were 
                                                 
1 A judged stimulus is called ambiguous either if it could be categorized in many different ways, or if 
the judgment task could be understood in many different ways, i.e., it is ambiguous to define which are 
the dimensions of the judged stimulus relevant to the judgment task.  
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given to be judged simultaneously, the two ratings within each pair shifted toward 
each other, in comparison to the case when the same faces were rated individually. 
 
In all these experiments, complex (multi-dimensional) and ambiguous stimuli 
were used. In these cases, people first have to retrieve or construct complex criteria 
for judging (combining several dimensions of the stimuli) and then to use these 
criteria for rating the stimuli. This is in contrast with the simple cases where the given 
dimension is judged directly (“How long is the presented line”). Many other 
experiments are in favour of the hypothesis that when ambiguous stimuli have to be 
judged, the external contextual elements tend to produce an assimilation effect in 
judgments. 
For example, Herr, Sherman & Fazio (1983) asked participants to judge the size 
of animals, even if they are unknown to them (authors also used non-words as labels 
of animals). Before making a judgment, participants were primed with different 
animals. The experimental results demonstrate that people tend to assimilate their 
ratings toward the size of the prime, but only in the condition where moderate 
exemplars were primes and ambiguous stimuli were judged. In some other conditions, 
the opposite effect appeared and later in the text (section 2.2.4) this experiment will 
be discussed again in more details. 
Another demonstration of assimilation toward the prime elements when judging 
ambiguous stimuli was proposed by Strack, Schwarz & Gschneidinger (1985). They 
asked participants to list three positive events that had happened to them recently and 
after that to judge their overall satisfaction with their life. In a second group, 
participants were asked to list three negative events and to rate their overall 
satisfaction with life. Participants in the first group expressed higher satisfaction than 
those in the second. This result can be interpreted as an assimilation effect of the 
ratings toward the ratings of the recalled events. 
In a series of experiments Stapel and Kooman (1996, 2000) used social stimuli 
(e.g. trait names or sentences that describe different behaviours) to demonstrate 
assimilation toward primed general frames (in contrast, when concrete exemplars are 
primed, the context beat out the judgments). Here again the judged dimensions were 
not well defined. The novelty is that the assimilation was toward general frames, not 
toward individual items.  
Finally, Manis, Nelson & Shedler (1998) demonstrated an assimilation effect 
toward moderate stereotypes. They formed stereotypes about particular hospitals in 
their subjects by presenting them with a series of pathological cases. After that, they 
gave to the participants two types of tasks – to judge the pathology of specific cases, 
or to choose the more pathological case from a pair of cases. In both tasks1 people 
assimilated their responses toward the induced stereotype, but only when this 
stereotype was relatively moderate. In the cases when the stereotype was extreme, a 
contrast effect was observed. 
 
However, there are experiments that demonstrate assimilation toward a certain 
contextual stimulus even when the judged dimension is simple and unambiguous. 
Sherif, Taub & Hovland (1958) asked participants to judge weights on an ascending 
scale from 1 to 6 – “1 means lightest, etc., 6 means heaviest”. In each trial, the 
participants hold the heaviest weight simultaneously with the target stimulus. The 
                                                 
1 Assimilation in the case of choice means that people systematically reverse their choices in a specific 
direction (toward the stereotype) in comparison with a control group. 
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experimenters said to participants to think of this heaviest weight as a prototype for 
the rating 6 (this procedure usually is called anchoring). The result was that all target 
stimuli were overestimated, i.e. their ratings shifted toward the anchor in comparison 
to the ratings, given without an anchor. Parducci & Marshall (1962) replicated the 
experiment and received the same result. It is interesting that in both experiments the 
result had reversed in another experimental condition, when the anchor was more 
extreme (outside the range of the judged stimuli). 
These experiments used quite an unusual modality for judgment. It seems that 
judging weights is an unambiguous and well defined task but maybe it is not. The task 
does not require any concepts to be retrieved or constructed. The only necessary 
criterion for judgment is an estimation of the changes in muscle tension. However, 
there are too many complex pressures that influence this tension – adaptation, lateral 
inhibition, tiredness, etc. and the information is brought through a number of sensors 
and has to be integrated. Thus, it might be the case that judgment of weights is 
actually quite a complex task (in contrast to judgment of length or redness). 
 
2.1.2   Sequential Assimilation Effect 
One typical judgment task is to ask participants to judge sequentially series of 
homogeneous stimuli that vary only in the value of the judged property. Almost all 
experiments of this type demonstrate a robust sequential assimilation effect – the 
rating of each stimulus tends to shift toward the rating of the previously judged one. 
For example, Lockhead (1992) studied the integral nature of bi-dimensional 
stimuli – auditory tones with loudness and pitch. He demonstrated that judgments of 
each tone were assimilated toward the rating of the previous bi-dimensional stimulus. 
Moreover, assimilation was detected not only for the target dimension, but also for the 
combination of both dimensions. 
Another study, reported by Petrov & Anderson (2000) showed similar results 
when participants judge lengths of line segments. Counter-intuitively, he found that 
assimilation is only toward the previous rating, but not toward the previous stimulus. 
More precisely, assimilation was measured with the standardized regression 
coefficients in a multiple linear regression with the following variables entering as 
predictors – the current stimulus St, the previous stimulus St-1, and the previous 
response Rt-1. The authors received standardized coefficient –0.25 (std. dev. 0.10) for 
the previous stimulus St-1, and +0.30 (std. dev. 0.10) for the previous response Rt-1, 
thus demonstrating evidence for stimulus-driven contrast and response-driven 
assimilation. 
The sequential assimilation effect seems to be very robust and any theory of 
judgment should account for it. It is reported also in Ward (1973, 1979), Jesteadt, 
Luce & Green (1977). The fact that the assimilation is toward the ratings, not toward 
the stimuli, needs special attention. This observation is one of the crucial points in 
JUDGEMAP model. 
 
Assimilation effects toward a contextual stimulus tend to be manifested when 
the target is ambiguous or complex and toward the previously used ratings. However, 
assimilation has been detected in other circumstances as well.   
 
2.1.3   Other Manifestation of Assimilation Effects 
2.1.3.1   Perceptually Driven Assimilation toward a Category 
Goldstone (1995) asked participants to adjust the color of a given probe, in order 
to equalize it to the color of a simultaneously presented standard. The trick is that the 
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probes are extracted from two categories – letters and numbers. The letters presented 
to the participants were predominantly more violet, whereas the numbers were 
predominantly more reddish. The result was that when the participants had to adjust 
the color of a given stimulus to match the color of a given standard they adjusted the 
letters to be more violet, and the numbers - more reddish. In other words, assimilation 
toward the category was demonstrated (in comparison with the adjustments of stimuli 
with the same color, but from different category). Furthermore, this assimilation 
seems to appear at a very low level of the cognitive processes – the task was just to 
adjust colors that the participants had seen. 
In the same study Goldstone tried to find out which is the driving force behind 
this effect - whether the category ‘draws up’ its exemplar, or the other category ‘beats 
it back’. The conclusion from his experiments is that both forces play a role, 
depending on the degree of similarity between the target and the contextual stimuli. 
These results are again in favor of the hypothesis that when judging an 
unambiguous dimension, the ratings tend to be assimilated toward a certain category 
or sub-category. The novelty, however, is that Goldstone highlighted the role of 
perception in this process. He argued that the assimilation could not be explained 
without any perceptual mechanisms. To get ahead of the story, JUDGEMAP fails to 
explain some of the assimilation effects and I assume that exactly the lack of 
perceptual mechanisms in JUDGEMAP is the reason for these failures. 
 
2.1.3.2   Assimilation toward a Number Value 
Strack & Mussweiler (1997) asked participants to answer two questions. The 
first one was whether the Brandenburg Gate is shorter or taller than 150 meters. Soon 
after the answer, the same participants had to judge how tall the Brandenburg Gate (in 
meters) is. People answered the latter question with numbers that were closer to the 
anchor 150 meters, in comparison with a control condition. The same results have 
been demonstrated when people had to judge the mean temperature in Antarctica, 
when they were anchored with a certain value. However, this type of assimilation 
decreases (but does not disappear) if a different object or a different property of the 
same object had been judged. For example, the anchor about the height of 
Brandenburg Gate has less influence on the answers to the question of its width. 
This result is in synchrony with the fact that the assimilation effect is toward the 
previous given rating (or primed numbers), not to the previous judged stimuli. Maybe 
the scale labels, considered as numbers, form an important part of the judgment 
process. 
 
2.1.3.3   Assimilation toward the Density of the Stimulus Distribution 
Usually the density of the stimulus distribution beats back the stimulus ratings 
(the famous frequency effect is presented later in the text). In some circumstances, 
however, assimilation can be observed. 
Cooke et al (2004) asked participants to rate cheeses that depend on their price 
and quality. This is a case of a typical trade-off judgment, in which usually an 
inversed U-shape curve illustrates people’s ratings. In other words, people rate the 
moderate stimuli higher than those, which have an extremely low price and extremely 
low quality, or vice versa. Cooke et al. demonstrated that if the overall distribution is 
skewed (for example, the cheep and low quality cheeses dominate), the peak of 
people’s ratings shifts toward the skew, e.g., toward the point of concentration of 
more stimuli. 
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However, it is important to stress that this result is unique. The changes of the 
stimuli distribution usually produce the opposite effect (section 2.2.3). 
 
2.1.4 Summary of the Assimilation Effects 
The tendency to shift judgments toward a particular contextual element is robust 
and has been demonstrated in a number of experiments. Assimilation effects tend to 
be observed: 
- toward the overall impression of a Gestalt, when the judged stimulus is part of 
this Gestalt (Anderson, 1974); 
- toward the value of a primed stimulus, when this primed stimulus is relatively 
moderate, and the judged stimulus is ambiguous (Herr, Sherman, Fazio, 
1983); 
- toward primed general schema (Stapel, Kooman, 1996, 2000); 
- toward moderate stereotypes (Manis, Nelson & Shedler, 1998); 
- toward the prototypical value of the category (Goldstone, 1995);  
- sometimes toward the rating of a stimulus, given simultaneously with the 
target one, in particular if the judged stimuli are too complex, like 
human faces (Wedell, Parducci & Geiselman 1987);  
- toward the rating of the previous judged stimulus, when a series of 
homogeneous stimuli are judged (Lockhead 1992, Petrov, 2005); 
- toward the primed numbers, when the task is for value estimation (Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997). 
 
Generally, assimilation tendencies could be observed in two main conditions. 
First, when people judge ambiguous dimensions of the stimuli, their ratings tend to be 
shifted toward the values of the stereotypes of available categories or sub-categories. 
Second, people tend to shift their ratings toward previously used ratings or other 
numbers. 
 
2.2 Contrast Effects 
 
Kenrick & Gutierres (1980) showed participants a TV-program with a strikingly 
attractive woman and after that asked them to rate female pictures. People 
underestimated all females in comparison with ratings, given in a second group, 
where people had watched another TV-program. The tendency to shift judgments 
away from the value of a certain contextual stimulus is called contrast effect. Some 
experimental conditions, in which contrast effects can be observed, are presented in 
this section. 
 
2.2.1. Contrast from an Anchoring Stimulus 
The same contrast effect was demonstrated with the anchoring procedure. For 
example, Sherif, Taub, Hovland (1958) and Parducci & Marshall (1962) asked 
participants to judge weights, instructing them that a certain stimulus – anchor - 
always has to be judged with the maximal value. People held both weights 
simultaneously. As was mentioned in the previous section, when the anchor had the 
same weight as the maximal one from the test set, assimilation occurred. When the 
anchor had been more extreme, however, the effect was reversed – a contrast effect 
was demonstrated. 
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Sarris & Parducci (1978) performed an analogous experiment, asking people to 
judge the size of squares on a numerical scale. The squares were presented 
sequentially, but people had to judge only the even ones. The odd squares served as 
anchors – the instruction was not to judge them. The anchors were equal or larger in 
size to the larger one from the test set and could vary from trial to trial. In all cases, a 
contrast effect was observed, but it was greater when the anchor was equal to the 
larger target square. The more extreme the anchors were, the smaller the contrast 
effect was. 
 
In general, when people judge a certain simple property of a given stimulus, 
their judgments shift away from the value of the predefined prototypical examples 
from the same category. This observation is not quite surprising in the sense that 
people try to differentiate the target stimulus from the exemplary ones. As a result, 
they probably often pay more attention to the differences. 
 
Unlike the contrast from concrete external exemplars described in this section, 
people often have to judge large series of homogeneous stimuli. The next section will 
review several experiments that demonstrate contrast effects due to the stimulus 
distribution.   
 
2.2.2   Range Effect 
The stimulus grade depends on the overall range of the set of judged stimuli. 
The experimental template for demonstrating the range effect is usually the following: 
A uniformly distributed set of homogeneous stimuli is given for judgment to the 
participants. After that, a subset is formed, removing all stimuli, whose physical value 
of the judged property exceeds a certain threshold. For stimuli that are more 
complicated, this physical value can be ambiguous or unknown. In such cases the 
mean ratings given by the participants can serve for this purpose. Once this restricted 
subset is formed, it can be given to participants (the same group after delay or another 
group) to be judged. Usually people tend to use all scale values in their judgments, i.e. 
the ratings of the stimuli in the restricted subset would capture the whole scale, not 
only the respective restricted part of it. This is called range effect. 
The range effect is very robust. It has been demonstrated with a number of 
different stimuli under different conditions. Weddel, Parducci & Geiselman (1987) 
demonstrated it with female faces; Mellers & Cooke (1994) – with overall class 
performance, based on the percentage of correct scores on two independent exams; 
Parducci (1968), Parducci & Perret (1971) – with sizes of squares, etc. 
It is important, however, to mention the observations by Wedell (1996), that 
when the stimulus distribution shifts, the ratings’ shift is not immediate, but after 
some delay – several stimuli have to be presented in order for people to capture the 
new distribution. 
 
To sum up, the Range effect is an excellent demonstration of the relativism in 
human judgments. People judge according to something – usually according to the 
category, in which the stimulus belongs. This is intuitively clear - for example, 
everybody understands what ‘small’ in ‘a small elephant’ means and what ‘large’ in 
‘a large butterfly’ means – the elephants are compared to other elephants, the 
butterflies – to other butterflies. People do not judge the actual physical size of 
something without taking into account the category to which it belongs. Each theory 
of judgment should also reflect the effect of the category range.  
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The next section describes another aspect of the stimulus set that was 
demonstrated to affect judgments, namely, the frequency effect. 
 
2.2.3   Frequency Effect 
Frequency effect is observed when the stimulus set is not uniformly distributed, 
but the stimuli are concentrated closer to one of the extremes. In this case, people’s 
ratings shift away from the direction of the density. 
For example, Parducci & Perret (1971) asked participants to judge the size of 
squares. The overall set of squares consisted of nine square sizes, but was positively 
(e.g. the small squares were more than the large ones) or negatively (the large ones 
dominated) skewed. In the first case, people gave higher ratings than in the second 
one (for one and the same square size). 
Wedell, Parducci & Geiselman (1987) performed an analogical experiment with 
similar results by using female faces for stimuli. 
Cooke & Mellers (1998) asked people to rate offers for apartment rents. The 
offers differed on three dimensions – their price, distance from the campus, and 
friend’s opinion. In order to form skewed sets, the authors fixed two of the 
dimensions and varied the density around the lower or upper extremes of the range of 
the third dimension. In all conditions, the frequency effect was demonstrated. 
 
Frequency effect is a manifestation of the tendency for people to use all 
available ratings an almost equal number of times (Parducci & Perret, 1971). This 
increases the precisions of judgments – it is easy but not informative to give to all 
stimuli one and the same rating. 
 
Contrast effects in judgment can be observed depending on the anchors, the 
range and the skew of the stimulus distribution. There are other specific judgment 
situations, however, in which contrast effects appear. In the next section, some of 
them are presented. 
 
2.2.4   Contrast from a Primed Stimulus 
Herr, Sherman & Fazio (1983) asked participants to judge the size of animals. 
The animals were presented with the words that name them. Moreover, some of the 
names were non-words, but participants were instructed to judge the animals, even if 
they did not know them. Before making their judgments, participants were primed 
with different animals. As was described above, an assimilation effect appeared when 
the context animals were moderate exemplars and the judged stimuli - ambiguous. In 
the other cases, however, contrast effect was demonstrated. When the judged animals 
were unambiguous and well known, regardless of the size of the priming animals, the 
ratings shifted away from it. When the judged stimuli were ambiguous, the contrast 
effect appeared only when the priming animals were extreme in their size. 
 
This experiment illustrates two different contrastive forces. On the one hand, 
people tend to shift their ratings away from a certain contextual element when the 
judged dimensions are clear and unambiguous. On the other hand, independently of 
the type of the judged stimulus, when the contextual elements are too extreme, again 
contrast is observed. The latter tendency may be viewed as an additional 
manifestation of the range effect. Not only the judged stimuli but also some available 
items of the same category could change the range.  
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For example, Manis, Nelson & Shedler (1988) induced in participants a 
stereotype about a patient’s hospital – the patients were predominantly high 
pathological. A second hospital was presented, in which the patients were moderate 
pathological. People tended to judge one and the same case definition as more 
pathological, if it was said that the patient came from the second hospital than if he 
was from the first one. This contrast effect, however, appeared only when the 
stereotype about the first hospital was very extreme. Otherwise, an assimilation effect 
was observed. 
 
Furthermore, the shifts in ratings when priming some items depend on whether 
concrete examples or whole categories serve for primes. For example, Stapel and 
Kooman (1996, 2000) asked people to judge different types of social stimuli – in 
different studies, they used trait names, actor’s play, and sentences, which describe 
different behaviours. The authors demonstrated contrast from a primed concrete 
exemplar. As was mentioned in the previous section, the opposite assimilation effect 
arises when the priming is for general schemes. 
In the previous section an experiment by Strack, Schwarz & Gschneidinger 
(1985) was described, in which the authors asked people to list three positive or 
negative recent events, and after that to judge their overall satisfaction with their life. 
In the same study authors asked participants in two additional groups to do the same, 
with the only exception that the listed events were not recent, but from the last ten 
years. In this case, the results reversed – people that recalled positive events, 
underestimated their life satisfaction, and vice versa. 
This experimental result also could be interpreted as confirmation of the 
hypothesis that primed concrete exemplars produce contrast. Because the task of 
people was to rate their overall satisfaction, the examples from the last ten years are 
concrete exemplars – they could serve as a basis for comparison. In the opposite, the 
examples from the recent past are part of a relatively small sub-category of the whole 
life. 
 
In conclusion, a certain item that serves for priming or is presented in the 
environment may cause the ratings of some stimuli to shift. This shift tends to be in a 
direction away from the contextual item when the judgment task is unambiguous, and 
when the contextual element could be recognized as an extreme exemplar of the 
category of the judged stimulus.    
 
2.2.5   Summary of the Contrast Contextual Effects 
The tendency to shift judgments away from a particular contextual element is 
called contrast effect and has been demonstrated in number of experiments. Contrast 
effect tends to be observed: 
- when the contextual item is outside the range of the stimuli distribution or near 
its boundaries (Sherif, Taub, Hovland, 1958), (Manis, Nelson & Shedler, 
1988); 
- away from the priming stimuli, when the judged stimulus is not ambiguous 
(Herr, Sherman & Fazio, 1983); 
- when the judged set is skewed (Parducci & Perret, 1971); 
- away from the prototypical value for the category of the judged stimulus in the 
case when the task is to judge on a subjective scale (Marks, 1988). 
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Together with the assimilation and contrast effects, however, psychological 
studies report some other systematic shifts of ratings when people judge on a scale. 
 
2.3 Other Contextual Effects in Judgment 
 
2.3.1   Rating Preferences 
Petrov & Anderson (2005) illustrated that the response distribution has a peak in 
the middle, even when the stimulus distribution is uniform. This can be numerically 
measured as the decrease in the variance of response distribution compared to the 
theoretical uniform one. This tendency - avoiding extreme ratings - is robust. It was 
also reported by Kokinov, Hristova & Petkov (2004). 
 
It seems that this tendency is in contradiction with the frequency effect (the 
latter assumes that all ratings tend to be used an almost equal number of times). This 
contradiction is an additional challenge for the theories of judgment. The 
manifestations of the frequency effect, however, appear when a skewed set of stimuli 
is judged, whereas the non-uniform distribution of the ratings could be observed even 
when a uniform set of stimuli is judged. 
 
2.3.2   The Role of Time Delays 
Srull and Wyer (1980) investigated the influence of time between the priming 
and the target presentation. Their stimuli were trait concepts and paragraphs that 
describe a particular personal behaviour. The contextual stimulus, the target one, and 
the requested judgment of the target were positioned subsequently in time. The 
authors demonstrated that the assimilation effect decreases with the increase of the 
delay between the perception of the contextual stimulus and the target one. At the 
same time, the assimilation effect increases with the increase of the delay between the 
perception of the target stimulus and the moment of response1. 
Therefore, judgment (as well as cognition as a whole) seems to be a dynamic 
process. Hence, dynamic mechanisms should be proposed in order to describe the 
phenomena. 
 
2.3.3   The Role of the Number of Scale Labels 
Wedell, Parducci & Lane (1990) investigated the sizes of range and frequency 
effects when the scales vary. They asked people to judge the pathology of case 
definitions on 3-rate, 7-rate, and 100-rate scale. The authors concluded that the 
frequency effect decreases when more ratings are available on the scale. The range 
effect could decrease too, but only if each category (or at least the two extremes) was 
anchored with a verbal label or with an example. 
This seems to be an important constraint for the mechanisms that may be 
considered responsible for the frequency effect. These mechanisms should capture the 
dependency between judgments and the number of the scale labels. 
 
2.3.4   ‘Elasticity’ 
Hsee (1996) introduced a new interesting term – “elasticity”. He noted that 
sometimes new, unexpected factors play an important part in the judgment task. The 
author gives the following example: Imagine a competition between two piano-
                                                 
1 The authors first presented the stimulus, and after a delay asked people to give a rating. 
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players. The first one plays a piece of music that is the more difficult one, but the 
second pianist makes less errors. The judge may never admit it but perhaps the crucial 
factor for his judgment is the fact that one of the players is from his country. 
According to the author, such new factors do not always arise but only when the main 
factors are “elastic”, i.e. it is possible to interpret them in different ways. In the 
example, how does one compare the complexity versus the number of errors? In this 
example, the elasticity is in the combination of complicated piece of music and errors. 
 
2.4 Contextual Effects in Choice 
 
This section briefly reviews a few contextual effects demonstrated in choice 
situation. 
JUDGEMAP model assumes that the tasks for judgment and choice are very 
close and that the same mechanisms underlie them. A similar view was expressed by 
Medin, Goldstone & Markman (1995). They argue that maybe there are common 
mechanisms underlying choice and similarity judgments. According to the authors, 
some of these mechanisms can be: generation of alternatives, establishment of 
correspondences between items, requirement of reference points, and justification of 
judgments. JUDGEMAP developed analogical mechanisms for judgment. That is why 
some contextual effects in choice are briefly presented here, and discussed later in the 
simulations. 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979), Kahneman & Tversky (1984) demonstrated their 
famous examples of preference reversals because of pre-formulation of the task. 
When describing two social programs in terms of saved lives, one of them was 
preferred, whereas if the same two polices were described in terms of lives lost, the 
other one is preferred. 
In addition, preference reversals could also result from presenting a third 
alternative to the two basic ones (Tversky, 1972; Shafir, Simmonson & Tversky, 
1993). Participants were asked to choose between two gambles – the first one 
promised a higher profit, but with lower probability than the second one. The two 
gambles were adjusted so that each one was preferred by almost half of the people. 
The authors gave to another group of people to chose among three alternative gambles 
– the same two from the first condition, and a third one, which was less attractive than 
the first one both in its profit and probability to win. In comparison with the second 
gamble, however, the third one is better in one of the dimensions. Of course, nobody 
had chosen the third alternative (it was worse than the first one in the both 
dimensions), but now much more people chose the first gamble than the second one. 
 
2.5 Summary of the Contextual Effects in Judgment 
 
The following is a brief review of the main data from the psychological 
experiments on judgment: 
First, judgments seem to be contextually dependent – they depend on the whole 
set of given stimuli and their location in time (their chronological order), on the 
attributes of the stimulus used in judgment (called also stimulus levels), on the 
formulation of the task, on the previously solved tasks, on biases primed from the 
experimenter, and on the time of contextual manipulation. 
Second, the main observed effects of this dependency are assimilation and 
contrast. These terms are relevant only when both the target and the contextual 
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stimuli can be judged on the same scale. Sometimes, the two opposite effects can be 
observed in experiments, performed under almost equal conditions, differing only in 
the type of stimuli, or in some details of the experimental procedure. 
 
Usually, presentation of a single contextual element when judging unambiguous 
dimensions of the stimuli (no matter whether it is anchored with a rating or not) 
causes contrast effect (Saris & Parducci, 1978, Parducci & Marshal, 1962, Sherif, 
Taub, Hovland, 1958). In the opposite case, when the judged properties of the stimuli 
are too ambiguous, assimilation is observed (Wedell, Parducci & Geiselman 1987; 
Anderson, 1974; Herr, Sherman, Fazio, 1983). Sometimes, however, exceptions 
occur. For example, when the task was for judgment of weights and the anchor was 
exactly on the boundaries of the stimulus set (Wedell, Parducci & Geiselman 1987), 
again assimilation was observed. This exception is difficult to explain – maybe the 
tested modality is special in some way.  
The influence of the whole set of the stimuli on judgment could be expressed 
with the tendency of the judgments to satisfy both the range principle and the 
frequency principle (Parducci, 1968).  
The sequential assimilation effect (Lockhead, 1992) is also robust and has been 
observed in almost all experiments involving judgments of series of homogeneous 
stimuli. 
The type of the scale also influences judgments. Parducci demonstrated that 
increasing the number of the scale values decreases frequency effect.  
 
None of the existing theories can explain simultaneously all these pressures 
(JUDGEMAP does not make an exception). However, they highlight different aspects 
of the judgment task. The most famous theories and models of judgment, their 
contributions and shortcomings, are discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
Main Theories and Models of Judgment 
 
 
3.1   Classification of the Theories of Judgment 
 
The cognitive theories differ in the level of description at which they try to 
explain known phenomena. 
Some explanations are mathematical in their form. They try to describe the final 
result as a function of the input – the given task and the surrounding context. These 
theories describe the phenomena on the level of input-output correspondences and are 
usually called normative theories. 
When a certain bias (i.e. systematic error) is found, the researchers try to explain 
it. In this way descriptive theories are formed – they describe some heuristics that 
people use in solving tasks, and suggest an explanation how those heuristics are 
responsible for the systematic shifts in the responses. 
Another type of theories (JUDGEMAP is included in this group) assumes that 
cognition is an emergent product of local interactions between a large number of units 
that share a small number of basic principles. From this point of view, each cognitive 
process should be treated not in isolation from the others. Instead, it should be based 
on a cognitive architecture, i.e., on a limited number of fixed basic principles and 
mechanisms. The contextual effects then should not be specially modeled, but they 
should emerge from these low-level principles.  
Independently of their form, the theories and models of judgment could be 
separated in three main groups, according to their point of view about the nature of 
the judgment. The first point of view is that judgment is a process of measuring the 
similarity/dissimilarity to a standard. A second group of approaches looks at the 
judgment as a process of classification. Each rating forms a subcategory and the target 
stimulus has to be classified into one of those subcategories. The JUDGEMAP project 
assumes a third point of view. The target stimulus is included in the comparison set 
and then a mapping between the elements of the comparison set and the set of scale 
elements is established. This mapping should satisfy as much as possible the 
structural constraints specified in the instruction – higher stimulus magnitudes should 
receive higher ratings, and almost equal differences between magnitudes should 
correspond to almost equal differences between the corresponding ratings. 
 
3.2 Judgment as Measuring the Distance to a Standard 
 
The theories that treat judgment as a process of comparison fall in this group. 
According to them, the magnitude of the judged stimulus is compared to a certain 
standard. The theories, however, differ in the nature of this standard – where it comes 
from, how stable it is, whether the external context influences the standard, etc. 
 
3.2.1 Psychological Scaling and Ideal Point Theory 
Suppose that the experimenter presents some stimuli to a subject and asks 
him/her to judge one of their simple one-dimensional properties (like weight, 
sweetness or length). When a certain stimulus is given, in the observer’s mind a 
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psychological effect springs up, i.e. he/she perceives the stimulus. One fundamental 
hypothesis in classical psychophysics is that these psychological effects form a 
continuous and ordered space – the so-called ‘psychological continuum’. This 
assumption underlies one of the main goals of psychophysics - to map the physical 
continuum with the correspondent psychological one. After this is done, a linear 
transformation transforms this psychological continuum to a given scale. 
This methodology is called psychological scaling. The experimental results, 
however, show that even during a single judgment session people often give different 
ratings to the same stimulus, which contradicts the formula. According to the 
psychological scaling approach, this is due to the imprecision of our perceptions and 
thinking. This imprecision could be treated as a source of noise. Hence, one random 
value has to be added to the predicted by the model response. 
In the case of judgment of subjective, ambiguous properties (e.g. female faces, 
sweetness of drinks, etc.), the Ideal Point Theory represents psychological effects 
again as points in continuous ordered abstract psychological space. One additional 
assumption, however, is that people keep in mind one ideal stimulus and the 
preferences are calculated as a function of the distance between the attribute values of 
the given stimulus and the ideal one. 
Wedell and Petibone (1999) propose an improvement of the mathematical 
equations of Ideal Point Theory, explaining some non-symmetric effects of equivalent 
deviations above and below the ideal point. 
Overall, both Psychological scaling methodology and Ideal Point Theory, in 
their classical form, do not consider any role of the context in the process. Thus, they 
fail to explain most of the experimental results that demonstrate systematic shifts in 
judgments. 
 
3.2.2 Adaptation Level Theory (Helson) 
Adaptation Level Theory (Helson, 1964) was first proposed in the field of 
perceptions. The fact of adaptation of perceptions has been well known for a long 
time. The sensory systems react only to change (the only exception is pain). When the 
irritating factor is constant, the psychological effect falls down to zero. 
The assumptions of the theory, however, have been used both in the field of 
perception and in the task of judgment. According to them, the psychological effect of 
the entire context can be represented by the so-called adaptation level (AL) – just a 
single value, the “average” (for example, 4 in the 1-7 scale). After the AL is 
calculated, the judgment J is equalized to the ratio between the stimulus value being 
judged and the adaptation level AL. The AL value itself is given as a geometric mean 
of various factors: the value of the target stimulus, the value of the manipulated 
contextual stimuli, and whole context (the room in which the experiment is 
conducted, the people in it and so on). Each factor has its own relative power. 
The Adaptation Level Theory always predicts contrast effect. In order to defend 
the theory and to use it even when the experimental data shows assimilation, Restle 
(1978) proposes its specification. He argues that it is wrong to assume that the 
weights of the factors are constant and independent from the context, studying some 
perceptual illusions with simple geometrical figures. He observed that when the 
contextual stimulus was very small, an assimilation effect appeared; when the 
contextual stimulus grew, this effect decreased to zero, turned into contrast, and the 
latter increased. Fitting the parameters of the equation with the experimental data, 
Restle proposes one quite complex but precise function. 
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A big advantage of the Adaptation Level Theory is its attempt to explain the 
contextual sensitivity of judgment. Not only the magnitude of the judged property, but 
also its relative position with regard to the whole set of stimuli, reflect judgments. The 
theory also tries to establish a bridge between perceptions and high-level cognitive 
processes (like judgment), assuming that the same principles underlie them. 
The theory, however, does not provide a deeper explanation of the controversial 
assimilation and contrast effects. It uses too abstract and ambiguous terms (like ‘the 
whole context’). This makes its experimental testing difficult. 
 
3.2.3   Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller) 
A different point of view is expressed by Kahneman & Miller (1986). They 
suggest their Norm Theory - one constructivist idea based on the exemplar model of 
memory. According to it, the stimulus is compared with a norm. Instead of the 
classical Ideal–point theory, where the ideal point is constant and is stored in the 
memory in advance, the Kahneman’s norm is constructive. The available exemplars, 
which the stimulus retrieves, create this norm. How does this mechanism work? Let 
only a single stimulus be given. It must create its own context. Because the number of 
its attributes is huge (maybe infinite), a small set of such attributes needs to be viewed 
like important. More probably, the attributes, which identify the stimulus, are the most 
important, i.e. these attributes, which are not central for the whole set of stimuli. “The 
general rule is that, other things being equal, the more mutable and less important of 
two attributes will have a disproportionately large effect in single–stimulus judgment” 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986, p.142). On the contrary, when a set of stimuli is given, 
the identifying attributes are those, which are common for the whole set (they identify 
the set, no matter that a single stimulus is judged). Kahneman and Miller justify this 
idea by presenting data about the preferences of people to some bets. 
In order to define the concept “norm”, the authors stress that “normality” and 
“probability” are not the same thing. For example, compare the two sentences: (a) 
“The favorite lost the first set.” and (b) “The favorite lost the first set, but won the 
match". Obviously (a) is more probable, but is also more surprising, hence – 
abnormal. According to the authors, the norm is exactly the opposite of the surprise. 
 
The Norm Theory and DUAL cognitive architecture share the same idea about 
the constructive nature of the memory. The Norm Theory states that each stimulus is 
compared with a norm, which is yielded from a set of retrieved or constructed 
memories. However, JUDGEMAP proposes a different mechanism. Each stimulus is 
included in a constructed comparison set of stimuli that varies dynamically in time. 
The content of this set is: the target stimulus, the recent or primed stimuli, the typical 
stimuli (if they exist), and the closer to the already active stimuli (i.e., the stimuli, 
whose magnitude of the rated property is close to the ones of the already active 
stimuli). The rating of the target stimulus emerges from the mapping between this set 
and the required scale for judgment. 
 
The next two subsections present respectively two models that assume 
comparison–making as a basic mechanism in judgment. According to these theories, 
however, instead of comparing the target stimulus with a single standard or norm, the 
response arises from many local comparisons between the target and other memory 
traces. 
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3.2.4 Comparison–Based Judgments (Mussweiler) 
Mussweiler (2003) proposes a descriptive model of judgment, based on 
comparisons between the target stimuli and retrieved ones from the memory. 
According to the model, two different parallel processes are involved in judgment. 
One of them is responsible for assimilation effects, the other one – for contrast ones 
(fig. 3.1). 
Mussweiler assumes that it is impossible to make judgments without context, 
i.e. using only the information about the judged magnitude, without anything to 
compare it with. It is necessary first to categorize it, to extract from memory other 
exemplars, and then to compare these memories to the target one. The author 
proposes two different kinds of such comparisons. On the one hand, the system 
checks the hypothesis that the target is similar to the standard. During this test, the 
common features become more salient and this creates a pressure to rate the target and 
standard with close ratings. On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis is checked in 
parallel. The features that differentiate target from the standard increase their 
attractiveness, and an opposite pressure arises. Thus, the final decision is biased from 
two conflicting forces and the kind of effect that arises depends on the strength of the 
arguments of similarity in comparison with the argument of dissimilarity. 
Mussweiler’s model and JUDGEMAP share the assumption that judgment is 
based on comparisons. The former, however, cannot determine in more detail the 
exact circumstances in which one or another mechanism wins. It fails to explain what 
the principal difference between the previously judged stimulus and the anchoring 
stimulus is. Why assimilation toward the former but contrast to the latter occurs?  
 
3.2.5 Two-Path Model (Manis & Paskewitz) 
The two–path model (Manis & Paskewitz, 1984, Manis, Nelson, Shedler, 1988) 
tries to explain a certain group of biases, observed in experiments. It is similar to 
Similarity testing 
Test hypothesis: 
Target = standard 
Dissimilarity testing 
Test hypothesis: 
Target ≠ standard 
Selective accessibility 
of standard consistent 
target knowledge 
Selective accessibility 
of standard 
inconsistent target 
knowledge 
Contrast 
Assimilation Holistic 
assessment of 
target – standard 
similarity 
Fig.3.1. Comparison – Based Model of Mussweiler (taken from Mussweiler, 2003). 
Expectation
Comparisons
Assimilation 
Contrast 
Two-path model 
Fig.3.2. The two-path model of Manis & Paskewitz. 
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Mussweiler’s model with proposal of two parallel conflicting pressures in judgment 
(fig.3.2). 
According to the model, one of the driving forces in judgment is expectation. 
The cognitive system always has some expectations about the nature of the next 
stimulus. These expectations are based on stereotypes, recently met exemplars, etc. 
When the real stimulus becomes available, the system shifts it a little toward the 
expectation. This shift causes the assimilation effects in the final response. 
In addition, the system makes comparisons between target and other exemplars, 
retrieved from memory. Contrary to Mussweiler’s model, Manis and Paskewitz 
assume that comparisons always produce contrast effect. 
 
The two-path model fits many empirical data excellently. Unfortunately, it fails 
to explain some other phenomena, e.g. why contrast appears when the context 
stimulus is outside or near the range boundaries, why sequential assimilation appears 
with respect to the previous ratings, but not to the previous stimuli. 
 
3.3 Judgment as a Classification Task 
 
The theories that treat judgment task as a classification task fall in this group. 
According to these theories, the category of the judged stimulus is subdivided into 
several subcategories. Each of these subcategories consists of exemplars that should 
be judged with a certain scale label. Thus, when people judge a certain stimulus, they 
try to find the most proper of these subcategories. 
 
3.3.1   Range–Frequency Model (Parducci) 
Allen Parducci accepts the relativistic idea that the judgment of a concrete 
stimulus depends on the entire set of presented stimuli and proposes his “Range-
Frequency Model” (Parducci, 1965, 1968, 1973; Parducci & Perret, 1971, Wedell, 
Parducci, Geiselman, 1987). For several decades, he has improved and tested it with 
different stimuli – perceptual (Parducci, 1962), moral (Parducci, 1968), tasks of 
preference (Wedell, Parducci, Geiselman, 1987) and games (Parducci, 1973). 
 
The Range–Frequency Theory is based on the competition and compromise 
between two principles: 
The Range principle asserts that the judge uses the given categories to subdivide 
the psychological range. He/she fixes the two extreme values of the stimuli in the set 
and assigns the two extreme categories to them. After that, the set is subdivided into 
the necessary number of categories. 
The Frequency principle asserts that the judge uses each category for a fixed 
proportion of his judgment. These proportions may vary for the different sets of 
categories but we can often assume equal proportions. 
The two principles are in conflict when stimuli from the different parts of the 
range are presented with unequal frequencies. This conflict can be solved with a 
simple linear weighted sum: 
 
Ji = wRi+(1-w)Fi 
This equation expresses the Range–Frequency Model. Here Ji is the mean 
judgment of the i-th stimulus; Ri and Fi are respectively the range value and 
frequency value of the i-th stimulus and w is a weighting constant. 
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Frequency value is the mean of the grades that a given stimulus would elicit if 
each category was used with equal frequency and can be easily calculated. One needs 
to divide first the total number of stimuli presentations into the number of available 
categories. After that one needs to count by rank, to which category a particular 
stimulus should be assigned. 
The Range value Ri is determined by the relationship between the presented 
stimulus and the two extreme stimuli defining the two extremes of the scale. It 
depends just on these three things. It cannot be calculated a priori without the actual 
data. Each Ri can be extracted by a substitution of Ji and Fi in the equation. This 
method may look strange, but the idea is that such a value can be used to predict the 
judgment of the same stimulus in another set (but with the same two extremes). 
In the first version of the model (“Limen Model” - Parducci, 1965), Parducci 
presumed that according to the range principle the set of the stimuli was subdivided 
into the needed categories according to the principle of equal discrimination. 
However, after collecting huge experimental data, using squares with different sizes, 
he rejected this idea. 
Parducci also studied the role of weight and found out that the relative power of 
the frequency principle decreases when the number of available categories increases. 
 
In conclusion, the Range-Frequency Model is one of the first theories that 
underlie the important role of the context in judgment. In addition, the two principles, 
developed by Parducci are simple and clear, and at the same time, their validity is 
manifested in almost all experiments, independently of the type of stimuli that are 
judged.   
However, the Range–Frequency Model does not predict an assimilation effect in 
any condition. In order to explain the assimilative results, when two target stimuli are 
presented simultaneously, Parducci assumes that a second assimilative force 
influences judgment. 
 
Being a normative theory, the Range–Frequency Model does not propose any 
mechanisms that could be responsible for the systematic shifts of the ratings 
depending on the distribution of the stimulus set. In the next subsection, a 
computational model for judgment is presented. 
 
3.3.2 The ANCHOR Model (Petrov & Anderson) 
The ANCHOR model (Petrov & Anderson, 2000) is a computational model of 
judgment and absolute identification (this task is similar to judgment, but after each 
response, a feed-back signal is given about the right answer.), based on ACT-R 
architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1993). It views judgment as a two-stage process. 
At the first stage, the perceived magnitude of the target stimulus is compared to a set 
of anchors in memory. Each anchor corresponds to the prototype of the subcategory 
of stimuli and its corresponding rating label. At the second stage, an explicit 
correction strategy shifts a little the final response. 
The magnitude of the judged property is transformed into an internal 
representation via exponential transformation and by adding some noise. Then this 
internal representation is mapped into one of the anchors in a stochastic manner. The 
probability to map onto a certain anchor is sensitive to similarity (between the target 
and anchor), anchor’s base-level strength, and whether it was recently used. After an 
anchor has been chosen, a correction mechanism may shift the response with one or 
two grades in both directions. The correction reflects the difference between the target 
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and anchor’s magnitudes, and the appropriate knowledge about the approximate 
category width. Finally, a learning algorithm updates the locations and base-level 
activations of the anchors. 
 
The ANCHOR model does not only describe the input–output correspondences, 
like normative theories. It does not describe in abstract terms some biases, and 
possible explanations for them, as the descriptive theories do. Instead, it is a complete 
computational model, whose starting points are assumed fundamental for all cognitive 
processes (namely, the principles of ACT-R architecture). The ANCHOR model 
demonstrates how many contextual effects – sequential assimilation, non-uniform 
distribution of the responses, systematic changes during the time of judgment, etc. - 
could emerge from these low-level mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, the parameters in ANCHOR model should be fixed on a certain 
scale and certain type of stimuli, for example, in the reported simulations, the scale is 
a 9-point one and the stimuli are line segments. The model does not propose more 
general templates, which are independent from the scale and the concrete stimulus 
category. In addition, the model cannot explain the contextual effects, caused by 
properties of the stimuli, which are irrelevant to the task. 
 
3.3.3 Descriptive Theories that Treat Judgment as Classification 
In this subsection, three descriptive theories of judgment are briefly presented, 
together with their advantages and shortcomings. 
The Integration theory proposed by Anderson (1971) assumes that some 
proportion of the overall impression, i.e. the stimulus together with its surrounding 
context, is induced onto the stimulus rating. For example, if a group of people were 
perceived, part of the overall evaluation of the group would be added to each 
individual member. Anderson calls this influence a ‘halo effect’. 
 
A similar approach was proposed by Wyer (1974). He assumes that if the 
perceived stimulus is ambiguous, then the category, in which it would be categorized, 
tends to be the most accessible and applicable one. A possible explanation of this 
phenomenon could be the neural net approach. Here the stimulus is represented by a 
set of associated semantic nodes and the contextual stimuli prime some of those 
nodes. Because according to this approach the meaning is coded through the overall 
pattern of activation across the nodes, Wyer calls this priming “change of meaning”. 
 
Both the Integration Theory and the Change of Meaning approaches always 
predict assimilation toward the contextual elements. The next model in this group 
tries to explain both assimilation and contrast effects in a single frame. 
According to the Inclusion – Exclusion Model (Schwarz  & Bless, 1991), the 
default option in judgment is to include the accessible contextual information in the 
representation of the target. This gives rise to assimilation effects. Sometimes, 
however, it is possible to do exactly the opposite – to exclude the outside information 
that comes to mind from the representation of the target, and hence contrast would be 
observed. This may happen because this information comes for irrelevant to the task 
reason, because it does not belong to the category of the target, or because the subject 
was explicitly instructed not to use it. 
 
The descriptive theories that treat judgment as a process of classification share 
with JUDGEMAP the idea that judgment cannot be separated from the overall 
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context. However, the focus of the model differs from the focus of the presented in 
this subsection approaches.   
 
3.3.4 The Role of Perception (Goldstone) 
Goldstone (1998) highlights the role of perceptions in the process of judgment. 
He argues that there are many known phenomena in perception that could give rise to 
some of the contextual effects in high-level tasks like judgment. 
He proposes four mechanisms that are merged in the theory of perceptual 
learning: By Attentional weighting, the relevant dimensions and features become 
more attractive, and the irrelevant ones become less attractive. By stimulus 
imprinting, precise detectors for the important stimuli and parts of stimuli are 
developed. By differentiation, the perceptual system becomes more accurate in 
distinguishing features that were undistinguishable before the respective task was 
presented. Finally, by unitization the system becomes able to detect whole 
constructions together with their parts. 
 
One advantage of the theory is that it points to the important role of perception 
in judgment. Unfortunately, the theory lacks mechanisms that are more concrete and 
cannot demonstrate how these pressures can be modeled to work together in 
synchrony. 
However, JUDGEMAP, since its focus is on different aspects of the judgment 
process, treats the mechanisms and principles, proposed by Goldstone (1998) as 
complementary ones. If a single model could merge them, this would increase the 
power of its explanations and predictions. 
 
3.3.5 Exemplar–Based Random Walk Model (Nosofsky) 
Nosofsky & Palmeri (1997) proposed the Exemplar–Based Random Walk 
Model (EBRW) for classification. As in the Anchor model, each scale label is 
associated with a prototype and all prototypes compete to match the target. This 
competition is resolved via prolonged random walk – at each step, one of the 
hypotheses increases its strength, and the other decreases it. 
The memory in the model is exemplar-based. When a stimulus is given to be 
classified into one of two categories, the exemplars in memory are retrieved one after 
the other with races, determined by their similarities to the test item. A random walk 
counter with start value zero, increments a little in positive direction if evidence to 
categorize the target in the first category arise, or in negative direction, if the evidence 
is in favor of the second category. When the counter reaches one of the two 
predefined thresholds (criteria), the system gives a response. 
 
EBWR shares with the JUDGEMAP model the idea that judgment could be 
treated as a result from a competition between alternative hypotheses. The two models 
differ, however, in that the mechanisms of EBWR are expressed only by 
mathematical equation, while JUDGEMAP, being designed on a cognitive 
architecture, integrates the judgment process with other cognitive abilities. 
 
3.4 Summary of the Theories of Judgment 
 
All theories and models make their own contribution and highlight the problems 
from different perspectives. It is difficult, however, to integrate all phenomena, 
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known about human judgments in a single model. Unfortunately, none of the 
contemporary theories can explain satisfactorily the whole range of systematic shifts 
in judgments (JUDGEMAP is no exception). 
Ideal Point Theory (in its classical form) does not give rise to any contextual 
effects at all. Adaptation Level Theory and the Range–Frequency model predict 
contrast effect in all cases, whereas Integration Theory and the Change-of-meaning 
approach deal only with assimilation effects. 
Some theories propose the existence of two different pressures and treat 
judgment as a result of compromise between them. Comparison–Based Judgments 
and the Two– paths model are in this group. 
Norm Theory and the Perceptual Learning approach propose more integrated 
mechanisms for judgment. Unfortunately, they deal with too abstract terms, do not 
propose any concrete mechanisms, and thus, it is difficult to verify them. 
Finally, the ANCHOR model and the EBRW model are focused only on a 
narrow part of the problem – they put too many limitations on the type of the stimuli 
and of the scale. 
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CHAPTER IV 
JUDGEMAP in Broad Strokes 
 
 
4.1  Main Ideas 
 
In contrast to the theories described in the previous chapter, I view the process 
of judgment as a process of mapping of a set of stimuli onto the set of scale elements. 
In other words, the judge always needs a whole set of elements to be rated – even if 
he/she has to evaluate one single stimulus he/she has to construct a set of elements to 
be evaluated that include this target element and then maps the whole set onto the 
scale (Figure 4.1.). This is in sharp contrast to the theories discussed so far that 
assume the presence of a standard or prototype or stereotype or anchors of the 
categories – in all these cases one can simply compare the target with this 
standard/prototype/anchor and as a result obtain a rating. JUDGEMAP approach 
makes no assumptions about the existence of such a centralized and static 
representation of a standard and thus requires dynamically constructing the 
comparison set. This peculiar characteristic of the current approach makes it unique in 
terms of its high context-sensitivity since the formation of the comparison set (which 
is crucial for the specific rating the target will obtain) is dynamic and can be 
influenced in many ways. 
 
Thus the process of judgment can be described as consisting of two 
subprocesses: 
Mapping 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
2
1 
Scale Set Comparison Set 
Figure 4.1 Judgment as mapping.
• formation of the comparison set, and 
• mapping the comparison set onto the scale elements set. 
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The comparison set is supposed to consist of those elements whose 
representations happen to become part of the Working Memory of the judge on the 
particular occasion. There are two main sources: comparison set elements may come 
from perception (if the judge encounters other elements in the environment) and from 
memory (if the target element reminds the judge of some previously encountered 
elements). The perceptual mechanisms are not modeled in the current version of 
JUDGEMAP-2, but the spreading activation mechanism of the DUAL cognitive 
architecture is a good candidate for explaining the process of “reminding”. Moreover, 
DUAL has already been successfully used for modeling memory processes (Kokinov, 
1998, Kokinov & Petrov, 2001, Kokinov & Zareva-Toncheva, 2001). 
The mapping process has to preserve the structure of ordering relations in the 
comparison set when finding their corresponding elements in the scale elements set 
(Figure 4.2.). Thus, this process seems very similar to the process of mapping in 
analogy-making (which always preserves the structure of relations). Therefore, the 
mapping mechanisms developed within the AMBR model of analogy-making 
(Kokinov, 1988, 1994a, 1998, Kokinov & Petrov, 2001) can be potentially useful for 
judgment as well. 
Thus, a natural idea would be to use the DUAL cognitive architecture (Kokinov, 
1994b, 1994c) that has already been successfully used for modeling analogy and 
memory to build a model of judgment as well. Moreover, starting the modeling 
process from a general cognitive architecture has several important consequences: 
Comparison Set 
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Mapping 
Ordering 
relations 
Scale Set
Ordering 
relations 
Figure 4.2: Mapping the relational structure of the ordering relations.
• The principles of DUAL and its mechanisms and representations have been 
developed having in mind other cognitive processes and if these can be 
successfully applied to modeling judgment, this would be a good test for 
DUAL as a general cognitive architecture. 
• The process of modeling will be severely constrained: one cannot build any 
possible mechanism and representation that would be simply useful for fitting 
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the experimental data. The model should keep the principles of DUAL and be 
based on the already developed mechanisms – new mechanisms can be build 
only if necessary and with great care. In this way, fitting the data is not a 
simple process – the data should rather naturally arise out of the embedded 
DUAL principles and mechanisms. 
• The process of judgment will not be in isolation – it will be naturally 
integrated with other cognitive processes such as analogy, memory, and in 
the future with perception and learning. This will also allow for modeling and 
explaining the interactions between various cognitive processes. 
 
Having reviewed the background information, it is now time to formulate the 
aims of the current dissertation. 
 
4.2 Aims of the Current Dissertation 
 
The main aim of the current dissertation is to build a computational model of 
human judgment, based on the cognitive architecture DUAL. The model should also 
use as much as possible the already developed mechanisms of mapping within the 
AMBR model of analogy-making and thus integrate judgment with other cognitive 
processes such as memory and analogy. The model should account for the contrast 
and assimilation effects described in chapter 2 and possibly make new predictions. 
The model should also become a basis for future development of a model of 
decision-making based on DUAL. 
 
What follows is a brief presentation of the cognitive architecture DUAL that 
serves as a basis for building the model and the related AMBR model of analogy-
making. 
 
4.3 DUAL Architecture 
 
4.2.1 Basic Properties 
DUAL is a cognitive architecture, launched by Kokinov (1994b,c). It consists of 
memory structures and processing mechanisms, organized around the following 
principles: 
- Hybridity – DUAL combines the symbolic with connectionist approaches, 
by integrating them at the micro-level. 
- Emergent computations – the global behavior of the architecture emerges 
from local interactions among a huge number of small entities, called 
DUAL-agents. There is no central executor that monitors the whole 
system. 
- Dynamics and context–sensitivity – The behavior of DUAL changes 
continuously in response to the influence of the dynamic changes in 
context. There is no clear-cut boundary between the task and its context. 
Instead, the context is assumed to be the state of the system in any 
certain moment, i.e. the pattern of activation over the set of DUAL-
agents. This pattern is assumed to reflect the relevance of the various 
pieces of knowledge in the current context. Some DUAL-agents might 
be relevant because the corresponding elements are currently perceived 
from the surrounding environment, others – because they reflect the 
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current goals of the system, and finally, some agents might be relevant 
because they were recently used and have some residual activation or are 
linked to recently used agents.  
 
4.2.2   DUAL – agents 
The basic structural and functional element in DUAL is the DUAL – agent. It is 
hybrid in two ways – it has both connectionists and symbolic aspects, and it serves 
both as a representational and a functional unit. 
 
4.2.2.1   Connectionist’s Aspect 
From the connectionist’s perspective, each agent is a node in a localist neural 
network. It continuously receives activation, updates its current activation level, and 
spreads it through associative links to other agents. An important feature of DUAL is 
that it distinguishes the semantic meaning of the agents from their relevance, 
considering them as independent. The activation level is a numeric value that codes 
the relevance of each agent. The pattern of activation does not represent any concept 
or scheme, but just the current context. 
 
4.2.2.2   Symbolic Aspect 
From the symbolic point of view, DUAL – agents are organized in a semantic 
network. Each agent ‘stands’ for something – an object, property, relation, etc. It has 
its own micro-frame. The micro-frames have slots, which in turn may have facets. 
There are two kinds of slots – general ones (G-slots), and frame-specific ones (S-
slots). 
G-slots have labels, the meaning of which is invariant across the agents. 
Consider the example on fig. 4.3. The first line depicts the name of the agent – ‘line’. 
The next two lines represent two different G-slots. The first one has a label :type. Its 
filler is a tag that denotes the type of the agent – :concept. The label :subc of the 
second G-slot points to the super-class of the agent. Its filler is a reference. The 
references are associations that consist of two parts. The first one is a name of another 
agent, whereas the second one concerns only the connectionist aspects. It is a real 
number that depicts the weight of the reference1. The whole activation that the agents 
send is distributed to all references, normalized by their weights. 
The remaining part of the agent ‘line’ consists of one S-slot - :slot1. S-slots also 
have labels, but their labels are arbitrary, i.e., :slot1 in one agent may mean something 
very different from :slot1 in another agent. S-slots (and only S-slots) have facets, i.e., 
slots within slots. The same set of labels applies to both G-slots and facets. 
 
 
Line 
   :type :concept 
   :subc (geometrical_figure 1.000) 
   :slot1 
      :type :aspect 
      :c-coref (color-of-12 0.500) 
Fig. 4.3. An example of a DUAL-agent 
                                                 
1 When the connectionist aspect is highlighted, the references are called links. 
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4.2.2.3   Symbolic Processing 
DUAL – agents interact with each other. These interactions are relatively simple 
– they always involve two agents – one of them sends some information, and the other 
one reads it. 
Each DUAL – agent has a symbolic processor. It can receive or construct 
symbolic structures, transform them, store them in its own local memory, and send 
them to neighboring agents. A typical symbolical transaction involves receiving a 
symbolic structure, comparing it with the other symbolic structures in the local 
memory, storing it, transforming it via specific to the agent’s type routines, and 
sending its modification. Each one of these steps is discrete. DUAL – agents 
manipulate symbols sequentially, one after another, with a frequency that reflects the 
relevance of the respective agents. 
 
4.2.2.4   Relationships between Connectionist and Symbolic Processing 
All aspects of the agents are merged in a single whole and each one influences 
the others. 
Only a small number of agents whose activation exceeds a certain threshold 
form the Working Memory (WM). The agents that are outside of the WM cannot 
perform any symbolic operations – they are assumed invisible. For the agents that are 
involved in the WM, the activation level determines the speed of the symbolic 
processing. Each elementary symbolic operation (namely read, send, modify, etc.) has 
a ‘price’ that is paid with activation. Whenever an agent wants to perform such an 
operation, it begins to accumulate activation in order to pay the required price. Only 
after it is ready, can it perform the operation. Therefore, the most active agents work 
rapidly, the less active ones – slowly, and the inactive ones do not work at all. In this 
manner, the relevance influences the symbolic part of the architecture. 
There is also an opposite dependence. The symbolic operations cause new 
agents to be born, and new connections to be established. This changes the overall 
pattern of activation. Thus, the symbolic operations influence the pattern of relevance 
too. 
 
4.2.3   The Coalitions of Agents 
DUAL – agents are very simple and some of the more important properties of 
the architecture could be observed if looked at from a distant perspective.  
DUAL – agents form coalitions, i.e., sets of agents, together with the pattern of 
interactions among them. Coalitions represent more complex entities like propositions 
or situations. However, the coalitions are not part of the strict computational 
description of the architecture. Instead, they enhance the conceptual understanding 
only. 
 
Three important properties of the architecture become visible only at the level of 
coalitions. The coalitions are decentralized, emergent, and dynamic. None of these 
properties is presented in the individual agents. The coalitions vary in the intensity of 
the interactions among their members in comparison to the intensity of interactions 
with the outside agents. ‘Tight’ and ‘loose’ coalitions could be distinguished in 
respect to this ratio and there is a whole continuum between these two extremes. 
Coalitions do not have clear-cut boundaries. Instead, the same agent can 
participate in two or more coalitions and to a different extent. In the course of time, 
the coalitions can become ‘tighter’ or ‘looser’, can break up, and new coalitions can 
emerge. 
 31
4.4 The AMBR Model 
 
4.3.1   Main Ideas 
Since JUDGEMAP treats judgment as a process of mapping (or roughly 
speaking, a kind of analogy - making), it is based on the Associative Memory Based 
Reasoning (AMBR) (Kokinov, 1994a, 1998, Kokinov & Petrov, 2001) model. AMBR 
is a model for analogy making based on DUAL. It treats analogy making as an 
emergent result of the common work of several overlapping sub-processes – 
perception, retrieval, mapping, transfer, evaluation, and learning. However, AMBR is 
a long-term project and unfortunately, at the current stage only the processes of 
retrieval, mapping, and transfer are modeled and integrated. 
AMBR is capable of capturing some similarities between local structures of 
agents and mapping them, creating hypotheses for correspondences. It is a pressure 
for these mappings to grow, involving other agents. In this way, a Constraint 
Satisfaction Network is formed. Just as in the process of crystallization, the system 
strives to a stable equilibrium, changing quantitatively itself. Because the structure–
based mappings emerge locally and grow, often some inconsistent hypotheses meet 
and compete with each other and sometimes blending between episodes occurs. 
 
4.3.2 Mechanisms Used in AMBR 
Several AMBR mechanisms will be briefly reviewed in this section. These 
mechanisms were explicitly designed for modeling the process of analogy – making.  
 
4.3.2.1   Spreading Activation 
The sources of activation are two special nodes – INPUT and GOAL. The node 
INPUT represents the perception of the system, whereas the node GOAL – the current 
tasks of the system. AMBR’s work begins when some agents that represent the 
environment, are attached to INPUT, and some other agents, which represent the task 
– to GOAL. The activation then spreads through the Long-Term Memory (LTM) 
network. 
 
The spreading activation mechanism defines the working memory, determines 
the speed of the symbolic processes performed by each individual agent, and 
underlies the relaxation of the constraint satisfaction network. 
 
4.3.2.2  Marker Passing 
AMBR marks the instance-agents1, which enter in the WM; they in turn mark 
their respective concepts; then the markers spread to their neighbors that are up in the 
class hierarchy, and so on. 
 
The main purpose of the mechanism is to justify some semantic similarities 
between two agents. Whenever two markers cross somewhere, AMBR creates a 
hypothesis about a correspondence between the two marker origins. The justification 
for this hypothesis is the fact that these two origins have a common super-class, i.e., 
they are similar in something. Note, that AMBR makes such inferences only if the 
whole paths of the markers involve only relevant agents. 
 
                                                 
1 AMBR differentiates instance-agents (responsible for individual items) from concept-agents 
(responsible for classes of homogeneous entities). 
 32
4.3.2.3 Structural Correspondences. 
Like marker passing, this mechanism creates hypotheses between agents. The 
difference is that the former is sensitive to semantic justifications, whereas the latter – 
to propositional ones. There are different kinds of structural correspondences – if two 
relations are mapped, their arguments should also be mapped; if two instances are 
mapped, their respective concepts should be mapped. 
 
Because several mechanisms create hypotheses independently, it is possible for 
some of them to be duplicated, or some of them to be contradictory. A special 
mechanism, namely secretary’s work, establishes inhibitory or excitatory links 
between them. 
 
4.3.2.4 The Constraint Satisfaction Network 
The Constraint Satisfaction Network (CSN) consists of hypotheses for 
correspondences and is interconnected with the main one. Each hypothesis receives 
activation from its arguments and from its justifications. It is also inhibited from its 
competitors. Thus, CSN simultaneously reflects the semantic, pragmatic, and 
structural pressures of the analogy–making  task. Due to the CSN, the global behavior 
of the system emerges from the local interactions between agents. 
 
4.3.2.5 Rating and Promotion 
Because at some moment the system should finish its work, each agent rates its 
competing hypotheses at regular time intervals. If one of them holds for a long time as 
a leader, it is promoted to a winner. 
Note, that there is not any central executor that monitors the CSN and decides 
whether the network is relaxed enough. Instead, some hypotheses become winners 
locally and in asynchrony. This allows blending between episodes to occur, or unique 
solutions to be found (of course, sometimes useless solutions are also proposed by the 
system). 
 
4.3.2.6  Skolemization and Transfer 
These mechanisms augment the descriptions of the episodes based on semantic 
or structural information. Their goal is to ensure a tolerance to lack of information, or 
to reformulations of the task. However, there is no need of these mechanisms in a 
judgment task. 
 
4.5 The JUDGEMAP Model 
 
Like AMBR, JUDGEMAP is based on the DUAL cognitive architecture. 
Moreover, the two models are integrated and share the same mechanisms. 
 
4.5.1 The Agent’s Types 
JUDGEMAP consists of nothing but DUAL agents of various kinds. The 
individual agents carry information about the entities that they represent. Each agent’s 
type keeps an agenda of possible operations that the agents of this type can perform. 
The type of each agent is marked with a tag in the :type G-slot of its micro-frame. 
 
There are four major types of agents in JUDGEMAP: concepts, instances, 
hypotheses, and justifications. The first three are inherited from AMBR; the fourth 
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one is a novel one. All types are systematized in a taxonomic manner and are 
illustrated in fig. 4.4.  
Concept–agents (for short concepts) represent classes of homogeneous entities 
and are organized in a semantic network. They are interconnected via vertical links, 
labeled :subc and :superc, for pointing respectively to their super-classes and some of 
their sub-classes. They are interconnected also horizontally, pointing to some 
associations and prototypical relations. Note that concepts can stand for objects as 
well as for relations and abstract terms. 
JUDGEMAP proposes two special kinds of concepts: 
Comparison-relations represent classes of specific relations that have two 
arguments and express a comparison between these arguments. Examples of 
comparison-relations are concepts like “longer_than”, “cheaper_than”, “better_than”, 
etc. They are equipped with the specific procedural knowledge that allows them to 
recognize manifestations of the relation for which they are responsible among 
relevant items.  
Having comparisons between two objects, the model would theoretically be able 
to order the stimuli on an ordinal scale, i.e. it might be able to represent the fact that 
stimulus A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C. However, in order to be able to 
map these stimuli on an interval scale it should also be able to differentiate between 
and compare two comparison relations, i.e. to be able to say that A is much bigger 
than B, than B is to C. People make such statements quite often. For example, most 
Bulgarian citizens would not only recognize that Everest is higher than the Rila 
mountain, and that the Rila mountain is higher than Vitosha, but they would definitely 
also recognize that the difference between Everest and Rila is (in fact much) bigger 
that between Rila and Vitosha. This would require a second-order relation between 
comparison relations. (And if we also need to be able to say that one difference is 
much bigger than another one, then we would also need third-order relations. 
However, we do not really need the third-order relations in order to be able to form 
interval scales and that is why we did not introduce such relations – in addition, they 
instance hypothesis justification
standard Comparison 
relations 
Correspondence 
relations
permanent temporary
embryo mature winner 
concept 
first order second order first order second order 
JUGGEMAP-2 agent
Fig.4.4. Main types of agents, used by JUDGEMAP 
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seem to be too complicated and it would not be justified to introduce them without 
checking whether people really use them.) Thus, JUDGEMAP involves first and 
second-order comparison relations.   
Correspondence–relations represent the specific tasks of judgment. For 
example, if the task is to judge lengths of lines, one correspondence relation 
represents the knowledge “longer lines have to correspond to higher ratings”. These 
correspondence-relations can be temporary agents that do not participate in Long-
Term Memory. The correspondence relations trigger the mechanisms for the 
construction of hypotheses about correspondences.  
 
Instance-agents (instances) represent individual entities. Each instance has a G-
slot, labeled :inst-of that points to its respective category concept. Links, labeled 
:instance connect the concepts to some of their instances. Some instances are 
permanent – they are part of LTM and represent concrete memory traces. Other 
instances are temporary – they are constructed on the spot because of certain 
inferences (usually as a result of the work of comparison-relations). Some magnitudes 
can be represented with numbers that are filled in specific slots of the instances. 
 
Hypothesis agents represent possible correspondences between entities  (e.g., 
between stimuli and scale labels). They are temporary agents; they do not participate 
in LTM; and if they lose their relevance, they disappear. Hypotheses are organized in 
a constraint satisfaction network (consisting of excitatory and inhibitory links). From 
the relaxation of this network, the responses of the system emerge. Each hypothesis 
has its ‘life cycle’ – it can transform itself from embryo to mature hypothesis, and 
then to winner. These sub-types reflect the degree to which the hypotheses are novel 
and attractive. 
 
Creation of a hypothesis requires a reason for this to be found. The reasons are 
inferred from the common effort of several agents and are expressed by justification 
agents (for short – justification). The justifications are also temporary. Their purpose 
is to combine many data into a single inference and then to create a hypothesis, which 
represents this inference. 
 
4.5.2 JUDGEMAP Processing 
One judgment session usually involves several overlapping processes. 
The instance that represents the target stimulus to be judged is attached to the 
INPUT and GOAL nodes, assuming that on the one hand, people see the stimulus, 
and on the other, it is part of the task. The concept that represents the scale, together 
with some contextual elements (if any) is also attached to INPUT. The respective 
correspondence relation (e.g. bigger corresponds to higher rating) is connected to the 
GOAL node. 
 
Due to the spreading activation mechanism, similar exemplars from LTM, 
relevant concepts, possibly together with their prototypes (if any), and various 
properties of the target stimulus can enter WM. Some recently judged stimuli might 
also stay active even if they are not similar to the target. The activation spreads 
through more abstract concepts and then again to their instances. 
 
Other mechanisms do not wait until the activation stabilizes; they run in parallel. 
Each instance–agent that enters the WM emits markers. The concepts transmit them 
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to their super-classes and via special mechanisms for exchanging argument-related 
messages, to the relations that may interest them. Some concepts send argument-
related requests to other concepts, asking them for their markers. The receivers of 
such requests answer by sending back argument-related answers with the requested 
information. (This mechanism is to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter). 
 
The comparison-relations collect and update the information that is relevant to 
their goals. They can compare two magnitudes or two local structures and if they 
satisfy the relation they dynamically create their own temporary instance. 
 
Soon after the first such instances establish and send their markers, the 
correspondence relations begin their work. They check whether some established 
comparisons, together with some existing hypotheses could be viewed as reasons for 
other hypotheses. For example, the knowledge that “line-A is longer than line-B”, 
together with the already established correspondence “line-B<-->rating-5” makes the 
hypotheses that “line-A could be judged with rating-6 or rating-7” reasonable. 
The correspondence-relations build justification-agents on the basis of such 
inferences. The purpose of the justification-agents is to combine the effort of all 
agents that together explicit the respective inference. After their establishment, these 
justification-agents in their turn create new hypotheses for correspondences. 
 
For various reasons and at various moments of time many new hypotheses 
emerge. Some of them duplicate each other and in this case, they combine their 
justifications; the contradictory ones create inhibitory links between themselves. In 
this way, a constraint satisfaction network is formed. When a certain hypothesis about 
the target wins over the competitors, it is considered as the response of the model. 
Then the system receives the next target stimulus without any initialization and 
continues with its judgment. 
 
4.5.3 Back to the Phenomena 
As mentioned above, the starting point for modeling JUDGEMAP were DUAL 
principles, which were assumed to be at the core of human cognition. Some of the 
mechanisms used by the model may seem too complicated, others unnecessary, etc. 
They allow, however, integrating JUDGEMAP with other models within the 
framework of a single architecture. From this perspective, judgment seems not to be a 
separate module but a natural part of human cognition. 
However, the model would not contribute much, if it fails when verifying it 
against the experimental data. In this subsection, possible explanations of some of the 
observed effects are discussed in terms of JUDGEMAP mechanisms. The real 
verification, of course, could arise only from the simulation results presented in 
chapter 6. 
 
In short, we assume that one of the main sources of assimilation effects is the 
association–based spreading activation, whereas the contrast effects arise from the 
mechanisms for creating comparisons and also from the competition between 
competing hypotheses. 
We suppose that sequential assimilation occurs because of the residual 
activation of the previous rating. The overall pattern of activation over all scale values 
changes dynamically. There are always some ratings which are more active and some 
others which are less active. The hypotheses for correspondences, however, receive 
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positive activation from two sources – from their justifications, and from their 
elements. The role of the justifications in the competition between hypotheses is 
intuitively clear. However, the role of the relevance of the elements of the hypotheses 
does not seem essential for the judgment task. It is a consequence of the basic 
mechanisms that underlie analogy–making (in particular - mappings). 
JUDGEMAP points to an important differentiation: sequential assimilation is 
not towards the previous stimulus, but towards its rating – just as it was observed in 
the experimental data (Petrov & Anderson, 2000; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). 
 
The main sources of the contrast effects in JUDGEMAP are two. On the one 
hand, the comparison between the stimuli highlights their differences and hence 
creates a pressure for their ratings to be differentiated too. On the other hand, the soft 
version of the pressure for one-to-one mappings1 causes a tendency for the scale 
labels to be used an almost equal number of times (in accordance with the frequency 
principle). This pressure is inherited from the AMBR model. The importance of one-
to-one mapping is obvious in analogy making, but not in a judgment task. Thus, the 
assumption that the same mechanism produces the mapping in analogy and judgment 
explains the emergence of the frequency principle in judgment. 
 
4.5.4 Comparison with Other Theories and Models 
This section discusses the main ideas that JUDGEMAP shares with other 
theories. 
For example, the creation of comparisons could be considered as a basic 
mechanism for the JUDGEMAP model. Comparisons between the target stimulus and 
the memory traces are also in the core of the Comparison-Based Judgments 
(Mussweiler, 2003) and the Two-Paths Model (Manis, Paskewitz, 1984). Like the 
latter JUDGEMAP assumes that comparisons always cause contrast, in contrast with 
the assumptions of the former model. The expectation path, proposed by the Two-
paths model is analogical in many respects to the influence of the residual activation 
on DUAL’s behavior. 
However, JUDGEMAP differs from both models in several respects. First, being 
a computational model, it proposes more concrete mechanisms. Second, it creates 
comparisons dynamically, one after another, and in parallel with other working 
mechanisms. Third, several sub-mechanisms in JUDGEMAP reflect the relevance of 
the items: the speed of creation of comparisons; and the strength with which these 
comparisons would influence the other agents. 
 
JUDGEMAP could be considered as being similar to the Norm Theory 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986) in respect to the associative memory–based principles, 
responsible for the construction of the comparison set. One point in which they differ 
is that the Norm Theory assumes a construction of an explicit norm, whereas in 
JUDGEMAP such a norm could be viewed as an implicit emergent result. 
JUDGEMAP is also endowed with other additional mechanisms, which contribute to 
the judgment process, and is implemented in a computer program. 
 
Several theories are complementary to JUDGEMAP, i.e. are focused on some 
complementary aspects of the problem. Perceptual Learning Theory (Goldstone, 
1998) and Integration Theory (Anderson, 1971) fall in this group. One of the future 
                                                 
1 Hypotheses that connect one and the same rating with different stimuli compete with each other 
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goals of the DUAL research group is to augment JUDGEMAP with mechanisms for 
perception and categorization. 
 
JUDGEMAP shares with the EBWR model (Nosofsky, 1997) the idea that 
judgment is a result of a competition between alternative hypotheses, and that 
comparisons between the target and some memory traces justify these hypotheses. 
However, there are several differences between the two models. EBWR consists 
of mathematical formulas and involves stochastic elements, whereas JUDGEMAP is a 
multi-agent deterministic model that is grounded on a larger cognitive architecture 
(and hence, it is integrated with other cognitive models). EBWR assumes strictly 
exemplar–based memory, whereas DUAL and the models based on it allow the 
combination of both exemplar–based and prototype–based approaches. 
 
Both JUDGEMAP and the ANCHOR model (Petrov, 2005) are computational 
models, based on large cognitive architectures (ANCHOR is based on ACT-R). 
ANCHOR assumes a two-step process – first, simultaneous comparisons between the 
target stimulus and all prototypes of scale labels, followed by an explicit correction 
strategy. The ANCHOR model has an advantage with respect to its learning 
mechanism that accounts for the dynamical changes of the representation of the 
categories. Its behavior, however, (unlike JUDGEMAP’s) is restricted by special 
predefined parameters that depend on the concrete type of stimuli and scale. 
 
Since JUDGEMAP integrates analogy-making with judgment, and proposes 
concrete computational mechanisms, it makes a step ahead of many descriptive 
theories of judgment. 
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CHAPTER V 
Detailed Description of the Model 
 
 
5.1  Knowledge Encoding 
 
All the knowledge of JUDGEMAP is represented by a network of a huge 
number of DUAL-agents. Each agent has a name. It is practical to use mnemonic 
names, like line, color-of and longer. However, these names are irrelevant to the 
program itself; it would work in the same way had the agents been named ag0001, 
ag0002, etc. 
DUAL-agents also have specific types, which determine the set of operations 
that a given agent can perform. Again, words like concept, instance, and hypothesis 
are used for naming types, with full awareness that these names serve only the 
documentation of the model, not its actual work. 
 
5.1.1 Representation of Concepts and Instances 
The concept-agents represent classes of objects, whereas the instance-agents 
represent individual entities. This differentiation is popular in AI domain; it is known 
also as type vs. token, and class vs. instance distinction. 
 
The concepts are arranged in a taxonomic semantic network via :subc and 
:superc links.  The instance-agents are related to the concepts via links :inst-of and 
:instance (fig 5.1.). 
Each concept can be connected to zero, one, or more of its super-classes or sub-
classes. It is an assumption, however, that the top-down links :superc and :instance 
represent only the most salient subclasses and instances, hence they cannot be too 
subc 
Abstract figure 
subc 
Geometrical figure 
Circle 
Line
Line-15 
Line-13
Line-21
inst-of 
instance 
inst-of 
inst-of 
subc 
subc 
subc 
Square
superc 
superc 
Fig. 5.1. The concepts and instances are represented by a hierarchical semantic network. The concepts are 
interconnected via :subc and :superc links, whereas the instances are connected to the concepts via :inst-of and 
:instance links. From each concept only few top-down links go out. 
 39
many (usually 1-4). The exact definition of the term salient is still under discussion 
within the DUAL research team. In JUDGEMAP two types of agents were defined to 
be more salient – the prototypes and the recently used instances.  The top-down links 
from a concept to its prototypes are predefined and stable. The links to the recently 
used ones are temporal (named :t-instance); they are created at the moment when the 
concept receives a marker from them; and their weight slowly decreases in time. 
 
Some instances are temporal and do not belong to long-term memory. They are 
constructed on the spot as a response to certain inferences, and if they fall out of WM, 
they disappear forever. In JUDGEMAP, such temporary instances represent the 
knowledge about comparisons between objects (for example, line18 is longer than 
line10). This knowledge is relevant in the context of judgment of lengths of lines, but 
after losing its relevance, the system forgets it. (Of course, the same knowledge can 
be constructed again, if needed.) 
 
5.1.2 Representation of Relations and Propositions 
Some multi-agent memory models separate objects from relations. JUDGEMAP 
does not follow this approach. Relations are represented in the same way as their 
arguments – via a network of concepts and instances. A piece of propositional 
knowledge (line2-15 is longer than line1-10; and the latter is green) is presented in 
fig. 5.2. 
It is not difficult to distinguish the proposition line2-15 is longer than line 1-10 
from the inverse one – line-1-10 is longer than line2-15, because of the elaborated 
DUAL representational scheme (Kokinov, 1988, 1994a). DUAL-agents have G-slots, 
which represent some general knowledge about the agent, but also have S-slots, in 
which different aspects of the knowledge are organized. The more detailed description 
of the propositions line2-15 is longer than line1-10 and line-2-15 is green is presented 
as a transcript in fig. 5.3. 
Geometrical figure 
Spatial relation 
Physical relation 
Color
Line
Longer Color-of
Green
Line-2-15
Line-1-10
Longer17
Color-of20
Green8
subc 
subc 
subc 
subc 
c-coref c-coref c-coref 
c-coref 
inst-of 
inst-of inst-of 
inst-of inst-of 
subc 
subc 
subc 
subc 
Fig. 5.2. The propositional knowledge is represented by coalitions of interconnected instances and 
concepts. (Fig. 5.3. demonstrates in more detail some of the agents and links.) 
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Longer 
   :type :concept 
   :subc spatial_relation 
   :slot1 
      :subc (spatial_relation . :slot1) 
      :c-coref object 
   :slot2 
      :subc (spatial_relation . :slot2) 
     :c-coref object
Longer17 
   :type (:instance temporary) 
   :inst-of longer 
   :slot1 
      :inst-of (longer . :slot1) 
      :c-coref line2-15 
   :slot2 
      :inst-of (longer . :slot2) 
      :c-coref line1-10 
Color-of-20 
   :type :instance 
   :inst-of color-of 
   :slot1 
      :inst-of (color-of . :slot1) 
      :c-coref line1-10 
   :slot2 
      :inst-of (color-of . :slot2) 
      :c-coref green8 
Green8 
   :type :instance 
   :inst-of green 
   :c-coref (color-of-20 . :slot2) 
Color-of 
   :type :concept 
   :subc physical_relation 
   :slot1 
      :subc (physical_relation . :
      :c-co
slot1) 
ref object 
 (physical_relation . :slot2) 
   :slot2 
      :subc
      :c-coref color
Line1-10 
   :type :instance 
   :inst-of line 
   :c-coref ((longer17 . :slot2) 
                   (color-of-20 . :slot1)) 
Line2-15 
   :type :instance 
   :inst-of line 
   :c-coref (longer17 . :slot1) 
Fig.5.3. Coalition of seven agents, which represents two propositions – line2-15 is longer than l
10 and line1-10 is green. The coalition does not have any clear boundaries – it is interco
with the main network. Fig. 5.2. presents the same knowledge in nodes – links diagram. 
ine1-
nnected 
The conceptual co-references (c-coref) connect two complementary aspects of 
the same entity. In the example below, line1-10 point to the same thing in the outside 
world as the second argument (:slot2) of longer17. That is why they are connected 
with the :c-coref link. 
 
The S-slot labels, like :slot1, :slot2, etc. are absolutely arbitrary and their order 
does not have any prescribed meaning1. The arguments of a given relation are defined 
only by :inst-of or :subc facets, which are within each specific slot. It is possible for 
some aspects of an agent to be highlighted in a certain context, or some other aspects 
to disappear from WM. It is possible for an agent to have temporal slots – they can be 
constructed or removed on the spot. Hence, it is practical to keep the meaning of the 
arguments of the relations independent of any reordering of the S-slot labels. Only the 
pointers to their parents define their meaning. Such organization provides greater 
flexibility. It is possible for two different slots in a child-agent to inherit from one and 
the same slot in the parent-agent, or some parent’s slots to be left unused in the child-
agent, etc. 
 
5.1.3 Representation of Perceived Properties 
DUAL does not yet deal satisfactorily with perception. The only steps in this 
direction were made by constructing the PEAN model (Nestor, 2004), but 
unfortunately, this model is not fully integrated with the architecture. Hence, it is not 
                                                 
1 The only exceptions are the most abstract relations. The order of their S-slots (if any) does have a 
prescribed meaning. 
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yet defined how JUDGEMAP could construct new perceived instances on its own and 
how it can interconnect them with the others. Instead, ready-made instances are 
constructed manually and presented to the model. 
In order to judge a certain stimulus, several conditions appear necessary. First, 
one needs to recognize and classify the stimulus, i.e. to fill its :inst-of slot. Second, 
one needs to recognize its relevant aspects, i.e. its properties. This means a coalition 
of DUAL-agents to be created and interconnected via :c-coref links. Third, one needs 
to represent somehow the quantitative knowledge about these aspects. This is done by 
filling in a special slot, named :amount, with a real number (e.g. the magnitude of the 
stimulus). Leaving some questions for future discussions (for example, is it necessary 
to recognize the stimulus in order to judge its properties), the work of JUDGEMAP 
begins after manually creating coalitions like the one shown in fig. 5.4. 
The number 125 in the slot :amount of length-18 does not mean meters, inches, 
or something like that. It is just an internal representation of the physical magnitude. 
For simple stimuli, like lines’ lengths, the exact function that transforms the physical 
magnitude into its internal representation can be experimentally obtained using 
Weber’s low as a template and adjusting the coefficients in it. 
JUDGEMAP, however, uses numbers as fillers of the :amount slots also for 
much more ambiguous and uncertain properties. In the context of judging food, a 
coalition, representing the aspects of a certain cheese, is shown on fig. 5.5. Here, it is 
not clear what the concrete physical magnitudes, responsible for the quality (taste) of 
the cheese are but the model assumes that the internal psychological representation of 
the taste may be coded with a number for the model’s purposes1. 
Representation of internal magnitudes with real numbers is used in other models 
for judgment as well, but still looks too artificial. Note, however, that JUDGEMAP 
does not use these numbers in any complex calculations. The only purpose of the 
:amount slot is to be used in construction of comparisons between entities (the 
mechanism is described in detail further in the text). For example, if the system 
Line15 
   :type :instance 
   :inst-of line 
   :c-coref length-18 
Length-18 
   :type :instance 
   :inst-of length 
   :amount 125 
   :c-coref line15 
Fig. 5.4. Representation of the information that line15 has length 125. 
Price-2 
  :type  :instance 
  :inst-of  price 
  :c-coref  cheese-15 
  :amount  18 
Cheese-15 
  :type  :instance 
  :inst-of  cheese 
  :c-coref  (price-2 quality-12) 
Quality-12 
  :type  :instance 
  :inst-of  quality 
  :c-coref  cheese-15 
  :amount  150 
Fig.5.5 Representation of a certain instance of cheese, together with its price and q
(see text for details). 
uality 
‘knows’ that line10 is long 10, line12 – 12, line20 – 20, then it is able to m
                                                
ake 
 
1 However, JUDGEMAP does not deal yet with the judgment of very abstract concepts like the beauty 
of an idea. 
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inferences that line20 is longer than line12, line12 is longer than line10, and that the 
difference between lengths of line20 and line12 is bigger than the difference between 
lengths of line12 and line10. (fig . 5.6.) 
much-longer 
longer longer 
Line-20 Line-12 Line-10 
Fig. 5.6. The system is able to make comparisons between instances and, inductively, comparisons between 
comparisons. 
It is possible, however, that human perceptual mechanisms may build these 
com
.1.4 Representation of Scales 
e, scales are represented in DUAL as 
coalit
Each individual rating is represented by a single instance-agent, which has 
:amou
parisons more directly, without using any internal magnitudes. Nevertheless, 
since JUDGEMAP focuses on the mechanisms of the judgment process, it was 
assumed that the system is able to make the discussed comparisons between items. 
 
5
Like each other piece of knowledg
ions of micro-agents (fig. 5.7.). 
nt slot, filled with the concrete number. It also has :inst-of  link to the concept 
number. The ratings, participating in a certain scale (and only they), also have in their 
:inst-of slot links to the ‘head’ of the scale (which is a concept-agent). Of course, one 
number can participate in many different scales, and it is not possible to fill its :inst-of 
slot with too many concepts. Only the prototypical scales have to be defined. Because 
this question is not essential for JUDGEMAP purposes, it is left open, waiting to be 
solved together with the more general problems of recognition and generalization in 
the DUAL architecture. For the simulations, JUDGEMAP does not use more than one 
1 
:amount 1 
Seven-point scale number 
3 
:amount 3
4 
:amount 42 
:amount 2 8 
:amount 8 0 
:amount 0 
6 
:amount 6
7 
:amount 7 
5 
:amount 5
Fig. 5.7. Representation of the scale from 1 to 7. Scale labels are just numbers and can participate in 
a-link 
link 
a-link a-link -link 
a-link a-link a-link 
a
a-
other scales or relations. Neighboring ratings are connected with associative links. 
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scale simultaneously, and does not use too many scales at all (actually in the 
simulations a 2-point, a 3-point, a 7-point, and 100-point scales are used). 
 
As shown in fig. 5.7. :a-links connect the neighboring rating labels. The 
associative links (a-links) are used in DUAL-based models to represent associations 
between entities that cannot be represented with other types of links (the classical 
example is cow - milk). A-links do not have any semantic meaning; they serve only 
the connectionist aspect of the system. Thus, the order of the scale is not explicitly 
represented. However, it can be inferred by comparisons between the fillers of the 
:amount slots. 
It is not predetermined that a-links necessary connect neighboring ratings and 
only them. For example, in a 100-point scale a-links connect also the rating labels 10 
with 20, 20 with 30, etc. Moreover, the a-links can be asymmetrical. They are usually 
weighted higher in the direction from smaller to larger rating, than vice versa (it is 
more difficult to count from 10 to 1 than from 1 to10). A special tool is implemented 
in DUAL that generates randomly variations of the knowledge base, varying the 
weights of the :instance and :a-links. In this way various “individuals” are simulated 
who perform the same judgment task. 
 
5.1.5 Representation of the Task for Judgment 
The task “Please, judge the property P of the stimulus S on scale A” consists of 
three explicit elements – P, S, and A, and some implicit ones. For example, in 
judgment of lengths of lines, it is assumed that longer lines have to receive higher 
ratings. Moreover, it is implicitly assumed that to almost equal differences between 
two lengths have to correspond almost equal differences between their ratings. 
Knowledge of this sort is explicitly represented in JUDGEMAP by a special 
kind of concepts, called correspondence–relations. An example of such an agent is 
shown in fig. 5.8. 
Correspondence–relations are usually temporal agents. They exist only during 
the period the respective task for judgment is relevant. The facets of type :argument in 
their S-slots serve both the connectionist and the symbolic aspects of the model.  
Symbolic messages and their responses can be exchanged through those links. 
Using such messages, the correspondence–relations become ‘aware’ about number of 
relevant properties and are able to make inferences about them (detailed description of 
the process is presented in 5.3.4). 
 
Longer <-> higher rating 
   :type :concept 
   :subc correspondence–relation-rang1 
   :a-link much-longer<-> much-higher-rating 
   :slot1 
      :subc (correspondence–relation-rang1 . :slot1) 
      :argument longer 
   :slot2 
      :subc (correspondence–relation-rang1 . :slot2) 
      :argument seven-point-scale 
Fig. 5.8. An example of correspondence–relation of rank1. It represents the knowledge that longer lines have 
to receive higher ratings. 
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As shown in fig. 5.8. the implicit knowledge about judgment is represented by  
an a-link to another correspondence–relation –much-longer<-> much-higher-rating 
(fig. 5.9). 
It represents the more complicated information that in judgment one has to 
choose ratings not only according to the relative position of the stimulus, but also 
according to its absolute range. One example is shown in fig. 5.10. 
Line20 is longer than both line10 and line12, and obviously, it is a good idea to 
judge it with a rating higher than 4. However, because the middle line (line12) is 
closer to line10 than to line20, there is a pressure also to judge line20 with even 
greater ratings – 6 or 7. 
Inductively, correspondence–relations of rang 3, 4, etc. can be constructed. 
However, this requires much more resources – working memory, calculations, etc. 
The correspondence–relations of higher order receive activation only from those of 
lower order. Hence the higher their order is, the less active they are, until they become 
inactive at all. Without putting any strong limitations, JUDGEMAP uses in the 
simulations only first and second order correspondence–relations. 
 
Much-longer <-> Much-higher rating 
   :type :concept 
   :subc correspondence–relation-rang2 
   :slot1 
      :subc (correspondence–relation-rang2 . :slot1) 
      :argument more-longer 
   :slot2 
      :subc (correspondence–relation-rang2 . :slot2) 
      :argument seven-point-scale 
    
Fig. 5.9. An example of correspondence–relation of rank2. It represents the knowledge that if the difference of 
two lengths is higher than the difference of two other, this has to reflect analogically onto their ratings too. 
Line10 Line12 Line20 
2 4 ? 
Fig. 5.10. The purpose of correspondence–relations of higher order is to ensure pressure to judge 
also according to the absolute position of the stimulus. 
5.2 Spreading Activation 
 
The activation level in DUAL-based models represents the relevance of the 
respective agent to the context. The spreading activation mechanism defines the 
working memory of the system as the set of all agents, whose relevance exceeds a 
certain threshold. Activation also determines the speed of each symbolic processor. 
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5.2.1 Activation Functions 
From a connectionist point of view, the DUAL-based models work like huge 
connectionist networks. Each agent receives activation from many other agents and 
sums it via the input function n=n (t), where t is the time. All links are excitatory 
(with the exception of hypothesis – agents, described in section 5.4.6), and this 
guarantees that n (t)>=0. 
 
From a conceptual point of view, it is assumed that time is continuous. The 
computational realization, however, uses quanta of time, the length of which is 
negligible small in comparison to the macroscopic time scale. 
The connectionist processor of each agent calculates the new activation level anew 
at each elementary cycle on the basis of the previous level aold and the net input n, 
using the same activation function, like the one used by the AMBR model (Petrov, 
Kokinov). 
 
| anew = 0,                                         if  aold + E.n.(M-aold) - d.aold < Θ 
| anew = M,                                       if  aold + E.n.(M-aold) - d.aold > M 
| anew=aold + E.n.(M-aold) - d.aold,   otherwise, 
 
where M = const is the maximal activation value, E and d are parameters that 
control the rate of excitation and decay respectively, Θ is a threshold. As was 
mentioned above, anew is the new activation level, aold – the old one, n is the net input. 
 
This function has the following properties: 
1) It is a non-decreasing function with respect to the input n. 
2) The activation level of each agent is bound between 0 and M. 
3) All activation levels, which are smaller than the threshold Θ clip to zero. 
4) It is a spontaneous decay and each agent loses its activation in the absence of 
external support. 
 
At each connectionist cycle each agent also sends activation, the amount of which 
is calculated through the output function o (t) = a (t), i.e. the total output is equal to 
the activation level. This is done by normalizing the weights of all outgoing links so 
that their sum is always equal to 1. The normalization of the weights is one of the 
mechanisms, responsible for preventing working memory from unlimited growth. 
 
5.2.2 INPUT and GOAL Nodes 
The INPUT and GOAL nodes are the sources of activation. Their activation level 
is always equal to the maximal value M. By attaching different agents to them, 
respectively perceptions and tasks are simulated. Each simulation of judgment of a set 
of stimuli looks like the following: The respective correspondence–relation, together 
with the concept for the scale is attached to a GOAL node (for example – the relation 
longer<->higher-rating and the concept seven-point-scale). Then the stimuli are 
attached to both GOAL and INPUT sequentially, one after another, and are removed 
from there immediately after a response is given. Various context or priming objects 
can be attached or removed from INPUT at any moment in time. It is possible for 
several stimuli to be given simultaneously for judgment; it is also possible for 
predefined correspondences between stimuli and ratings (anchors) to be constructed 
and attached to INPUT or GOAL. 
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Each agent, attached to GOAL, receives a tag :t-driver in it’s :type slot., which 
stays there while the agent stays on GOAL. The agents, connected to :t-driver agent, 
also receive the same tag (to remember, c-coref links connect two aspects of one and 
the same entity). Various mechanisms need the information about whether a certain 
agent is :t-driver or not. 
 
5.3   Marker-Passing and Exchanging Symbols 
 
Generally speaking, the marker-passing mechanism serves to find out whether a 
path between two agents is present or not. All symbolic interactions between agents, 
i.e. exchanging messages, are local and involve only two neighbors. The marker 
passing mechanism is not an exception, but it allows information about agents to be 
carried through longer distance as an emergent result. 
 
5.3.1 Marker Emission and Marker Passing 
Each instance-agent emits a marker when entering the WM – it sends it to its 
parent concepts through the :inst-of links. The marker itself is a symbolic structure 
that contains the name of the origin and information about whether the origin is :t-
driver or not. 
When it receives a marker, each concept agent analyzes it and performs with it the 
operations, which are specified in its symbolic routine (if any) – for example, answers 
to an argument-related request (this mechanism is described in the next section). After 
that, the concept stores a copy of the marker in its buffer (temporary local memory), 
and sends it to its neighbors, which are up in the class hierarchy through :subc links. 
In addition, if the origin is a direct instance of the concept, the latter creates a 
temporary top-down link of type :t-instance to the former. The weight of this link 
slowly decreases in time. 
 
To summarize, the presence of a marker in a certain concept codes the information 
that the concept ‘knows’: 
1) The marker origin is in WM; 
2) The marker origin is an instance of the respective concept – direct or by 
inheritance; 
3) Whether marker origin is :t-driver or not (i.e. is it attached to GOAL node or 
not). 
 
Note that the number of markers, stored in a particular concept, stay relatively 
small, because of the natural limitations of their spreading, emerging from the basic 
principles of DUAL architecture. Marker emission and marker passing are symbolic 
operations. Thus, only the active agents can emit, receive or transmit markers. 
Moreover, these operations require time, and this time depends on the activation level 
of the agents. Consequently, spreading markers is limited by the boundaries of WM. 
The speed of this spreading is extremely slow in its periphery. Because all processes 
in JUDGEMAP run in parallel, it often happens that the decision has been made and a 
response has been given before the very slow markers reach the respective concepts. 
Thus, only the most relevant agents participate in the decision-making process. 
In addition, only instance-agents emit markers, whereas the concepts only pass the 
existing ones. When an instance – agent leaves WM, all its markers are removed. As a 
final result, JUDGEMAP simulations show that even the most active concepts store 
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no more than 5-7 markers at each particular moment of time. The concepts analyze 
markers in a temporal order, reflecting their potential usefulness for the particular task 
and in the particular environment. 
 
5.3.2 Argument–Related Messages 
Sometimes concepts may need for their work to know the instances of another 
concept. This ‘communication’ is possible due to the links of type :argument and the 
messages that are exchanged through them. An example of a concept with :argument 
links is shown on fig. 5. 11. 
Links :argument between concepts point to the respective class of instances of 
interest. When a concept–agent enters WM, it sends an argument-related-request 
through it’s :argument links. This message means simply: “Send me the markers that 
you receive”. When a concept receives such a request, it memorizes it in its local 
memory, and each time it receives a marker, it sends an argument-related-answer. 
These answers are just like the markers, but they do not spread further. Only the 
symbolic processor of its receiver uses them. 
 
Longer-line 
   :type :concept 
   :subc longer 
   :argument (line more-length) 
   :slot1 
      :subc (longer . :slot1) 
      :c-coref line 
   :slot2 
      :subc (longer . :slot2) 
      :c-coref line 
Fig. 5.11. An example of comparison-relation and the use of :argument links (see text for details). 
5.4 Comparison-Relations 
 
The role of the comparison-relations is to recognize relations, for which they are 
responsible. For example, the relation longer-line (see fig 5.11.) receives information 
about the active lines via exchanging of markers and argument-related messages. If 
reasonable, it creates instance-agents of itself and interconnects them with the 
respective neighbors (fig. 5.12.). 
Longer-line 
c-coref 
inst-of 
Line10 Line15 
Longer-line-1 
c-coref 
Fig. 5.12. The role of the comparison relations (longer-line) is to recognize the relations, for which they 
are responsible, and to create instances of themselves (longer-line-1). 
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There are two types of comparison-relations, depending on whether their 
arguments have :amount slot or not. For example, the arguments of more-length are 
lengths, which have :amount slot, whereas the arguments of longer-line are lines, 
which do not. 
 
5.4.1 Comparisons between Amounts 
The comparison-relations of the first type simply compare the two amounts and 
depending on this comparison decide how to order the pointers in the S-slots of the 
new instance, e.g. define which amount is higher and which one - smaller. If, for 
example, the agent length-of-line-12 has :amount slot with filler 200, the agent length-
of-line-19 has :amount slot with filler 400, then the comparison-relation more-length, 
after receiving the necessary messages, would create a new comparison-instance-
agent, which codes that length-of-line-19 is more than length-of-line-12. The new 
instance also has :amount slot, which is filled with the difference of the two amounts, 
e.g. 200. 
 
Note that even simple objects like lines may have many different aspects and the 
information about them is distributed over many different agents. Hence, line-19 is 
something different from length-of-line-19, color-of-line-19, position-of-line-19, etc. 
In the same way, the comparison-relation more-length is something different from the 
comparison-relation longer-line, no matter that they represent the same information. 
 
5.4.2 Comparisons on the Base of Structures 
The comparison-relations of the second type work in a slightly more complicated 
manner. Longer-line (see fig. 5.12,) has :argument links both to the concepts line and 
more-length (the same more-length that was discussed above). Its behavior does not 
depend on any amounts, but only on the structural relationships. In short, if it receives 
argument-related-answers about: line19, line12 and length-of-line-19 is more than 
length-of-line-12, it starts the construction of the relation line-19 is longer than line-
12. 
 
Note that because of the specific way of symbolic computations in DUAL, there is 
no risk of “combinatorial explosion”. The new relations would not capture all pairs of 
instances. They emerge slowly, one after another, in an order that reflects their 
relevance. Just after the creation of the most relevant ones, the other processes in 
JUDGEMAP begin to work in parallel, and often the system gives a response long 
before the less active instances are compared. In addition, as many relations around a 
certain agent emerge, the so-called “fan-out” effect1 decreases the activation levels 
and creates a pressure for the next relations to be created with more difficulty. 
 
5.4.3 Comparisons of Higher-Order Relations 
All new relations are instance-agents in their nature, and hence have all the rights 
as the other instances, i.e. they emit markers, they can participate in argument-related 
messages, etc. Therefore, they can also be arguments of another comparison–instance. 
In this way, some comparison-relations may compare comparisons. The relations that 
compare comparisons are called second-order comparisons (fig 5.13). 
                                                 
1 ‘fan-out’ effect – because of the normalization of the weights of the links, the more output neighbors 
an agent has, the less activation it would send to them. 
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Longer-1 
:amount 8 
Line-12 
:amount 12 
Line-10 
:amount 10 
Longer-2 
:amount 2 
Line-20 
:amount 20 
more-longer-1 
:amount 6 
Fig. 5.13. Some comparison relations are responsible for comparisons of higher order. The information that 
the difference between line-20 and line-12 is higher than the difference between line-12 and line-10 is 
represented.
These comparison-relations (having comparisons for arguments) do not differ 
from the other comparison-relations in any way. Their activation level, however, is 
lower, because they receive activation only from their arguments. The conceptual idea 
is that such agents extract from the environment and encode more complicated 
information, involving more objects. This has a price, of course. They have less 
activation and work more slowly.  
 
Inductively, it is possible to define comparisons of third, fourth, and higher order. 
JUDGEMAP, however, uses only those from first and second order1, assuming that 
the more complicated ones would work so slowly that their work would not influence 
the processes.  
 
The comparison-relations from higher order are an important innovation. Their 
purpose is to equip the model with a capability to use the properties of the interval 
scales, not only of the ordinal ones. 
 
5.4.4 Fault Comparison-Relations 
It is possible for two instances to be equal in their amount. In this case the 
respective comparison-relation that compares them, again creates a new relation 
between them, but marks it as a fault comparison instance. This mark is used by the 
mechanisms for creating hypotheses. 
 
5.5 Correspondence–Relations and Justification Agents 
 
The correspondence–relations represent the information that a greater amount of 
the judged property has to correspond to higher rating (the information given in the 
instruction for judgment). These relations typically stay attached to GOAL node. The 
role of the correspondence–relations is to trigger the creation of new hypotheses 
between stimuli and ratings. 
 
                                                 
1 By convention, the name of the relations of second order replicates the names of those of first order, 
adding more at beginning, for example – longer and more-longer. 
 50
One of the assumptions behind all DUAL–based models is that each inference 
must have its justifications. The justifications themselves are usually semantic or 
structural, and hence are represented by DUAL agents. JUDGEMAP uses a separate 
class of justification agents, whose role is to combine different justifications in a 
single ‘head’ agent. 
The correspondence–relations are very similar to the comparison-relations, 
according to their micro-frame. Usually they have :argument links and via exchange 
of argument-related messages, they collect information about the available 
comparisons and grade labels (fig. 5. 14). 
The correspondence-relations, however, differ from the comparison ones in 
respect to the operations that they perform, when they receive argument-related 
answers. When a new comparison arrives, the correspondence–relations extract the 
hypotheses that one of the arguments of the comparison also have, and trigger 
creation of new hypotheses, which involve the other argument of the comparison and 
the appropriate scale labels1. For example, let us say for variety’s sake, the task is to 
rate cheeses on the basis of their price and quality. Suppose that there also exist a 
hypothesis to rate ‘chese1’ with rating 4. Let this cheese have price 3 and quality 10. 
Suppose that now the target stimulus is ‘cheese2’ with price 2 and quality 5. The 
system would detect that ‘cheese2’ is cheaper than ‘cheese1’ and would create a new 
comparison instance-agent about this fact. The marker that this instance emits, would 
come at a certain moment into the concept ‘cheaper’, then would continue to the 
concept ‘better’, and through an argument-related answer would receive in the 
correspondence–relation ‘better < -- > higher rating’. Now the correspondence–
relation would detect that a hypotheses to rate ‘cheese1’ with grade 4 exist, and hence, 
would trigger creation of hypotheses that involve the target ‘cheese2’ and the 
available ratings, which are higher than 4. Of course, in parallel, the relation ‘cheese1 
has better quality than cheese2’ would emerge, and this would be a justification to 
rate the target ‘cheese2’ with lower ratings. The final decision here would depend on 
other comparisons with other cheeses and on the relative relevance of the price and 
the quality. 
Note, that the meaning of ‘better’ is not strictly predefined by its prototypes. In a 
certain context, a different concept can be recognized as its subclass. For example, if 
Seven-point scale 
(concept) 
:argument 
:argument 
Better 
(comparison relation) 
Cheaper 
(comparison relation) 
:subc 
:subc 
Higher quality 
(comparison relation)
Better< -- >higher rating 
(correspondence–relation)
Fig. 5. 14. An example of a correspondence–relation (better < -- > higher rating), and its :argument links 
to comparison relations and scale concepts.
                                                 
1 New hypotheses can be created only for target stimuli, not for retrieved ones. 
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the necessary agents are active enough, the system may infer that ‘more yellowish’ is 
better, because yellow cheeses suit the tablecloth more. 
 
Analogically to the comparison-relations, the correspondence ones also have 
orders. The ones described above are of first order. The correspondence–relations of 
second order create hypotheses based on comparisons of second order, etc. For 
example, in the situation shown on fig. 5. 15, the information that the difference in 
price between ‘cheese1’ and ‘cheese2’ is higher than the difference between the prices 
of ‘cheese2’ and ‘cheese3’, together with the information that ‘cheese2’ was rated 
with 5, ‘cheese3’ – with 7, forms a justification to rate the target ‘cheese1’ with 
ratings that are smaller than 3. 
The exact algorithm for creating hypotheses is the following one. When a certain 
correspondence–relation is ready to infer a new hypothesis, it gathers all justifications 
for this inference – usually one comparison and one or more hypotheses. After that, it 
creates a new agent – justification agent, whose only work is to create the new 
hypothesis. The correspondence–relation does not do this job directly, because the 
speed of this creation has to depend on its justifications. The speed of the processes is 
a very important element of DUAL specification, and it must be carefully considered. 
The justification agents ensure that the order of hypotheses creation would reflect 
their relevance to the context. 
 
Cheese1 Cheese2 Cheese3 
price 
rating 
? 5 7 
Fig. 5. 15. The correspondence–relations of second order make inferences on the basis of comparisons of 
second order, and the available hypotheses and ratings. (See text for details)
5.6 Constraint Satisfaction 
 
5.6.1 Main Ideas 
The Constraint Satisfaction Network (CSN) consists of hypotheses and 
justification agents, which are interconnected with the main semantic long-term 
network. The justifications and the hypotheses are created locally and 
asynchronously. Thus, the CSN emerges dynamically in parallel with the other 
mechanisms of the model. 
 
The construction of hypotheses is based on reasons. In order to be created, each 
hypothesis has to have justifications – groups of other agents, which together describe 
the semantic or structural reason for the hypothesis. 
 
No time is spent waiting for the CSN to settle in order to read out the ‘solution’ 
from the activation pattern. Instead, the target stimulus along gives a response when it 
is ready without informing all agents of this. This allows cognition to be viewed as a 
continuous process, without breaks between the given tasks. 
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Each hypothesis agent has its ‘life cycle’, making several ‘metamorphoses’. CSN, 
however, involves hypotheses of a different kind. 
 
5.6.2 Hypothesis Agents 
From a declarative point of view, hypothesis agents keep three main pieces of 
information – the two agents being mapped (called hypothesis arguments or just 
elements), and a list of justifications for this correspondence1. Each one piece of 
information is written in a separate slot (Fig. 5. 16). 
As is shown in figure 5.16., there is one more G-slot labeled :t-link. These links 
are temporary and connect hypotheses to hypotheses. They serve only the 
connectionist aspect of the architecture. 
The AMBR model postulates two types of :t-links – excitatory (links between 
coherent hypotheses), and inhibitory (links between conflicting hypotheses). The 
latter embody the one-to-one mapping constraint. This means that, for example, the 
hypotheses X<-->Y and X<-->Z are viewed as contradictory, because X should not be 
mapped to two or more elements, e.g. Y and Z. This constrain is well known in 
analogy making, but is more complicated in a judgment task. It is obviously that one 
and the same stimulus should not be mapped onto two different ratings, but the 
opposite is possible – different stimuli can be mapped onto the same rating. 
Our belief was that the one-to-one mapping constraint is a more fundamental 
principle and can also be detected outside the boundaries of the task for analogy-
making. It plays a very important role in DUAL–based models. The architecture 
combines the mechanisms of associative memory and relevance-based mappings. 
Without a pressure for one-to-one mapping the most active elements would be 
mapped onto each other again and again. Thus, the system would not be able to run 
out of its fixation, and would not be able to search for other paths. Thus, the pressure 
for one-to-one mapping balances the associative and mapping mechanisms. 
This, however, does not mean that it is not possible for different stimuli to be 
judged with the same rating. The tendency for one-to-one mapping is only a pressure 
– one of many constraints. Only the agents, marked as :t-driver have to report only 
one of their winner hypotheses. For the judgment task those :t-driver agents are the 
judged stimuli (one or more), whereas in the choice task the maximal rating is marked 
Line15<-->grade3 
   :type (:mature :hypothesis :temporary) 
   :t-link ((Line15<-->grade5  – 0.3) 
              (Line10<-->grade3  – 0.3)) 
   :slot1 
      :c-coref line15 
   :slot2 
      :c-coref grade3 
   :slot3 
      :c-coref (justif->line15>line6==grade2 
                    justif-> grade5==line20>line15) 
Fig. 5. 16. An example of a hypothesis agent. It represents the hypothesis to rate line15 with grade3; 
two justifications for this, and two alternative hypotheses (competitors). 
                                                 
1 In AMBR model the hypotheses carry out in addition the information about the respective situation. 
JUDGEMAP, however, does not need his information, and the respective slot stays empty. 
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as :t-driver and has to report only one stimulus that corresponds to it, i.e. the final 
choice. 
 
JUDGEMAP uses only inhibitory :t-links. The reason is the following: In AMBR, 
justification agents are not postulated, because in analogy-making the justifications 
are always single agents, and it is not necessary to create their replications. Thus, the 
coherent hypotheses are connected directly with excitatory links. In JUDGEMAP, 
however, the justification agents serve as mediators between the coherent hypotheses 
(fig. 5.17), and thus the direct links between the hypotheses are only inhibitory. 
 
5.6.3 Secretary Messages 
Maintaining inhibitory links poses one problem. There is not any one central 
executor in JUDGEMAP that ‘sees’ all hypotheses, identifying the conflicting ones. 
Rather, the hypotheses emerge one by one, and their creators have local information 
only. Then, how does the hypothesis X<-->Y ‘know’ that there is a rival hypothesis 
(X<-->Z) in order to create an inhibitory link to it? 
The solution is for the hypothesis to ‘ask’ its elements. In short, the first job that a 
hypothesis agent does after its creation is to send hypothesis-registration-requests to 
its two arguments. These requests are symbolic structures that carry information about 
the name of the hypothesis-sender, and also it’s other argument. The job of the 
instance-agent that receives such a request is to make sequentially two things: First, if 
the hypothesis is novel (it does not duplicate an already existing one), it registers it in 
a special buffer of its own, called secretary. This registration has several purposes – it 
is used in analyzing the next registration requests; supports the rating mechanism, 
responsible for finding out the final winners (later in the text), etc. Second, the 
respective instance-agent sends back to the hypothesis a hypothesis-registration-
answer. 
 
Line6 Line15 Line20
Line15 
is longer than 
line6 
~ ~ ~ 
Grade2 Grade3 
~ 
Grade5 
Line20 
is longer than 
line15 
Fig. 5. 17. An example of the connections between entities (small ovals), comparison instances (large 
ovals), justification agents (triangles), and hypothesis agents (diamonds). The conflicting hypotheses 
line15<-->grade3 and line15<-->grade5 are connected with an inhibitory link. (Compare with the 
transcript in fig. 5.16.) 
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The hypothesis-registration-requests are symbolic structures that, roughly 
speaking, state one of the two orders – resign or establish. 
The answer ‘resign’ means either that it comes too late – there is already a winner, 
or that the new hypothesis is a duplicate of an existing one. To be a duplicate means 
that it connects the same two arguments, probably for a different reason. For example, 
suppose that line-A is longer than line-B, and line-B was judged with 6. This would 
serve as a justification to rate line-A with, let’s say, 4. It is possible at a later moment 
for the information that line-A is shorter than line-C, and line-C was judged with 3 to 
spring up, and hence the system would construct another justification-agent that 
would create a second hypothesis about the same – judge line-A with 4. 
The answer ‘resign’ also carries information about the hypothesis in favor of 
whom to resign. When a hypothesis agent receives such an answer, it hands over all 
its justifications to the favorite, and dies. In such a way the hypotheses agents usually 
collect many justifications, which support them with activation. 
The answer ‘establish’ means that the correspondence is a novel one. This answer 
also carries a list of the conflicting hypotheses, to which inhibitory links have to be 
added. 
 
5.6.4 Life Cycle of the Hypothesis Agents 
There are three main types of hypotheses – embryo, mature, and winner; the type 
is marked in their :type slot. 
Each hypothesis begins its life cycle as an embryo. During this period, it sends 
hypothesis-registration requests to its respective arguments and waits for answers. 
When both answers arrive, the hypothesis analyzes them and makes a decision. Three 
variants are possible – both answers to be ‘resign’, both to be ‘establish’, or to 
contradict each other (the last case is possible because of the asynchronous and 
parallel nature of the model). If the answers are contradictory, the hypothesis carefully 
checks what the reason is, and then decides what to do next. The possible reasons for 
contradictory answers are three. First, maybe a duplicate exists, but one of the 
arguments was not yet informed about it. Second, the answer ‘resign’ has come 
because one of the arguments already had a winner hypothesis, i.e. there is no more 
need of the hypothesis – the system has finished the tasks concerning the respective 
entity. Third, maybe there was a duplicate, but it has died (again one of the arguments 
was not yet informed about this). The new hypothesis should resign, if the first or the 
second event has happened, or be established in the third case. 
 
If the embryo hypothesis decides to resign, it hands over all its justifications to its 
duplicate (if such mentioned in the hypothesis request answers), and fizzles out. This 
is the mechanism that allows for multiple justifications for one and the same 
hypothesis, instead of having redundancies of correspondences. 
 
Otherwise, if the embryo decides to establish, it transforms itself to a mature 
hypothesis. In this case, it connects itself to its competitors (mentioned in the 
hypothesis request answers) with inhibitory links. For fair play, it informs those 
competitors to do the same. 
 
The third phase of the hypothesis’s life cycle begins if they receive a special 
message from one of the arguments that promotes it into a winner. The mechanisms 
of rating and promotion are described in the next sub-section. 
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5.6.5 Rating and Promotion 
These two mechanisms were proposed by the AMBR model (Petrov, 1988). They 
may look too complicated for the purposes of judgment and choice, where the task is 
to report in the end for only one correspondence – of the judged stimulus (or several, 
if several stimuli are given to judge simultaneously, but always not too many). 
However, the mechanisms have been designed to work in analogy–making between 
huge domains, where many agents have to find corresponding elements. The 
architecture’ requirements were this to be done locally, without any central executors. 
The main ideas are the following: Some of the instance-agents  (the :t-driver ones) 
are authorized to use the rating mechanism. The purpose of this mechanism is to 
monitory all hypotheses that involve the agent and to send promotion incentives to 
those that emerge as stable and unambiguous leaders. 
Each authorized instance keeps a data structure, called rating table. The individual 
ratings for each registered mature hypothesis are stored in this table. Individual 
ratings are just a numbers that characterize the relative success of the respective 
hypothesis – how long, how recently, and how strongly has it been a leader, according 
to its rivals. The instance-agents periodically (in a fixed time interval and whenever a 
hypothesis registration request come) adjust the individual ratings. The rating of the 
current leader increases, whereas those of the other hypotheses decrease. The amount 
of the change is proportional to the difference between the activation levels of the 
leader and its closest competitors. 
When the individual rating of some hypothesis exceeds a certain threshold, the 
respective instance-agent sends to it a symbolic structure, called promotion incentive. 
In addition, it eliminates all loser hypotheses. When a hypothesis agent receives such 
message, it transforms itself to winner hypothesis. If the task is for judgment, this 
winner is the response of the system about the respective stimulus. 
 
5.6.6 Hypothesis Activation Functions 
Hypothesis agents differ from the other agents in that they receive both positive 
and negative activation. That is why they have two separate input values – enet and 
inet. The former is equal to the total sum of all input activation that comes from 
excitatory links, whereas the latter – to the total sum of the inhibitory activation. 
 
The calculation of the current activation level involves three steps: 
First, the old activation level is adjusted with a linear transformation that ensures 
that the adjusted value would be non-negative: 
 
a| = a + Z,  
 
where a| is the adjusted value, a is the original one, and Z is hypothesis zero level 
– the level, to which activation strives if the input is zero. 
 
Second, the new activation level is calculated, according to the formula: 
 
| a|new = m,          if  -d* a|  + E*enet*(M - a|) + I*inet*( a|  - m) < m, 
 
| a|new = M,         if  -d* a|  + E*enet*(M - a|) + I*inet*( a|  - m) > M, 
| a|new = -d* a|  + E*enet*(M - a|) + I*inet*( a|  - m), otherwise. 
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Here a|new is the new adjusted activation level; d and E are respectively decay and 
excitatory constants; M and m are respectively the maximal and minimal value the 
activation can reach; and I is a parameter that reflects the power of inhibition between 
hypotheses. a is the original (non-adjusted) value, enet and inet are respectively the 
total excitatory and inhibitory inputs. 
 
Third, the activation level is again re-adjusted with inversed linear transformation: 
 
a = a| - Z,  
 
where a is the original value, a| is the adjusted one, and Z is hypothesis zero level. 
 
These formulas ensure that the adjusted activation level has the same properties as 
the activations of the other agents in DUAL. 
 
The hypothesis output function also has some specifics. The novelty concerns the 
embryo hypotheses. Their output is always equal to zero, i.e. from a connectionist 
point of view they do not influence the other agents. 
 
5.6.7 The Constraint Satisfaction Network 
In the course of time many hypothesis agents, interconnected each other and with 
the other agents, emerge. They, together with their justifications, form the Constraint 
Satisfaction Network. Its purpose is to solve the constraint satisfaction problem by the 
cooperative work of all hypotheses, justifications, and entities. The network involves 
several kinds of links: 
The links from LTM to CSN represents the semantic constraints – the more 
relevant a certain entity is, the more relevant are its correspondences. The links with 
opposite direction – from CSN to LTM - allow the CSN to influence the overall 
pattern of activation – the better a certain inference looks, the more attractive its 
elements are. 
The links from LTM to the justification agents, and those from justification agents 
to the hypotheses represent the structural constraints – they reflect the instructions for 
the task as well as some implicit assumptions behind these instructions. 
The opposite links – from hypotheses to justifications and then to LTM also play 
an important role. They could be viewed as feedback from the hypotheses to the 
entities about how relevant the constructed hypotheses are. 
Finally, the inhibitory links between competing hypotheses represent the pressure 
for one-to-one mappings – one very important for analogy–making constraint. 
 
5.7 Putting Everything Together 
 
5.7.1 Presentation of the Task and Judgment of the First Stimulus 
This subsection illustrates how all mechanisms of the model work together. Let 
the task be to judge sequentially lengths of lines on a seven-point scale.  
 
The session begins by attaching the correspondence–relation ‘longer<-->higher 
rating’ to GOAL node, and the concept ‘seven-point scale’ to INPUT node. Their 
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micro-frames are predefined and are shown in fig.5.18. Initially, the prototypes of the 
scales are assumed to be their end-points. The links to them are temporary and their 
weight decreases with the course of time. The initial choice of prototypical ratings, 
however, matters only for the first several judgments. It does not influence the 
statistical results over judgment of large sets of stimuli. 
Now, it is time to choose also one line and to attach it to both GOAL and INPUT 
nodes. Let it be ‘line-200’ with length 200 (fig.5.19) 
longer<-->higher rating  
  :type :concept 
  :subc correspondence 
  :argument (longer seven-point-scale) 
  :a-link (higher-length--higher-rating 0.200) 
seven-point-scale 
  :type :concept 
  :subc scale 
  :t-instance (grade-1 grade-7)) 
Fig. 5.18. At the beginning of the simulation, the correspondence relation ‘longer<-->higher 
rating’ is attached to the GOAL node, the concept ‘seven-point-scale’ – to the INPUT. 
line-200 
  :type :instance 
  :inst-of line 
  :c-coref length-200) 
Fig.5.19. The agent ‘line-200’ represents the first stimulus to be judged and is attached both 
to GOAL and INPUT nodes. 
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The activation spreads in the network and brings relevant concepts and instances 
into WM. Fig.5.20 illustrates at which moment the agents pass the threshold of the 
WM (the agents, attached to GOAL or INPUT are not reported). The markers from 
the instance-agents  (scale labels, ‘line-200’, ‘length-200, etc) spread upward to their 
super-classes, and then to other concepts as argument-related answers. The concepts 
that receive markers check whether the origins are their direct instances, and if yes – 
create :t-instance links to them (see in fig.1.21. the continuation of the transcript). 
 
 
;;T=0.000, #$seven-point-scale enters in WM 
;;T=0.000, #$longer--higher-rating enters in WM 
;;T=0.000, #$line-200 enters in WM 
;;T=0.100,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$longer--higher-rating> receives in #$seven-point-scale 
;;T=0.200, #$grade-1 enters in WM 
;;T=0.200, #$grade-7 enters in WM 
;;T=0.200, #$length-200 enters in WM 
;;T=0.300, #$grade-0 enters in WM 
;;T=0.300, #$grade-2 enters in WM 
;;T=0.300, #$grade-6 enters in WM 
;;T=0.300, #$grade-8 enters in WM 
;;T=0.300, #$relation enters in WM 
;;T=0.300, #$object enters in WM 
;;T=0.300, <MARKER-#$line-200> receives in #$line 
;;T=0.300,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$longer--higher-rating> receives in #$longer 
;;T=0.400, #$number enters in WM 
;;T=0.400, #$property enters in WM 
;;T=0.400, <MARKER-#$grade-7> receives in #$seven-point-scale 
;;T=0.400, <MARKER-#$grade-1> receives in #$seven-point-scale 
;;T=0.500, #$grade-3 enters in WM 
;;T=0.500, #$grade-5 enters in WM 
;;T=0.500,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$longer> receives in #$line 
;;T=0.600, #$grade-4 enters in WM 
Fig.5.20. Part of the transcript of the simulation run is showed. The first column (T=0.20) shows the 
time moment, the next point the event.  ARG-REL-REQ-agent means argument-related request, sent 
by agent, MRK-agent means marker, emitted by agent. 
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;;T=0.600, <MARKER-#$length-200> receives in #$length 
;;T=0.900, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-7> receives in #$longer--higher-rating 
;;T=0.900, <MARKER-#$grade-6> receives in #$seven-point-scale 
;;T=0.900, <MARKER-#$grade-2> receives in #$seven-point-scale 
;;T=1.000, #$more-higher-length enters in WM 
;;T=1.200, #$more-longer enters in WM 
;;T=1.200,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$longer> receives in #$higher-length 
;;T=1.200,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$higher-length--higher-rating> receives in #$seven-point-scale 
;;T=1.200,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$higher-length> receives in #$length 
;;T=1.300, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$line-200> receives in #$longer 
;;T=1.400, <MARKER-#$grade-5> receives in #$seven-point-scale 
;;T=1.400, <MARKER-#$grade-3> receives in #$seven-point-scale 
;;T=1.400, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-1> receives in #$longer--higher-rating 
;;T=1.600, <MARKER-#$grade-4> receives in #$seven-point-scale 
;;T=1.900, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-6> receives in #$longer--higher-rating 
;;T=2.200, <MARKER-#$length-200> receives in #$property 
;;T=2.200,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$more-higher-length> receives in #$higher-length 
;;T=2.400, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$length-200> receives in #$higher-length 
;;T=2.600, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-2> receives in #$longer--higher-rating 
;;T=2.700, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-6> receives in #$higher-length--higher-rating 
;;T=2.800, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-2> receives in #$higher-length--higher-rating 
;;T=2.800, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-7> receives in #$higher-length--higher-rating 
;;T=2.900, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-1> receives in #$higher-length--higher-rating 
;;T=3.100,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$more-longer> receives in #$more-higher-length 
;;T=3.500,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$higher-length--higher-rating> receives in #$more-longer 
;;T=3.600, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-5> receives in #$longer--higher-rating 
;;T=3.600, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-5> receives in #$higher-length--higher-rating 
;;T=4.900, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-3> receives in #$longer--higher-rating 
;;T=4.900, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-3> receives in #$higher-length--higher-rating 
;;T=5.000,<ARG-REL-REQ-#$more-longer> receives in #$longer 
;;T=5.800, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-4> receives in #$longer--higher-rating 
;;T=5.800, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$grade-4> receives in #$higher-length--higher-rating 
Fig. 5. 21. Continuation of the transcript form fig.5. 20. Again only part of the events is 
presented. 
However, no other lines and lengths would enter in WM, and no comparisons 
would be formed. This initial moment – the judgment of the first stimulus needs a 
special comment. The system must judge in a ‘vacuum’ – without anything to 
compare the stimulus with. My belief is that this never happens to people. They have 
extremely huge knowledge bases and in all cases, they are able to retrieve (or to 
construct) something similar to the target. One possibility to deal with this problem in 
JUDGEMAP is to use some predefined prototypes of the concept ‘line’ – may be the 
two extremes (assuming that people construct them from the boundaries of the 
screen), or the middle one. The additional problem then would be that these 
prototypes would bias judgments in an artificial and unwanted manner. For this 
reason, a different solution was chosen in the model. If and only if such a case appears 
– the target stimulus has not found any rating to map it to for a long time - the system 
creates one hypothesis without any reason (justification). It just takes the most active 
rating and maps the target onto it. (fig. 5. 22). 
  
A winner by scrap: Stimulus #$line-200 <-> Grade #$grade-4 
In time 249,90 the stimulus #$line-200was judged with rating #$grade-4 WM - 24 ag.,act 29.543 Justs: 0 
Fig. 5.22. In some pathological cases, a hypothesis can be created without reasons. 
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5.7.2 Judgment of the Next Stimuli 
Once the first stimulus has been judged, it is removed from the GOAL list but not 
from WM, i.e., it still receives activation from its concept via :t-instance link. 
However, removing the respective stimulus from the GOAL list causes erasing the tag 
:t-driver from its :type slot.  
 
Let the second stimulus to be judged be ‘line-500’ with length 500. The 
initialization procedure is the same – the stimulus is attached to the GOAL, and :t-
driver tag is added in its :type slot. The new stimulus emits marker, activates its 
At time T=2
neighbors, etc. 
Thi ives in 
the  lines) at time 257.6 
(fig arison between lengths is 
res nce-agent 
‘lin
                                                
;;T=249.900, #$line-500 enters in WM 
;;T=250.000, <MARKER-#$line-500> receives in #$line 
;;T=250.100, #$length-500 enters in WM 
;;T=250.400, <MARKER-#$length-500> receives in #$length 
;;T=250.700, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$line-500> receives in #$longer 
;;T=250.900, <MARKER-#$line-500> receives in #$object 
;;T=251.400, <ARG-REL-ANS-#$length-500> receives in #$higher-length 
;;T=251.600, <MARKER-#$length-500> receives in #$property 
;;T=252.900, #${length-500}>{length-200} enters in WM 
Fig.5.23. The beginning of the judgment of the second stimulus – ‘line-500’. 
50.7 (fig. 5. 23.) the comparison-relation ‘higher-length’ receives an 
argument-related message about ‘length-500’. Now the comparison-concept is ready 
to apply its symbolic routine – at time T=252.9 it creates a new instance that 
represents the information that ‘length-500’ has a higher amount than ‘length-200’. 
s new instance (like each one instance-agent) also emits a marker, which arr
 comparison-relation ‘longer’ (the arguments of  ‘longer’ are
.5. 24.). ‘Longer’ detects for with two objects the comp
ponsible – respectively ‘line-500’ and ‘line-200’ – and creates the insta
e-500 is longer than line-200’ . 1
 
in WM 
At time 292.900 the stimulus #$line-500 was judged with rating #$grade-5 WM - 32 ag.,act 33.641 Justs: 1 
Fig.5.24. Th
;;T=256.300, <MARKER-#${length-500}>{length-200}> receives in #$higher-length 
;;T=257.600, <ARG-REL-ANS-#${length-500}>{length-200}> receives in #$longer 
;;T=257.900, <ARG-REL-ANS-#${length-500}>{length-200}> receives in #$more- higher -length 
;;T=258.400, <MARKER-#${length-500}>{length-200}> receives in #$relation 
;;T=258.700, #${line-500}>{line-200} enters 
;;T=261.800, <MARKER-#${line-500}>{line-200}> receives in #$longer 
;;T=263.000, <ARG-REL-ANS-#${line-500}>{line-200}> receives in #$longer—higher-rating 
;;T=263.100, #$justif-\#${line-500}>{line-200}- enters in WM 
;;T=263.200, <ARG-REL-ANS-#${line-500}>{line-200}> receives in #$more-longer 
;;T=263.400, <MARKER-#${line-500}>{line-200}> receives in #$relation 
;;T=281.800, #$line-500<==>grade-5 enters in WM 
;;T=286.200, #$line-500<==>grade-6 enters in WM 
;;T=292.700, #$line-500<==>grade-7 enters in WM 
e rest of the judgment of the second stimulus – ‘line-500’.
1 It may seem that having two separate comparisons about one and the same information is unnecessary 
redundancy. The advantages of such separation, however, are more salient when judging complex 
stimuli, according to several relevant dimensions. For example, it is important to separate the relation 
‘better cheese’ from the relations about cheese’s properties – ‘better price’ or ‘better quality’. 
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At time 263.0 the correspondence–relation longer<-->higher-rating ‘hears’ about 
this new instance. It creates a justification agent and interconnects it with the 
com arison ‘line-500 is longer than line-200’ and to the correspondence 
line
grade-5’, ‘grade-6’ or ‘grade-7’. The justification 
age
increases a little bit the 
individual rating of the hypothesis. 
hanism 
pro
pete with each other and what their support is. 
competition between these two hypotheses, however, was 
long, because the second hypothesis receives more activation from its arguments than 
the 
gh. The competition during 
judgment of line-300 was so short mainly because the competing hypotheses were too 
wea
p
200<==>rating4. The correspondence–relation also sends a message to the new 
justification agent with instructions what hypotheses to create, namely – hypotheses 
that ‘line-500’ may correspond to ‘
nt creates them prolonged in time, one after another, in order that reflects the 
activation levels of the hypothesis’s arguments. 
 
At time 281.8 the first hypothesis is born – line-500<==>rating-5. At this moment 
the rating mechanism begins to work – at each step it 
At time 286.2 a competitor arrives - line-500<==>rating-6. However, it is not 
strong enough to stop the run of the first one. At time 292.9 the promotion mec
claims line-500<==>rating-5 a winner (the emergence of the third hypothesis in 
fact does not matter – it comes too late). The response is reported; all loser hypotheses 
are fizzled out, and ‘line-500’ is removed from GOAL list. 
 
Let the third stimulus be ‘line-1400’. Let us skip some details and look at a later 
moment which hypotheses com
The first hypothesis proposes to judge the stimulus with rating-7. It receives 
support from three justifications – line-1400 is longer than line-200, judged with 4; it 
is also longer than line-500, judged with 5, and ‘line-1400 is longer than line-200’ is 
more than ‘line-1400 is longer than line-500’. It also receives activation from their 
elements, respectively ‘line-1400’ and ‘rating-7’. In addition, the hypothesis is 
inhibited from its competitors. 
The second hypothesis proposes to judge the stimulus with rating-6. It receives 
activation only from two justifications – the first and the second justification of the 
previous hypothesis. The 
first one. This happens, because the agent ‘grade-6’, being a winner in the 
previous trial, is very relevant. 
One more hypothesis – about rating-5, also exists, but it is too weak to do 
anything more. In the end, however, the first hypothesis wins the competition and 
line-144 is judged with 7. 
 
Let the fourth stimulus to be judged be ‘line-300’ with length 300. One may think 
that now the system is close to a ‘combinatory explosion’ – too many comparisons 
and correspondences could be created. However, this is not the case, because of the 
special role of the working memory. In fact, at the moment when the hypothesis ‘line-
300<==>rating-4’ was promoted, it was supported only by 2 justifications, namely 
‘line-1400 is longer than line-300’, and ‘line-500 is longer than line-300’. There could 
be found more possible reasons to judge line-300 with 4, but most of them do not 
have enough time to be established. The rating and promotion mechanisms do not 
wait until all moderately relevant hypotheses emerge. Instead, they report 
immediately if the current state is satisfactory enou
k. During the previous judgments, the system was ‘focused’ on the larger ratings 
(i.e., that they were quite active). Because each hypothesis receives activation not 
only from its justifications, but also from its elements, the small ratings lose the 
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competition. In addition, the contradictory information – that line-200 was judged 
with 4, has lost much of its activation due to the decay. 
 
Later in the judgment process the old instances fizzle out one after another. Note 
that termined by the order in which they 
hav  
line
the Judgment Task 
DGEMAP has the potential for dealing with variations of the judgment tasks.  
 is possible to judge several stimuli simultaneously – in this case all of them are 
atta
l case of judgment task would be if a set of stimuli is given and one has to 
jud ne 
would be the best 3, or the best 5). JUDGEMAP is able to simulate this task by 
atta  the stimuli. In the very 
spe
 for 
the judgment task. However, JUDGEMAP is part of the DUAL architecture and thus 
the 
d as a system of basic mechanisms that account for 
judgment, analogy-making, choice, and decision-making. Some of the proposed 
mec
, it is important to analyse the exact role of each one of the mechanisms 
in t
 the order of their fizzling out is not strictly de
e been judged. Instead, fizzling out reflects inversely their relevance. If a certain
 justifies many winner correspondences, it also receives feedback activation from 
them and hence stays in WM longer. If it is inconsistent with the recent winners, it 
loses its support and dies. 
 
5.7.3 Variants of 
JU
It does not put any limitations on the complexity of the stimuli or on the scales. If 
the stimulus has to be judged according to two or more dimensions, each of them is 
involved in creation of justifications, hypotheses, etc. on its own, but all the acts run 
in parallel and thus influence each other. The final result depends on the collective 
effort of all dimensions. 
 
It
ched to the INPUT list and marked as :t-drivers. It is also possible to model the so 
called anchoring procedure (one stimulus is presented together with the suggested 
rating while a second one has to be rated) – in this case the first item is attached to the 
INPUT list without marking it as :t-driver, while the second one is attached to the 
INPUT list as :t-driver.  
 
A specia
ge which of them would best correspond to a certain scale label. (Which o
ching the :t-driver tag to the rating label rather than to
cial case when we use a two-point scale, the task could be interpreted as a choice 
task: “Please, find the stimulus that best fits the higher rating, i.e. the one that is 
preferred”. 
From this point of view, JUDGEMAP can also be treated as a model of choice. 
 
5.7.4 The Role of these Mechanisms 
The behaviour of the JUDGEMAP model results from the combined work of 
many mechanisms. Some of them may seem too complicated or even unnecessary
used mechanisms cannot be considered just as mechanisms of judgment. Instead, 
JUDGEMAP can be treate
hanisms may look inessential for one or another of the mentioned cognitive 
activities but these mechanisms are mutually integrated and form a united whole. 
 
However
he process of judgment. 
 
The spreading activation mechanism defines the working memory, thus it is 
responsible for the construction of the comparison set. Activation represents the 
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relevance of each agent and determines the speed at which it performs symbolic 
operations.  
The spreading activation mechanism is undistinguishable from the associative 
org
echanism for making an analogy between two distant domains. In 
JUDGEMAP, however, a very small amount of its power is actually used. The 
mar
struction of a structure among the comparison set, based on the ordering 
rela
he comparison relations of second order allow the properties of the interval 
sca
often one correspondence relation, one comparison 
instance and one hypothesis. However, which of them is to decide how fast the new 
hyp
anisation of memory. The close associations of the most relevant items become 
also very relevant and thus their influence on the process becomes greater. This is the 
main source of the assimilation effects, observed by JUDGEMAP. More precisely, the 
decision of the system to judge a certain stimulus with a certain rating increases the 
relevance of the respective rating together with its neighbours and thus sequential 
assimilation is produced. 
 
The marker-passing mechanism serves to find a path between two items. It is an 
excellent m
kers and the other messages that the agents exchange during the judgment process 
usually spread through not more than four or five agents. Thus, it is possible 
JUDGEMAP to work using a simplified version of the mechanism. However, for the 
purpose of integration between the DUAL-based models, the marker passing 
mechanism is enlarged with the sub-mechanisms of exchanging argument-related 
messages. 
 
The comparison relations serve for a kind of recognition. Their work is essential 
for the con
tion. This structure is then mapped to the other ordering-relation based structure, 
namely the structure among the available scale labels. As the constructed comparison 
relations highlight the difference between the items (they create pressure even too 
close for different stimuli to be judged with different ratings), the mechanism for 
recognition of relations is one of the main sources of the contrast effects, 
demonstrated by JUDGEMAP (the other main source is the pressure for one-to-one 
mapping). 
T
les to be combined with the principle for local computations only. Without the 
relations of higher order, the model would be not able to differentiate, for example, 
the set of magnitudes 1, 2, and 10 from the set of magnitudes 1, 5, and 10. However, 
people judge differently these two sets. This differentiation is one of the 
manifestations of the Range effect (Parducci, 1968; Parducci & Perret, 1971; Weddel, 
Parducci & Geiselman, 1987; Mellers & Cooke, 1994). 
 
In fact the correspondence relations create hypotheses for correspondences and 
thus are the basis for the construction of the constraint satisfaction network. The work 
of the correspondence relations is closely related to the work of the justification 
agents. In order for a new hypothesis to be created, the common effort of several 
agents is necessary – more 
othesis should be created? As was already mentioned above, one of the basic 
constraints assumed by the DUAL architecture is that the relevance of each item 
determines the speed of its symbolic operations. The justification agents receive their 
activation from all justifications for the potential new hypothesis, thus their activation 
level represents the overall relevance of this potential new hypothesis and determines 
the speed at which to create it. 
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The hypotheses for correspondences are the basic components of the constraint 
satisfaction network. They have highly complex processing equipment, namely an 
elaborated life cycle and sub-mechanisms for rating and promotion inherited by the 
AMBR model. This complexity is important for analogy-making between two large 
situations based on emergency from local interactions only. For the judgment process, 
however, only a small part of their power is used because the mapping is between a 
relatively small number of items and relations. However, JUDGEMAP is designed to 
allow the same basic mechanisms to be used for modelling different cognitive 
processes. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Simulations 
 
 
6.1 Overview of Simulations 
 
In order to test the behavior of the model, several simulations organized in five 
groups were performed. In the simulations of the first group the distribution of the 
stimulus set was varied. The role of the scale was explored in the second group. The 
simulations in the third group tested the influence of a single contextual stimulus on 
judgments. In the fourth group, the judged stimuli had two relevant dimensions. The 
fifth group consisted of only one simulation – the capability of the model to make 
choice was tested. 
 
The stimuli from the first three groups were labeled ‘lines’ and their judged 
property was labeled ‘length’. As mentioned above, the names of the DUAL-agents 
are arbitrary, i.e., they can be named ag0001, ag0002, etc. without changing the 
behavior of the system. However, it is much easier to document the model using 
names that are more mnemonic. From this point of view, the capabilities of 
JUDGEMAP to judge stimuli that have a single relevant dimension were illustrated 
with judgments of lengths of lines. Analogically, the simulations in the fourth group 
demonstrated how the model can judge stimuli with respect to two relevant 
dimensions, independently of the names used for the stimuli. In the simulation from 
the fifth group, JUDGEMAP made a choice between alternatives, called ‘gambles”, 
according to their two relevant properties. 
 
In all simulations the stimuli were represented by coalitions of DUAL-agents. 
One agent was responsible for the stimulus itself and others, for its properties 
(relevant to the task or not). Each agent pointed to its super-class. There were :c-coref 
links between the head agent and all the properties. The agents that represent 
properties could have an :amount slot that was filled in with the magnitude of the 
respective property.   
 
Each scale was represented by one concept-agent responsible for the scale itself 
and a set of agents representing each scale label. All scale labels pointed with :inst-of 
links to the head concept. Each scale label also had an :amount slot filled in with the 
respective number. The neighboring ratings were interconnected with associative 
links. 
 
The comparison-relations that were used by the model stayed in LTM. They 
would be activated by the respective correspondence relations. For example, if the 
agent ‘longer<-->higher-rating’ was active enough, it would also activate the agents 
‘longer’ and ‘higher-rating’. 
For each simulation, correspondence relations from first and second order were 
designed, in order for the instruction to be represented. 
 
All simulations were performed using the same pattern of the values for all 
parameters of the model. 
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Overview of the simulations. 
The first group of simulations tests the role of the overall set of stimuli in 
judgment. It consists of four simulations.  
In the first one a uniformly distributed set is judged. It tests whether the overall 
correlation between the magnitudes and the ratings is satisfactory; whether the 
distribution of the ratings is uniform or not; whether the sequential assimilation effect 
can be observed; and whether the size of the Working Memory stays stable in the 
course of time.  
In the second simulation the model judges a subset of a restricted range and the 
results from this simulation are compared with those from the previous one. Thus, it is 
tested whether the model is capable of reproducing the Range Principle. 
The third simulation tests the Frequency principle. The model judges a skewed 
subset and the results from this simulation are compared with those from the first one. 
The stimuli judged in the fourth simulation are uniformly distributed but a 
dimension irrelevant to the task separates them into two subsets. The first of these 
subsets is positively skewed according to the relevant to the task dimension and the 
second one – negatively skewed. Thus, this simulation tests a novel prediction, that 
the irrelevant to the task dimensions take part in judgment. 
 
The second group of simulations tests the behavior of the model when the scale 
varies. A uniformly distributed set and a skewed subset are judged on a three-point 
scale and on a 100-point scale. Thus, the relative weight of the frequency pressure is 
calculated on a 3-point and a 100-point scale. This weight is calculated also on a 7-
point scale using the results of the simulations from the first group. After that all 
weights are compared in order to test whether the role of the skew decreases when the 
number of scale labels increase as the experimental data (Wedell, Parducci & Lane, 
1990) shows. 
 
The third group consists of four simulations and two psychological experiments. 
In the first three simulations a uniformly distributed set is judged but together with a 
single contextual element (anchor). In the first simulation the anchor is outside the 
stimulus range, in the second one, in the upper limit and in the third one, in the middle 
of the stimulus set. The results are compared with those received in a psychological 
experiment, which tested the hypothesis that the presence of an anchor (in the limit or 
in the middle of the stimulus set) ‘improves’ judgment, i.e., causes the small stimuli to 
be judged with lower ratings and the large stimuli to be judged with higher ratings. 
In the fourth simulation from this group JUDGEMAP judges pairs of stimuli 
simultaneously. The received contrast effect was then confirmed by a second 
psychological experiment. 
 
In the fourth group of simulations two-dimensional stimuli are judged. The 
capabilities of the model to reproduce the sequential assimilation effect, the range and 
frequency effects when judging complex stimuli are tested. In the first two 
simulations two sets of stimuli in which the two dimensions correlate are judged, the 
first one being uniform and the second, skewed. In the third simulation from this 
group the two dimensions of the stimuli correlate negatively, i.e. a natural trade-off 
judgment situation is simulated. 
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Finally, the fifth group consists of a single simulation testing whether the 
mechanisms of JUDGEMAP can be used to model choice-making. 
 
6.2 The Role of the Distribution of the Stimulus Set 
 
6.2.1 Uniform Distribution 
In the first simulation JUDGEMAP judged 112 uniformly distributed line 
lengths. The simulation had two purposes. First, it served to test the overall behavior 
of the model – whether JUDGEMAP was capable to give higher ratings to higher 
magnitudes and vice versa; whether the distribution of ratings would be non-uniform, 
as had been demonstrated by empirical studies (Petrov & Anderson, 2005); whether 
the model reproduced the sequential assimilation; whether a ‘combinatorial 
explosion’ was avoided. Second, the results from this simulation served for 
comparison with the results from various other simulations – when judging restricted 
or skewed sets, etc. 
Stimuli and procedure. 
The lengths of a set of 112 lines were judged on a 7-point scale. The lines were 
separated into 14 length groups, with 8 lines in each group. The first 8 lines had 
length 100, the last 8 – 1400. The increment of lengths was 100. All 112 lines were 
randomly ordered and were presented to the model sequentially, one after another. 
The procedure was repeated 15 times (varying randomly the ordering of the set), thus 
receiving totally 1680 responses from the model. 
Results and discussions. 
Linearity of the scale. To estimate whether the model judges linearly the stimuli, 
a function of the form R = a + k.Sn was fitted to the data. Here R was the response of 
the model, S was the length of the line, a, k, and n were estimated parameters. The 
95% confidence interval for the exponent n was 0.96 – 1.26. This allowed assuming 
that JUDGEMAP judges linearly the length. 
Correct Judgment. The overall correlation between length and rating was 0.762, 
p<0.01. This correlation is in agreement with those received in various experiments, 
e.g. Petrov & Anderson (2003) received a correlation 0.71, Kokinov, Hristova & 
Petkov (2004) – 0.88 when asking people to judge line length. The two experiments 
varied in their procedure and in their stimuli range. Thus, the correlation received by 
the model could be thought as satisfactory, i.e., the model is capable to judge. 
This result is a consequence of the fact that JUDGEMAP makes its judgments 
on the basis of justifications for them. However, it is important to stress that it judges 
the first stimulus in each session without anything to compare it with, a fact that never 
occurs when people judge. Thus, the correlation received by the model was a bit 
lower than the one received by the empirical data. 
Non-uniform distribution of the ratings. The overall distribution of the ratings is 
shown on fig.6.1. The standard deviation of the ratings could serve as a numerical 
value for estimation of non-uniformity (Petrov & Anderson 2005). The std. dev 
received from the simulation was 1.21 (min 1.09, max 1.28, mean 1.21, std. dev. 0.05 
across the 15 runs), whereas for assumed uniform distribution it should be 2.03. 
People prefer the middle ratings – this observation is robust and was reported by 
many studies. For example, Kokinov, Hristova & Petkov (2004) received for the 
standard deviation of the ratings mean 1.59, min 1.15, max 1.98, std. dev 0.19.   
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Fig.6.1. Ratings distribution when uniform set of stimuli was judged. 
JUDGEMAP rarely gives extreme grades because usually hypotheses for them 
are created at later moments. For example, suppose that a certain line was rated 4. If 
the next line had to be longer, then the first created hypothesis would more probably 
be for 5, the second one would be for 6, etc. Being created first, these hypotheses had 
an advantage and only a justification with too high an activation level should be found 
in order to give the extreme rating. 
Sequential assimilation. In order to estimate the sequential assimilation effect, a 
multiple regression was performed with the following variables entering as predictors: 
the current stimulus St, the previous stimulus St-1, and the previous rating Ri-1. The 
estimation of the overall accuracy of the model was R2=0.67, p<0.001. For the current 
stimulus St, the standardized coefficient βs was 0.76 (partial correlation 0.798), for the 
previous stimulus St-1, βs-1 was –0.42 (partial correlation -0.432), and for the previous 
rating Ri-1, βr-1 was +0.39 (partial correlation 0.406). The signs of the regression 
coefficients of the time-lagged variables were of special interest. Thus, assimilation 
towards the previous rating and contrast with the previous magnitude were observed. 
This result is in accordance with the results obtained in psychological experiments 
(Petrov & Anderson, 2000, Kokinov, Hristova & Petkov, 2004). 
JUDGEMAP was capable to illustrate sequential assimilation because the 
arguments of each hypothesis were one of its sources of activation. The pattern of 
activation, in turn, varied dynamically. When the system gave a certain response, a 
temporary :t-instance link was created from the scale concept to the respective rating. 
As a result the activation of this respective rating grew up together with the 
activations of its neighbors. In this way the previous ratings assimilated the current 
responses.  
This was not the case of the previous magnitudes, i.e., the magnitudes of the 
previous stimuli. On the contrary, these previous magnitudes participated in 
comparisons with the current one, and therefore, contrast with respect to them was 
observed.  
 
Working Memory size. The next analysis checked whether JUDGEMAP avoids 
the so-called ‘combinatorial explosion’. It was tested how the size of the WM varies 
in the course of judgment. This dependency is illustrated in fig.6.2. 
 70
Fig.6.2. Stabilization of the size of the WM. The number of active agents (ordinate) is calculated at 
the moment when the system gives its response.
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 Fig.6.2 illustrates that the number of agents that participated in the WM first 
grew, around the 12th stimulus started to decrease, and stabilized around the 19th one. 
In other words, the system accumulated enough ‘experience’ with the stimuli between 
the 12th and 19th presented stimuli. Thus, the size of the WM stabilizes and allows the 
system to judge sequentially an unspecified number of stimuli. 
 
The simulation 6.2.1 (‘Uniform distribution’) demonstrated several of the 
capabilities of the model. The correlation between length and rating was in the range 
of the respective correlations obtained in the psychological experiments. The ratings 
were non-uniformly distributed despite the fact that the stimulus set was uniform just 
as in the psychological experiments. The model reproduced the sequential 
assimilation effect as well.  
However, the effects received by the model were stronger in comparison with 
the empirical data, e.g., when testing the sequential assimilation effect βs-1 was –0.42 
in the simulation, whereas βs-1 was –0.25 in the experimental data (Petrov & 
Anderson, 2000); βr-1 was +0.39 in the simulation, whereas βr-1 was –0.30 in the 
experimental data (Petrov & Anderson, 2000). A similar tendency was observed in the 
other results – the non-uniformity of the responses was overestimated, whereas the 
overall correlation between length and rating was around the lower limit of the 
empirical data. However, I interpret this as a relatively small deviation from human 
behavior. After all, when people judge they have previous experience that helps them 
and also various external contextual elements (e.g. the size of the screen) influence 
their judgments and blur the various systematic effects. Thus, the main goal of 
JUDGEMAP is not to fit quantitatively the empirical data but test whether the 
proposed mechanisms could qualitatively produce the same effects.  
 
In the next simulation, JUDGEMAP judged a subset with restricted range in 
order to test whether the model can simulate the robust Range Effect (Parducci, 
1968), i.e., whether the grades depend on the minimal and maximal magnitudes in the 
stimulus set. 
 
6.2.2 Restricted Range 
Usually people tend to use all scale values in their judgments, i.e. the ratings of 
the stimuli in the restricted subset would capture the whole scale, not only the 
respective restricted part of it. (Parducci, 1968; Weddel, Parducci & Geiselman, 1987; 
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Parducci & Perret, 1971; Mellers & Cooke 1994). This is called a range effect. The 
purpose of this simulation is to test whether JUDGEMAP is able to reproduce it. 
Stimuli and procedure. 
Only a part of the stimuli used in the first simulation was used. From the overall 
set of 112 lines, those lines were extracted whose length exceeded 1000. Thus, only 
10 groups of line lengths were presented, with 8 stimuli in each group. The first 8 
lines had a length 100, the last 8 – 1000. The increment of length was 100. The whole 
set of lines consisted of 80 lines. The procedure remained the same – the overall set 
was judged 15 times, each time the order of the stimuli was randomly presented. 
Results and discussions. 
All effects observed in the first simulation were obtained in the second too. The 
correlation between magnitudes and ratings was 0.7941 (correct judgment), the 
standard deviation of the ratings was 1.21 (non-uniform distribution). The 
standardized regression coefficient for the previous ratings was 0.43 (sequential 
assimilation), for the previous lengths was -0.41 (contrast from the previous 
magnitude). 
The dependency of the ratings from the magnitudes is represented on fig.6.3, 
together with the respective dependency from the first simulation (‘Uniform 
distribution’) for comparison. 
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Fig.6.3. Main ratings, given by the model in two conditions – when a set of lengths varied between 100 
and 1400 (solid line), and when it varied between 100 and 1000 (dashed line). 
The mean ratings were aggregated by length and simulation. Then for each 
length (between 1 and 10) the mean ratings from the first simulation were extracted 
from the mean ratings from the second one. The received difference was tested with a 
t-test, and was found to be significantly different from zero (t(9)=4.260, mean 
difference was 0.485, p<0.003). Thus, it is shown that the model adapted the given 
rating with the range of the stimuli’s set. 
 
The received result was an expected consequence from JUDGEMAP’s work. 
The model creates hypotheses only on the basis of comparisons between magnitudes, 
and thus the ratings reflect the range of the set of stimuli. In addition, the model is 
able to create comparisons of higher order, i.e., comparisons between comparisons. 
They play an important role in the process of judgment because their work is the only 
                                                 
1 All reported correlations and regression coefficients to end of the thesis were with p<0.01. 
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mechanism in the model that takes into account the fact that judged magnitudes form 
an interval scale, not a range one.    
  
The result from the second simulation demonstrated that the model is capable of 
producing the Range Effect (Parducci, 1965). The next step was to test whether the 
model can simulate the Frequency Effect (Parducci, 1965). 
 
6.2.3 Skewed Set 
The frequency effect is observed when the stimulus set is not uniformly 
distributed but the stimuli are concentrated closer to one of the extremes. In this case, 
people’s ratings shift away from the direction of the density (Parducci & Perret, 1971; 
Wedell, Parducci & Geiselman, 1987); Cooke & Mellers, 1998). 
 
Stimuli and procedure. 
Again, the third simulation used only part of the stimuli used in the first one. 
The overall set consisted of 56 lines that separated into 14 length groups. The lengths 
in the first group had magnitude 100, in the last one – 1400. The increment of lengths 
was 100. In the first and in the second group there were 7 lines in each, in the third 
and the fourth ones - 6 lines in each, etc., in the last two groups there was one line in 
each (see table 6.5). Thus, the overall set of 56 lines was positively skewed. The 
procedure remained the same – the overall set was judged 15 times, each time the 
order of the stimuli presentation was random. 
Results and discussions. 
All of the effects observed in the first two simulations were obtained in the third 
one. The correlation between magnitudes and ratings was 0.759 (correct judgment); 
the standard deviation of the ratings was 1.23 (non-uniform distribution). The 
standardized regression coefficient for the previous ratings was 0.36 (sequential 
assimilation), for the previous lengths was -0.37 (contrast from the previous 
magnitude). 
The dependency of the ratings from the magnitudes is represented on fig.6.4, 
together with the respective dependency obtained in the first (uniform) simulation for 
comparison. The procedure for the comparison with the first simulation was the same 
as in the second simulation (‘Restricted Range). The mean ratings are aggregated for 
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Fig.6.4. Dependency of the main judgments on the length of lines in two conditions – when a 
uniformly distributed set of lengths was presented (solid line), and when a positively skewed 
set of lengths was judged (dashed line). 
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each length and for each simulation. Then the results from the first simulation 
(‘Uniform distribution’) were subtracted from those of the current one. The received 
difference was tested with t-test, and was found to be significantly different from zero 
(t(13)=6.690, mean difference was 0.511, p<0.001). 
 
The received result is a consequence of the pressure for one-to-one mapping, 
inherited by JUDGEMAP from the AMBR model of analogy-making (Kokinov, 
1994a, 1998, Kokinov & Petrov, 2001). This pressure was not included in the model 
for the sake of obtaining this contrast effect in the judgment task. However, it is 
assumed to be important for analogy–making. Thus, since JUDGEMAP is integrated 
with AMBR, the pressure for one-to-one mapping influences also the judgment 
process. 
This pressure prevented JUDGEMAP from using the same rating many times, 
and therefore it tends to use all of them an almost equal number of times. The result is 
that when a positively skewed set was judged, all stimuli were overestimated. In 
conclusion, the result from this simulation demonstrated that the model is capable of 
simulating the Frequency Effect (Parducci, 1965) as a side effect of the assumption 
that judgment is based on mapping. 
 
The next simulation was based on the ability of the model to simulate the 
frequency effect. It tested the behavior of the model when a uniform set of lines was 
judged but the set is distributed into two skewed subsets according to an irrelevant to 
the task characteristic. 
 
6.2.4 The Role of the Irrelevant Dimensions 
On the basis of the mechanisms of the JUDGEMAP model one novel prediction 
can be formulated. Because of the spreading activation the pattern of activation in the 
comparison set depended not only on the relevant to the task properties but also on 
some irrelevant ones. Suppose that the task was to judge line lengths but the lines 
were colored. Thus, the comparison set would consist of both red and green lines but 
if the target line was green, the green lines in it would be a little bit more active 
because of the additional activation that would spread through the concept ‘green’ and 
then back to the green instances. Consequently, the hypotheses that were justified by 
comparisons with green lines would have more chance to win. If the overall set was 
constructed in a manner that more often the green lines were shorter, those stronger 
hypotheses would predominantly be about the high ratings. Conversely, if more often 
the red lines were longer, then the red lines would be underestimated. Thus, lines with 
the same length would be judged with higher rating, if they were green than if they 
were red. 
Stimuli and procedure. 
Again, lengths of a set of 112 lines were judged on a 7-point scale. All lengths 
were distributed in the same way as in the simulation ‘uniform distribution’, thus 
forming uniformly distributed set. The lines were separated into 14 length groups, 
with 8 lines in each group. The first 8 lines had length 100, the last 8 – 1400. The 
increment of lengths was 100. 
However, in addition to the length, one more line property was represented with 
an additional DUAL–agent – the lines were colored, either in red or in green. The 56 
green lines formed positively skewed subset according to their length. The same lines 
used in the simulation ‘skewed set’ were green. The rest 56 lines were red. They 
formed a negatively skewed subset according to their length (see table.6.5.). 
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l engths  number  o f  the  green l ines  number  o f  the  red  l ines  
1 & 2  7  1  
3  & 4  6  2  
5  & 6  5  3  
7  & 8  4  4  
9  & 10  3  5  
11  & 12  2  6  
13  & 14  1  7  
Table. 6.5. Distribution of the stimuli used in the fourth simulation. 
The line color was irrelevant to the judgment task. The respective 
correspondence relation attached to the GOAL node required only that the longer 
lines receive higher ratings. 
All 112 lines were randomly ordered and were presented to the model 
sequentially, one by one. The procedure was repeated 57 times (varying randomly the 
ordering of the set), thus receiving totally 6384 responses from the model. 
 
Results and discussions. 
All effects observed in the first simulation remained the same. The correlation 
between magnitudes and ratings was 0.765 (correct judgment); the standard deviation 
of the ratings was 1.90 (non-uniform distribution). The standardized regression 
coefficient for the previous ratings was 0.12 (sequential assimilation), for the previous 
lengths was -0.18 (contrast from the previous magnitude). 
However, a difference in the ratings of the lines was found depending on their 
color (see fig.6.6). The mean ratings were averaged by length and color. These 
aggregated ratings were tested with Repeated Measurement Analysis and the result 
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Fig.6.6. Results from the simulation. The solid lines represent the ratings of the positively 
skewed green lines, the dashed one – the ratings of the negatively skewed red lines. 
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was that the color significantly influenced judgments (F (1,13)=3.990, p<0.05). In 
other words, a green line with the same magnitude as a red line obtained a higher 
rating. 
 
The difference, however, was very small. The mean rating of the green lines was 
4.101, whereas for the red ones - 4.025. The difference was 0.076. Moreover, the 
difference was not significant when only 15 runs of the program were performed. 
Therefore, this simulation differs from the others by the number of the runs of the 
program – 57 instead of 15 (60 runs were planed but 3 of them failed).  
 
This prediction of the model was then tested with a psychological experiment 
performed by Kokinov, Hristova & Petkov (2004). They formed a set of lines whose 
lengths were uniformly distributed. The whole set, however, was subdivided into two 
subsets according to an irrelevant for the judgment task dimension – the color of the 
lines. Half of the lines were green and they were positively skewed according to their 
length, i.e. the short green lines dominate the long green ones. Conversely, the other 
halves of the lines were red and negatively skewed. The participants had to judge the 
lengths of the whole set randomly presented. The result was that the same length was 
judged with higher rating when it was in green than when it was in red. The difference 
in the ratings was 0.046 and turned out to be significant p=0.026. Thus, the 
psychological experiment confirmed the prediction of the model that the irrelevant 
dimension (color of the line) also takes part in judgment of length. In addition, the 
psychological experiment also confirmed the small size of the effect. 
Other experiments also studied the role of the irrelevant characteristics in 
judgment and demonstrated similar results. 
For example, Marks (1988) reported “differential context effects”. He formed a 
set of sounds to be judged according to their loudness. Half of the sounds were 500Hz 
tones of a relatively low sound pressure level; the other halves were 2500Hz tones of 
relatively high sound pressure. The 70dB tones from the first half were judged to be 
as loud as the 73dB tones of the second half. The experiment was counterbalanced - in 
another group the 500Hz tones were of relatively high sound pressure, the 2500Hz 
tones, of low sound pressure. Now the 70dB tones from the first group were judged to 
be as loud as the 57dB tones from the second one. 
In similarly designed studies using horizontally and vertically oriented lines, 
Arieh & Marks (2002), Armstrong & Marks (1997) tried to find out at what level of 
the cognitive processes this effect appeared and argued that this is was a low-level 
retinal effect. The JUDGEMAP model is not currently capable of explaining 
perceptual-driven effects. However, the mechanisms that underlie it propose a natural 
explanation1 of the role of the irrelevant dimension in higher level cognitive 
processing.  
 
Thus, in a series of four simulations the influence of the stimulus distribution 
was tested. The model is sensitive to the magnitude of the stimuli, to the previously 
given ratings and to the range and frequency of the stimulus set. The model uses all 
available properties of the stimuli - both relevant and irrelevant ones to produce the 
judgment. 
The next step is to explore the behavior of JUDGEMAP when the scale varies. 
                                                 
1 Namely, the role of spreading activation in formation of the comparison set and as a result producing 
a contrast effect with the dominating set of green lines (when a green line is judged). 
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6.3 The Role of the Scale 
Wedell, Parducci & Geiselman (1987) demonstrated experimentally that the role 
of the skew of the stimulus set (frequency pressure) decreases when the number of the 
available ratings increases. In order to test whether JUDGEMAP can replicate this 
result, a uniform set and a skewed one were judged on a 3-point and on a 100-point 
scale. The used sets were the same as the two used in the previous simulations 
(‘uniform distribution’ and ’skewed set’). 
 
6.3.1 Judgment on a Three-Point Scale 
Stimuli and procedure. 
In this subsection two additional simulations are reported. The same set of 
stimuli was used – 112 lines separated into 8 length groups with 8 lines in each group 
but now the scale was a three-point one. 
First, the whole set of 112 lines was judged on a three-point scale 15 times, 
presented randomly. Second, a positively skewed subset of 56 lines was judged 15 
times on a three-point scale and again following the same procedure. 
Results and discussions. 
The results from both simulations are shown on fig.6.7. 
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Fig.6.7. Mean ratings of the length of line lines in two conditions – uniformly distributed set 
(solid line), and positively skewed set (dashed line). The judgments were on a three-point scale. 
The robust frequency effect was observed again – the distribution of the 
differences between the mean ratings for each length was significantly different from 
zero when analyzed with a t-test (t(13)=5.630, the mean difference was 0.216, 
p<0.001). 
 
In order to obtain more information, the influence of the skew when the 
judgment was on a three-point scale and when it was on a 7-point scale (simulation 
6.2.3 - ‘skewed set’) were compared. The methodology proposed by Wedell, Parducci 
& Geiselman (1987) was used to perform this comparison. For each simulation the 
data were averaged by length. Then the following formula was used: 
 
w = (Ci+ - Ci-) / (Fi+ - Fi-), where 
w is the weight of the frequency value; Ci+ and Ci- are the mean ratings given by 
the model to each length when positively and negatively sets respectively were 
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judged1; Fi+ and Fi- are the frequency values2 of the positively and negatively sets 
respectively. 
Thus, the received weight of the frequency value, averaged by length was 0.79 
(std. dev. 0.37) when judging on a three-point scale, and 0.53 (std. dev. 0.24) when 
judging on a 7-point scale. The difference was significant, analyzed with a paired t-
test (t(12)=2.18, the mean difference was 0.26, p=0.05). 
 
Why JUDGEMAP was capable to reproduce this result would be discussed 
later, after testing the behavior of the model when judging on a 100-point scale. 
 
6.3.2 Judgment on a Hundred-Point Scale 
Stimuli and procedure. 
The same two simulations were also performed using a 100-point scale. First, 
the whole set of 112 lines, randomly presented, was judged on a 100-point scale 15 
times. Second, a positively skewed subset of 56 lines was judged 15 times on a 100-
point scale following the same procedure. 
Results and discussions. 
The averaged weight of the frequency value was 0.17 (std. dev. 0.58), calculated 
using the same methodology (Wedell. Parducci & Geiselman, 1987). As mentioned 
above for a three-point scale the respective weight was 0.79, for a 7-point scale – 
0.53. All differences between these three weights were significant, analyzed with a 
paired t-test – respectively (t(12)=2.92, mean difference was 0.62, p<0.02) for a 3-
point and a 100-point scales, and (t(12)=2.91, mean difference was 0.36, p<0.02) for a 
7-point and a 100-point scales. 
 
Thus, the conclusion is that the influence of the skew on JUDGEMAP’s ratings 
increases when the scale range decreases, as demonstrated experimentally by Wedell, 
Parducci & Lane (1990). 
The mechanism responsible for this result again is the pressure for one-to-one 
mapping. However, when judging on a three-point scale the common inhibitory input 
for each hypothesis is higher in comparison with the situation when judging on a 100-
point scale. The reason for this is simple – when judging a certain stimulus on a three-
point scale, the system can create only three alternative hypotheses. However, usually 
all three available ratings have already been used many times by other instances that 
are in the WM. Consequently, when judging on a three-point scale a greater number 
of inhibitory links to each of the hypotheses would be created in comparison with the 
judgment on a 100-point scale. Thus, the relative weight of the frequency principle 
decreases when the number of the available categories increases.   
 
The next group of simulations also uses a 7-point scale. Their purpose is to test 
the behavior of the model when the so-called ‘anchors’ are presented. The anchor is a 
stimulus that is presented together with its rating. It serves as a reference point during 
judgment. The influences of extreme anchors, of anchors in the limits, and in the 
middle of the stimulus set were explored. 
 
                                                 
1 It would be redundant to simulate separately positively and negatively skewed sets. The values for the 
negatively skewed set were calculated by subtracting the difference between the skewed and the 
uniform sets from the data from the uniform set. 
2 Frequency values depend only on the stimulus distribution, not on the responses. Frequency values 
were calculated with the counting algorithm, used by Parducci & Perrett (1971). 
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6.4 The Role of the Single Contextual Stimuli 
 
Suppose that a certain stimulus connected with a certain rating via a winner 
hypothesis stays attached to the INPUT during the judgment of all set of stimuli. On 
the one hand, the activation of the respective rating label would stay permanently 
higher (because it receives activation from INPUT) and hence would produce 
assimilative pressure. Because of this assimilative pressure, the first several stimuli 
would be judged with ratings close to the anchor. On the other hand, however, this 
concentration around the respective anchor would increase the contrastive tendency 
because of the pressure for one-to-one mapping. Thus, from a long-term perspective, 
it is possible for the contrast effect to gain superiority or at least to weaken the 
assimilation. 
Several simulations explored the behavior of the model when anchors were 
attached to the INPUT node. 
 
6.4.1 Anchor outside of the Stimuli’s Range 
Stimuli and procedure. 
The stimuli, and the procedure repeated those of the first simulation – ‘uniform 
distribution’ (112 lines, distributed in 14 groups of line’s lengths, with 8 lines in each 
group, judged on 7-point scale) with only one exception – one additional line, 
together with its rating was attached at all times to the INPUT node. Thus, this 
additional stimulus was interpreted as anchor. 
In this simulation, the anchor line had length 1600, i.e. it was outside the range 
of the judged stimuli (this range was between 100 and 1400). A winner hypothesis 
between this anchor and the rating 7 was created manually. The stimulus, together 
with its rating stayed attached to INPUT all the time. The 112 lines were judged 15 
times, each time in a different, randomly selected, order. 
Results and Discussions. 
The dependency of the ratings from the magnitudes is represented on fig.6.8, 
together with the respective dependency from the simulation ‘Uniform distribution’ 
(the same stimuli without anchor) for comparison. 
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Fig.6.8. Main ratings on line length in two conditions – without anchors (solid line), and with anchor, 
whose magnitude was larger than the upper boundary of the range of the stimuli’s set (dashed line). 
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There was no significant difference between the mean ratings in the two 
conditions – with and without anchor. This may look contradictory to the range effect, 
which was illustrated in the simulation ‘restricted range’. However, in the current 
simulation the range restriction was too small and hence the size of the range effect 
disappeared. 
However, some tendencies should be noted. It is shown in fig. 6.8. that the short 
lines were underestimated, i.e. a contrast effect, according to the anchor, was 
observed. The difference between the mean ratings of the first four length sizes was 
significant (t(3)=-4.004, the mean of the differences was –0.283, p<0.029). This 
contrast effect, decreased when the length increased. 
This was due to the competition between the two opposite forces. On the one 
hand, the permanently higher activation level of the anchor ‘rating 7’ produced 
assimilation, i.e. overestimation of the ratings (this tendency was stronger for the long 
lines). On the other hand, from a long-term perspective, the same assimilative 
tendency increased the strength of the pressure for one-to-one mapping and hence 
produced contrast effect. 
 
In the next simulation, JUDGEMAP judged line lengths on a 7-point scale when 
an anchor on the boundary of the stimulus set was attached to the INPUT node. 
 
6.4.2 Anchor at the Boundary of the Stimuli’s Range 
The experimental data obtained in psychological studies turned out to be 
controversial as well, when the anchor was exactly on the boundary of the stimulus 
set. Sherif, Taub, Hovland (1958) and Parducci & Marshall (1962) received 
assimilation when they asked people to judge weights. Sarris & Parducci (1978) 
received contrast when they asked people to judge the size of squares. 
Stimuli and procedure. 
Everything remained the same with the exception that the anchor was exactly on 
the boundary of the stimuli’s range. The 113th line had length 1400, and was 
connected to the rating 7 with a winner hypothesis. This 113th line stayed attached to 
the INPUT node all the time. 
Results and Discussions. 
The dependency of the ratings from the magnitudes is represented in fig.6.9, 
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Fig.6.9. Plot of the main ratings in two conditions – without anchors (solid line), and with anchor on the 
upper boundary of the range of the stimulus set (dashed line). 
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together with the respective dependency from the simulation ‘uniform distribution’ 
(the same stimuli without anchor) for comparison. 
Again, there was no significant difference between the mean ratings in both 
conditions. However, a contrast effect appeared again when the short lines were 
judged, but now the long lines were overestimated, i.e., the result for these long lines 
could be interpreted as assimilation to the anchor. The contrast when judging the first 
four lengths was almost significant (t(3)=-2.760, the mean difference was –0.235, 
p<0.07), the assimilation when judging the last four lengths was significant 
(t(3)=11.399, the mean difference was 0.197, p<0.01). 
This result illustrated the combined contradictory influences of the spreading 
activation mechanism and the comparison-based construction of hypotheses. Looking 
at overall length’s range, neither contrast, nor assimilation could be concluded. Maybe 
this is the reason why the psychological experiments demonstrated ambiguous results 
– small shifts in both directions was observed, depending on the type of stimuli and 
the procedure. 
 
However, the results from the simulation ‘boundary anchor’ could be interpreted 
in a different way. It could be speculated that the judgments were improved, i.e., the 
ratings of short lines became lower when an anchor was presented and vice versa – 
the ratings of long lines become higher when accompanied by an anchor. This was 
tested in the following way: For each of the 15 runs of the program, the standardized 
regression coefficient of the rating depending on the length was calculated performing 
a linear regression with a single variable entering as predictor – the line length. The 
same procedure was repeated with the data from the simulation ‘uniform distribution’. 
Finally, the 15 regression coefficients from the simulation ‘anchor at the boundary’ 
were compared with the 15 regression coefficients from the simulation ‘uniform 
distribution’. The mean of the standardized regression coefficients for the ‘anchor at 
the boundary’ condition was 0.82, std.dev. 0.03; for the ‘uniform distribution 
condition – respectively 0.77, std.dev. 0.06. The difference was significant 
(F(1,28)=10.06 , p<0.01). 
 
The interpretation that anchors ‘improve’ judgment makes sense – it shouldn’t 
come as a surprise that the presentation of anchors helps judgments. In terms of 
JUDGEMAP, the higher the number of ‘correct’ hypotheses that stay in the WM, the 
higher the probability of the system finding out the current ‘correct’ answer. 
However, in order to test this new hypothesis, namely that the anchors improve 
judgments, one simulation in which the anchor was in the middle of the stimulus 
range was made. In addition, a psychological experiment was performed, which tested 
whether the anchors improve judgments.   
 
6.4.3 Anchor in the Middle of the Stimuli’s Range 
Stimuli and procedure. 
Everything remained the same with the exception that the anchor was exactly in 
the middle of the stimuli’s range. The 113th line had length 800, and was connected to 
the rating 4 with a winner hypothesis. 
Results and Discussions. 
The dependency of the ratings from the magnitudes is represented on fig.6.10, 
together with the respective dependency from the simulation ‘uniform distribution’ 
(the same stimuli without anchor) for comparison. 
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A clear contrast effect was observed. All short lines were underestimated, 
whereas all long lines were overestimated. The difference between the mean ratings 
with and without anchor was positive for the lengths between 8 and 14, and negative 
for lengths between 1 and 7. Thus, the total shift away from the anchor was 
significant (t(13)=8.94, the mean difference was 0.37, p<0.01). 
 
The standardized regression coefficients were compared with the respective 
ones from the simulation ‘uniform distribution’, following the procedure from the 
previous simulation. The mean standardized regression coefficients for the ‘anchor in 
the middle’ condition were 0.90, std.dev. 0.02; and for the ‘uniform distribution 
condition – respectively 0.77, std.dev. 0.06. The difference was significant (F 
(1,28)=69.05, p<0.01). 
 
This result, together with the results from the previous simulation, is in favor of 
the hypothesis that presentation of anchors improves judgments. This hypothesis is 
intuitively clear but, nevertheless, it is necessary to test it with a psychological 
experiment. 
 
6.4.4 Psychological Experiment 1 – Anchoring 
Stimulus material 
A set of 56 lines segment was used. They were distributed into 14 length groups, 
with 4 lines in each group. The shortest lines were 7 pixels, the longest ones – 410 
pixels, with increment 31 pixels. Thus, the longest lines were almost as long as half of 
the screen’s width. The lines were projected in red color on gray background on 17” 
PC monitor. 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three parts, the order of which varied randomly.  
The first part (named control part) consisted of 56 trials – participants had to 
judge all 56 lines on a 7-point scale sequentially, in a random order.  
The second part (named middle-anchor part) again consisted of 56 trials but at 
each trial two lines were projected. The line on the right side of the screen was from 
length group 8, i.e. the middle line and was marked with the number 4. Participants 
were instructed to judge the line on the left side on a 7-point scale, having in mind 
that the right line is a prototype for the rating 4. All 56 lines were presented on the left 
side in a random order. 
Fig.6.10. Plot of the mean ratings in two conditions – without anchors (solid line), and with anchor in the 
middle of the range of the stimulus set (dashed line). 
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The third part (named boundary-anchor part) was exactly like the second one, 
with the only difference that the line on the right side was the longest one (length 
group 14) and was marked with the number 7. 
For each subject, the order of the three parts varied randomly, in order to 
distribute the effect of learning. 
Participants 
6 voluntary students from New Bulgarian University participated in the 
experiment. 
Results and Discussions 
The overall distribution of the ratings is illustrated on fig.6.11. 
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Fig. 6.11. The results from Psychological Experiment I – Anchoring. The mean ratings for the control 
condition (without anchors) are presented with a dashed black curve, the mean ratings from the condition 
‘anchor 4’ (see text for details) are presented with a solid black curve, and the mean ratings for the condition 
‘anchor 7’ – with a dashed gray curve. 
 
The slopes of the three curves were of special interest. Thus, the procedure from 
the previous two simulations was repeated. The standardized regression coefficients 
for the dependency of judgments on lengths were calculated for each subject and each 
part of the experiment. There were three such regression coefficients for each subject 
– one for each part of the experiment, named respectively control, middle-anchor, and 
boundary anchor coefficients. The mean regression coefficients were respectively 
0.95, std.dev 0.014 for the control condition, 0.98, std.dev 0.009 for the middle-
anchor condition, and 0.97, std.dev 0.007 for the boundary-anchor condition. Two 
pairs of coefficients were compared with Repeated Measurement Analysis. On the 
one hand, the coefficients from the middle-anchor condition were significantly 
different from those of the control condition (F(1,5)=8.61, p<0.033). On the other 
hand, the coefficients from the boundary-anchor condition were also significantly 
different from those of the control condition (F(1,5)=10.44, p<0.024). 
 
The results allow the conclusion that the regression coefficients increase when 
an anchor is presented compared to judgments without anchors. This means that 
presentation of anchors improves judgments and thus the predictions of simulations 
‘anchor on the boundary’ and ‘anchor in the middle’ were confirmed. 
However, the results from the experiment did not replicate quantitatively the 
results from the simulations. All empirical regression coefficients were higher than 
the corresponding ones from the simulations. Thus, people were more precise in their 
judgments than the simulation. One possible reason could be the fact that people have 
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much more previous experience. Even without being able to predict the exact 
quantities in the empirical data, JUDGEMAP predicted the qualitative tendencies, e.g. 
the tendency to improve judgments when anchors are presented. 
 
In the next simulation, again two stimuli were given simultaneously to the 
model. However, neither of them was anchored. Instead, both of the stimuli were 
marked as target ones and thus the task of the model was to judge them both.  
 
6.4.5 Simultaneously Judgment of Two Stimuli 
Stimuli and procedure. 
The same set of 112 lines was judged on 7-point scale. The difference was that 
the stimuli were judged in pairs. The whole set was randomly separated into 56 pairs, 
and the lines in each pair were given simultaneously as target to the system. The 
model gave its responses at unspecified times – when it was ready with one of the 
lines, it gave its rating, and continued with the other one. The whole procedure was 
repeated 15 times, each times the pairs and their order was randomly selected. 
Results and Discussions. 
The correlation between the lengths and the ratings was 0.878 (p<0.001), e.g. 
the model was able to deal with such a task: to judge simultaneously more than one 
stimulus. 
In order to obtain more information, however, the influence of one of the stimuli 
in each pair on the judgment of the other stimulus was tested. The mean ratings for 
each length were calculated, and then from each single judgment the correspondent 
mean rating was subtracted, thus the deviation from the mean rating was calculated. 
The dependency of the received deviation from the second stimulus’s length in the 
pair is presented in fig.6.12. 
It can be seen from fig.6.12. that when the contextual stimulus was short, the 
ratings were overestimated, and vice versa – when the second line in the pair was 
long, the ratings were underestimated. This tendency was calculated numerically – the 
correlation between the calculated difference and the other line in each pair was 
negative, namely -0.277, p<0.01. 
This result could be interpreted as unambiguous contrast effect with respect to 
the second stimulus in the pair. The source of this contrast in JUDGEMAP was the 
fact that in all cases a comparison between the two stimuli in each pair was performed 
(the two target stimuli were the most active ones). 
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Fig.6.12. Mean shift of the ratings, depending on the magnitude of judged simultaneously 
stimuli. 
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Because the experimental results from experiments with similar design are 
contradictory – some obtain contrast, others - assimilation, a psychological 
experiment was conducted with the same stimulus material as in the simulation (we 
did not find psychological experiments with lines on simultaneous presentation of two 
stimuli. Anderson has obtained assimilation but he used human faces as stimuli and it 
is possible that other factors related to the instruction played a role in obtaining this 
result). 
 
6.4.6 Psychological Experiment 2 – Simultaneous Judgments 
Stimulus material 
A set of 112 line’s segment was used. They were distributed into 14 length 
groups, with 8 lines in each group. The shortest lines were 7 pixels, the longest ones – 
410 pixels, with increment 31 pixels. Thus, the longest lines are almost as long as the 
half of the screen’s width. The lines were projected with red color on gray 
background on 17” monitor. 
Procedure 
The participants have to judge two lines on each trial – the first one was on the 
left side of the monitor, the second one – on the right side. The instruction was to 
judge the lengths of both lines on 7-point scale, and to report their ratings in any order 
they chose – immediately after they were ready with one of the lines, they had to 
report its rating. 
Participants 
6 students from New Bulgarian University participated in the experiment 
voluntarily, without payment. 
Results and Discussions 
First, the mean ratings for each participant and for each length were calculated. 
Then, from each single answer the mean ratings for the corresponding participant and 
length was subtracted. Then the correlation between the received difference and the 
length of the other line in the pair was calculated. This correlation was negative, 
namely –0.133, p<0.01, which gave us reason to conclude that contrast effect 
appeared. This result was consistent with the prediction of JUDGEMAP from the 
simulation ‘simultaneous judgment’. However, because of the low value of the 
correlation coefficient, an additional experiment should be performed in order to test 
whether the negative correlation is robust. 
 
The behavior of JUDGEMAP was tested when the distribution of the stimulus 
set varied, when the scale type varied, and when different contextual stimuli were 
added to the representation of the stimuli and the task. In all the cases the stimuli were 
simple – lines with different lengths (and possibly colors). The next step was to test 
the model with more complicated stimuli – when more than one dimension should be 
taken into account in the judgment task. 
 
6.5 Judgment of Two-Dimensional Stimuli 
 
6.5.1 Correlated Magnitudes 
The items, given for judgment to JUDGEMAP in this simulation represent 
students. Each student had two exam scores and on the basis of these two scores the 
model had to judge the overall performance of the students. 
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Each student was represented with a head DUAL agent, connected to two its 
aspect – respectively its two exam scores. The correspondence relation attached to the 
GOAL represent the information that better students had to receive higher ratings. 
The concept ‘better student’ had two subclasses – comparison-relations respectively 
for higher score at the first exam, and higher score at the second exam. The scale, on 
which the students were judged, was again from 1 to 7. 
The scores from both exams varied between 10 and 140. The two scores for 
each student correlated, i.e. if a student had a lower score at the first exam, he/she also 
had a lower score at the second one, and vice versa. 
Totally 112 students, randomly ordered, were judged sequentially. The 
procedure was repeated 15 times, each time with a different random order of the 
stimuli. 
Result and Discussions 
The correlation between the score from the first exam and the given ratings was 
0.780, i.e. the model was able to deal with more than one dimension. 
The distribution of the ratings again was non-uniform – their standard deviation 
was 1.39 (min 1.26, max 1.51, std. dev. 0.07 on the aggregated for the runs of the 
program data) with expected for uniform distribution 2.03. 
Sequential assimilation effect was also observed. The standardized regression 
coefficient for the previous ratings was 0.44 (sequential assimilation), for the previous 
lengths was -0.42 (contrast from the previous magnitude). 
Thus, the simulation demonstrated that JUDGEMAP is able to make judgments 
of complex stimuli, using more than one relevant dimension. The next simulation 
tested whether the frequency effect would appear when a skewed set of two-
dimensional stimuli was judged. 
 
6.5.2 Skewed Set of Two-Dimensional Stimuli 
Design 
In this simulation, part of the stimuli, designed for the previous simulation, was 
used, forming a positively skewed subset. Eight students with scores 10 at both 
exams, eight students with score 20, seven ones with scores 30 and 40, etc., one 
student with score 130, and one with score 140 (a total of 56 students), were judged in 
random order. The procedure was repeated 15 times, varying the order of the 
presentation. 
Results and Discussions 
The mean ratings for each score were compared with those from the previous 
simulation. The results are shown in fig.6.13. 
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Fig.6.13. Mean ratings of the students’ performance in two conditions – uniformly 
distributed set (solid line), and positively skewed set (dashed line)
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The difference between the mean ratings in the two simulations for each score 
was estimated with t-test (t(13)=8.21, the mean difference was 0.59, p<0.01). 
The overall significant overestimation of the ratings pointed to contrast effect 
from the skew of the stimuli’s distribution, exactly as is predicted by the Frequency 
Principle (Parducci & Perret, 1971). 
 
6.5.3 Negatively Correlated Magnitudes 
Often in everyday life people face stimuli that have two negatively correlated 
dimensions. For example, in the so-called trade-off judgments, one needs to estimate 
products that have a kind of benefit and a kind of price. In addition, lower benefits 
correspond to lower prices, and vice versa. 
The next simulation tests the behavior of JUDGEMAP in a similar situation. 
Design 
In this simulation, the judged stimuli were different cheeses that vary in their 
price and quality. The correlation between the two dimensions, however, was 
negative. The cheeses with higher quality were more expensive, those with lower 
quality – cheaper. The magnitude of each quality was represented with a whole 
number between 100 and 1400. There were 14 different quality magnitudes – from 
100 to 1400 with increment 100. The cheeses with quality 100 had price 1, these with 
quality 200 had price 2, etc., the cheeses with quality 1400 had price 14. The task of 
the model was to rate each cheese on a 7-point scale, with constrains that higher 
qualities should correspond to higher ratings, and that higher prices should correspond 
to lower ratings. Thus, a natural trade-off judgment situation was simulated. 
Again, the whole judged set consisted of 112 stimuli, with 8 in each group. 
Again, the procedure was repeated 15 times, varying randomly the order of the 
presentation 
Result and Discussions. 
There were no correlations neither between the ratings and prices, nor between 
the ratings and qualities. In other words, the task was too ambiguous – the price and 
the quality of each cheese justified different hypotheses, and thus the competition in 
the constraint satisfaction network was extremely cruel. Each hypothesis was 
inhibited from too many competitors, and, consequently, the activation received from 
its elements influences judgment with a relatively lower degree. Thus, the sequential 
assimilation disappeared, and was even inversed. The standardized regression 
coefficient for the previous ratings was –0.17 (p<0.01), for the previous lengths it was 
not significant, i.e. a sequential contrast effect was observed. 
In order to check this prediction of the model, additional experiments were 
designed. One problem, however, arose – people are very confused when they have to 
judge such type of stimuli on a numerical scale. Some people use only one dimension, 
neglecting totally the other one. Others give to all stimuli one and the same rating 
(usually after long thinking). Thus, the data were not valid. However, additional 
experiments that could test this prediction of the model should be designed. 
 
6.6 Choice 
 
The last simulation tests the capability of JUDGEMAP-2 to make choices, using 
the same mechanisms as in the judgment task. An experiment by Shafir, Siminson & 
Tversky (1993) served for a template for this simulation. They asked people to choose 
between two gambles on the basis of their probability to win, and the amount of the 
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possible profit. Always one of the gambles was with higher profit but with lower 
probability. With series of pretests, they found out two psychologically equal 
gambles, i.e. half of the people chose the first one, and the other half – the second one. 
After that, the authors asked another group of people to choose between three 
alternative gambles – the same two, together with a third one, which was dominated 
by the first one according to both dimensions, and was dominated by the second one 
according to only one of the dimensions. The result was that now more people choose 
the first gamble than the second one. 
An analogical situation was tested with JUDGEMAP.  
Stimuli and procedure. 
Two gambles, named A and B were designed. The probability of A was 
randomly chosen to be between 0.51 and 0.99, and the profit was randomly chosen to 
be between 1 and 49. Then the probability and the profit of the gamble B were chosen 
to be respectively between 0.1 and 0.49, and between 51 and 99 (see fig.6.14). 
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Fig.6.14. Relative positions of the stimuli, used in simulation for testing choice making. 
One more stimulus, named O was added. Its probability and profit were always 
zero. Without it, the system would be unaware of the range of the given magnitudes. 
Recall that the model captures the absolute range with comparisons of second order. 
The procedure of creating stimuli was repeated 100 times, varying randomly the 
exact value of the probability and the profit of each gamble, but keeping their relative 
position. Thus, a hundred different knowledge bases were created and the model was 
run on each one of them. The task of the model was to judge simultaneously the three 
gambles on 2-point scale. In addition, the :t-driver tag was given not to the stimuli, 
but to the rating 2. Thus, only the highest rating (rating 2) could promote winner 
hypotheses. The winner hypothesis for rating 2 was interpreted as an answer of the 
system. 
 
After the runs over all 100 knowledge bases (KB), a fourth gamble C was added 
to each KB. Its values for probability and profit were randomly chosen, satisfying the 
constraints that its probability should always be lower than that of gamble B, and its 
profit should always be between the profits of A and B. The task of the system was to 
judge simultaneously the four stimuli, following the same procedure for choice. Again 
100 runs under each KB were performed. 
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All procedures were repeated 10 times in order for the results to be tested 
statistically. 
Results. 
When choosing between O, A, and B, the system picked up A 49.30 times on 
the average (out of 100 runs), and B – 50.70 times. In the second session, when the 
choice was between four alternatives, JUDGEMAP preferred A 36.80 times, B – 
60.30 times, and C – 2.90 times. The existence of the alternative C turned out to be a 
significant factor for the number of choices of A and B, tested with ANOVA analysis 
(respectively, F(1,18)=44.828, p<0.01 for A; and F(1,18)=34.525, p<0.01 for B). 
Thus, JUDGEMAP replicated the results obtained by Shafir, E., Siminson, I., 
Tversky, A. (1993), and demonstrated that the same mechanisms could be used for the 
tasks of judgment and choice. 
 
6.7 Summary of the Simulations 
 
Many simulations were performed with JUDGEMAP in order to test its 
behavior when judging different stimuli, in different contexts, and with different 
scales. 
The results showed that the model is capable of judging one- or multi-
dimensional stimuli, on various scales. The same mechanisms could also be used for 
making choices. JUDGEMAP reproduces sequential assimilation effect, Range and 
Frequency effects, the effect of non-uniform distribution of the ratings, even when the 
stimuli are uniformly distributed. It also reproduces various contrast effects when 
anchors are presented together with the judged stimuli. 
The model made several predictions that were experimentally tested and 
confirmed. The not so obvious and even strange prediction that JUDGEMAP made 
was that people do not neglect the role of the irrelevant dimensions in judgment. 
Instead, the model produced small shifts in judgments, depending on these irrelevant 
properties, and this prediction was confirmed by a psychological experiment. 
The model gives rise to the observed fact that the role of the Frequency principle 
increases when the number of the scale labels decreases. 
It is able to judge more than one stimulus simultaneously. A simulation, 
performed with such design made a prediction that was tested experimentally and was 
confirmed. 
Finally, JUDGEMAP is able to use the same mechanisms to make choice, and 
replicates the results, proposed and tested by the theory for Reason – Based Choice 
(Shafir, Siminson & Tversky, 1993). 
 
6.8 JUDGEMAP and the Other Models of Judgment 
 
Various descriptive theories of judgment are discussed in literature. 
JUDGEMAP shares some ideas with many of them. For example, it assumes that one 
of the basic mechanisms in judgment is the creation of comparisons between the 
target stimulus and similar ones, like the two-Path Model (Manis & Paskewitz, 1984) 
and the theory for Comparison-Based Judgments (Mussweiler 2003). JUDGEMAP is 
also similar to the Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) with respect to the fact 
that both assume that memory is constructive. From a connectionist point of view 
JUDGEMAP is a localist neural network and from this perspective, it is close to the 
Change of Meaning Approach (Wyer, 1974).  
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I believe that that some descriptive theories that focus on aspects that were not 
treated in this dissertation (like perception and categorization processes) could also be 
integrated with DUAL architecture and particularly with the JUDGEMAP model in 
the future. Examples of such theories are Perceptual Learning Theory (Goldstone, 
1998), and Integration Theory (Anderson, 1971). 
 
JUDGEMAP differs, however, from all descriptive theories in that it proposes 
concrete cognitive mechanisms and algorithms for judgment. Thus, the behavior of 
the model can be tested more precisely, and novel predictions can be proposed and 
tested experimentally. 
 
JUDGEMAP can be compared with normative theories and with other 
computational models based on the results from their simulations. 
Some theories from this group predict either always assimilation, or always 
contrast. For example, Range–Frequency Model (Parducci, 1965) predicts only 
contrast, whereas Adaptation Level Theory (Helson, 1964) – only assimilation. 
JUDGEMAP is able simultaneously to demonstrate both assimilation and contrast 
tendencies depending on the conditions of the simulations. 
The ANCHOR model (Petrov & Anderson, 2000) is capable of demonstrating 
various effects, for example sequential assimilation, and non-uniform distribution of 
the judgments. It also models the learning processes and the task for categorization – 
two related capabilities, which JUDGEMAP cannot simulate in its current version. 
However, JUDGEMAP does not put any a priori limitations on the type of scale or on 
the complexity of the judged stimuli, as ANCHOR does. JUDGEMAP also elaborates 
the role of the irrelevant dimensions in the judgment process, and the possibility to 
use the same mechanisms in judgment and choice tasks. 
 
Finally, in my opinion, the key innovation of JUDGEMAP is that it integrates 
the mechanisms that underlie judgment and choice on the one hand, and analogy-
making on the other, in a single whole, using a common cognitive architecture and 
underlying mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Shortcomings and Future Work 
 
 
7.1 Main Problems 
 
The simulations, performed by JUDGEMAP, demonstrate many of the 
capabilities of the model. 
However, one problem of the model is that it has no perception. Attaching 
different manually created stimuli on the INPUT node only mimics it. The 
magnitudes of the judged properties are predefined and filled as real numbers in 
special slots. This procedure, however, is not psychologically plausible. If the model 
has to be augmented with perceptual mechanisms for self-creation of the agent’s 
micro-frames, its behavior would be more flexible than it currently is. 
A second problem of JUDGEMAP is that the concepts are not dynamic enough. 
Their micro-frames are too frozen and do not reflect to a satisfactory extent the 
relevance of their features. One step in this direction was made by JUDGEMAP by 
using temporary links from the concept–agents to their most relevant instances. In 
order for the process of categorization to become more plausible, however, additional 
work in this direction is necessary. 
Finally, the simulations, performed with JUDGEMAP do not highlight all its 
capabilities. Additional simulations for judging multi-dimensional stimuli are needed. 
In the fields of choice and decision-making only first steps were performed and the 
model has not been explored enough. 
 
7.2 Perception 
 
Goldstone (1995) demonstrated how people’s perception influence judgments. 
He received both assimilation and contrast effects depending on the degree of 
similarity between the target and the contextual stimuli. Arieh & Marks (2002) found 
out that some contrast effects appear at the level of retina. Lockhead (1992) 
demonstrated that all cognitive levels of the judgment process produce sequential 
assimilation effect. 
None of these experiments could be replicated by JUDGEMAP-2. Additional 
perceptual mechanisms should be integrated in the model in order to do so. 
However, JUDGEMAP, together with DUAL architecture, exerts some 
constraints on these eventual mechanisms. 
First, these mechanisms should be integrated with DUAL, and should be 
applicable to all models, based on DUAL. 
Second, the perceptual mechanisms should not precede the other ones, but 
should be overlapped with them. One of the assumptions behind DUAL is that 
cognition is a continuous process. All mechanisms work in parallel and influence each 
other. Thus, the eventual perceptual mechanisms should influence the other ones, but 
the higher level processes should also influence perception. 
Third, the relevance of the various objects, features, and relations should be 
reflected in perception. The more relevant items should be perceived faster and better, 
the less relevant ones – more slowly and only in broad strokes. However, the 
relevance may not be the only driving force for attention. Some items may be more 
 91
salient. Moving objects, vivid colors, and other features also attract the attention, and 
this should be captured by the perceptual mechanisms. 
Fourth, in order to be consistent with DUAL principles, perceptions should be 
emergent processes – without any central executors or controllers 
First steps in this direction were made by Nestor (2004), who modeled 
representations, derived from visual stimuli in the TextWorld micro-domain. The 
model combines low-level parallel computations with DUAL’s semantic memory. 
However, additional work to fully integrate the model with DUAL is needed. 
 
7.3 Categorization (Recognition) 
 
In DUAL architecture terms, to categorize an item means to fill its :inst-of slot 
of its respective agent with a reference to a concept–agent. In order for this process to 
become psychologically plausible, several constraints have to be satisfied. 
First, recognition should be a context–sensitive process. The same item can be 
categorized in different ways in different contexts. One possible starting point is to 
think about the categorization process as a result of mapping. Different concepts 
compete with each other to capture a new instance, and this competition reflects the 
current relevance of the concepts and the current relevance of the justifications for 
each possible categorization. An example of recognition is implemented in 
JUDGEMAP, using a different starting point. The comparison-relations actively seek 
their manifestations and create their temporary instances. 
Second, the content of the concepts changes dynamically in response to the 
environment and the current goals. This is not implemented yet in DUAL architecture 
to the required extend. The weights of the links from the agents to their different 
aspects should change dynamically in response to the relevance of these aspects. 
Third, eventual augmentation of JUDGEMAP with such mechanisms should 
give rise to the ‘hallo’ effect (Anderson, 1971), and to the expectation–driven 
assimilation (Manis & Paskewitz, 1984) in judgment task. 
Goldstone (1988) proposes four possible mechanisms for integration of 
perceptions and categorization – intentional weighting, stimulus imprinting, 
differentiation, and unitization. A careful implementation of some of these principles 
into computational mechanisms could serve as a basis for modeling these processes. 
 
7.4 Additional Simulations for Multi-Attribute Judgments and 
Choice 
 
Even using only the currently implemented mechanisms, more extensive testing 
of JUDGEMAP can be performed. 
Cooke et al (2004) demonstrated that under special circumstances when people 
make trade-off judgments, greater preference to the stimuli in the middle of the set’s 
range could be observed (an inversed U-shape curve). New simulations with 
JUDGEMAP can be performed in order to test the behavior of the model when a task 
for trade-off judgments is presented. 
The work on the topic of choice is just the beginning. JUDGEMAP is based on 
mechanisms that may capture many of the phenomena, observed in the field of 
choice, but much work has to be done in that direction. 
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) propose several heuristics, on which people base 
their judgments and choices. Representativeness is an assessment of the 
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correspondence between instances and categories; availability reflects how easily the 
system finds instances of a certain category; anchoring and adjustment are 
mechanisms for creating starting points for judgments and adjusting them to reach a 
final answer. Tversky (1972) and Shafir, E., Siminson, I., Tversky, A. (1993) propose 
the theory for Reason–Based Choice, which highlights the importance of the 
justifications when choosing a certain alternative. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
demonstrate the role of the context in judgment and choice. 
The work of JUDGEMAP is based on comparisons between the target stimulus 
and memory traces, and this is in synchrony with the availability heuristic. The 
comparisons serve for creating justifications for alternative hypotheses and thus the 
model implements the ideas for reason–based choice and for anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics. Finally, one of the main principles in all DUAL-based models 
is context–sensitivity, thus giving rise to the role of prospect in decision–making. 
However, all these phenomena should be carefully modelled and tested with 
many additional simulations. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Main Ideas of the JUDGEMAP Model 
 
A model for judgment, JUDGEMAP, based on the cognitive architecture DUAL 
was presented. 
It proposes a new approach – it treats judgment as a process of mapping 
between a dynamic comparison set and the set of available ratings. The model inherits 
the basic principles of DUAL, and many of the mechanisms of AMBR model for 
analogy–making. The results, reported by JUDGEMAP emerge from the common 
work of several overlapping processes. 
The Working Memory is formed by the spreading activation. The activation 
level of each single unit represents its relevance to the current context. The overall 
pattern of activation changes continuously in response to the environment and the 
current goals. 
Some of the relations actively seek and create their new instances due to a kind 
of recognition process. These relations represent comparisons between items. 
Correspondence relations create justifications for new correspondences between 
stimuli and ratings. Their work reflects the constraints for homomorphism, defined in 
the judgment task. 
The justification agents combine the work of several agents and create new 
hypotheses for correspondences or justify old ones. 
At the end, the hypotheses are organized in a constraint satisfaction network, 
and the final result emerges from its relaxation. 
 
8.2 Contributions of this Thesis 
 
A model of judgment has been proposed and implemented. The model is based 
and integrated within the general cognitive architecture DUAL. Simulation 
experiments have been performed with the computer program. 
 
JUDGEMAP integrates judgment with analogy-making, proposing that the same 
mechanisms may underlie both of them. In addition, it demonstrates that the same 
mechanisms could potentially be used for making choice. 
 
JUDGEMAP replicates many of the results, observed in various experiments. It 
gives rise to sequential assimilation effect, to range and frequency principles, to the 
role of the irrelevant dimensions. The type of the stimuli and the scale does not limit 
the work of the model. It is capable of reproducing various contrastive effects with 
respect to some contextual elements. In addition, by changing the items assumed to 
have the driving role, the model demonstrates that it is able to make a choice between 
alternatives. It replicates some contextual effects, observed in people’s choices. 
The model made several predictions about new (yet unknown) psychological 
phenomena. Three of the model’s predictions were tested with psychological 
experiment and confirmed – the influence of irrelevant features on the judgment 
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outcome, contrast effects were observed when judging two line’s lengths 
simultaneously, and that anchors improve the precision of judgment. 
 
8.3 Open Issues and Future Research 
 
JUDGEMAP is just at an intermediate stage in the long-term DUAL-research 
program. 
 
First, many more simulations could be performed with the existing version of 
the model. The influences of the time delays between some contextual manipulations 
and judgments could be explored in more detail. Various simulations with priming 
could be tested. Much more complex stimuli could be given to the model in order for 
its behaviour to be tested. 
It was demonstrated that the mechanisms of JUDGEMAP could be used for 
making choices. However, this is only the starting point for the essential work in this 
direction. 
Testing of the model requires psychological experiments, too. For example, 
JUDGEMAP makes the prediction that the sequential effect disappears and even 
reverses in one special case of trade-off judgments. This prediction could be tested 
empirically. 
 
A great challenge will be to add capabilities for perception and categorisation in 
DUAL. All models, based on the architecture, are subject to some constraints. In the 
least, these models should be integrated with JUDGEMAP. 
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